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July 2019
En tant que dans le Parménide L’opérateur qua permet d’indiquer sous quel rapport quelque chose est dit de quelque chose d’autre ; il peut être exprimé par exemple par le datif grec ᾗ ou l’expression française « en tant que » (voir Bäck: 1996). Dans sa somme consacrée aux propriétés logiques de cet opérateur, Allan Bäck commence par les Premiers Analytiques d’Aristote et mentionne à peine Platon. Cette omission s’accorde avec l’interprétation de commentateurs comme Grégory Vlastos qui estiment que le type de rapports introduit par l’opérateur en tant que est tout simplement incompatible avec les Formes platoniciennes : puisque une Forme F est supposée être toujours F et jamais non-F (voir, par exemple, Banquet 211a), on voit mal en effet comment elle pourrait être dite F sous un certain rapport et non-F sous un autre (Vlastos : 1981). Même dans le Sophiste où Platon soutient que les Formes sont stables car elles sont [...]
Find out morePrädikationen pros heauto im Parmenides als Aussagen über die Struktur von Ideen Constance Meinwald hat mit ihrer Monographie „Plato’s Parmenides“ (1991) eine neuartige Interpretation des gesamten Dialogs vorlegt, die sich hauptsächlich auf dessen zweiten Teil bezieht. Sie vertritt darin die Auffassung, dass die Konklusionen aller acht Ableitungen im zweiten Dialogteil einander nicht widersprechen, sondern dass mit allen acht Konklusionen von ein und demselben Gegenstand, dem Einen (bzw. der Idee Einheit, to hen), Kompatibles ausgesagt wird. Ihre Argumentation beruht auf der Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Prädikationsarten, Prädikationen in Bezug auf anderes (pros ta alla) und Prädikationen in Bezug auf das Subjekt der Prädikation selbst (pros heauto). Die Unterscheidung sei dazu geeignet, aufzuzeigen, dass die Konklusionen aller acht Ableitungen im zweiten Teil wahre und konsistente Aussagen über denselben Gegenstand enthalten, und sie sollen eine Möglichkeit eröffnen, die Argumente des Dritten Menschen im ersten Teil des Parmenides zu parieren. Der Vortrag geht von Meinwalds [...]
Find out moreApparence et ressemblance dans le Parménide : les limites de l’image. (Dialectique de l’apparence et aporie de la ressemblance) Le Parménide présente, dans ses deux dernières hypothèses (plus précisément, dans ses deux dernières « séries de déductions » : 164b5-165e1, 165e2-166c2) un usage systématique des termes d’apparaître (phainesthai) ou d’apparence (phantasma). On étudiera ici le sens et le statut propre à cet usage, qui semble, chez Platon, tout à fait singulier (la singularité s’expliquant en grande partie par la dimension dialectique du raisonnement). I/ La signification de cet apparaître semble à première vue irréductible à d’autres emplois platoniciens du registre du phainesthai. On étudiera donc la spécificité de la relation entre être et apparaître dans le cas précis du jeu dialectique des hypothèses. Cependant, la question se pose aussi de savoir dans quelle mesure les développements sur ce qu’est l’apparence à la fin du Parménide peuvent être éclairés par d’autres dialogues, [...]
Find out moreEnigmatique exaiphnès De l’ensemble relativement réduit d’occurrences du terme exaiphnes dans les dialogues de Platon (36 occurrences réparties en 9 dialogues auxquels s’ajoute l’occurrence de la Lettre VII), les lignes que lui consacre le Parménide (156 c-e) sont parmi les plus célèbres et le lien de l’un et du temps fait l’objet dans ce dialogue de l’une des plus belles pages consacrées, comme dans le Timée, aux formes que peut prendre le temps. Les études récentes (Brisson-Décarie 1987) montrent clairement que cette section du Parménide (155 e 4 – 157 b 5) ne constitue pas une troisième hypothèse autonome, mais examine les conséquences de la série des déductions qui la précèdent, comme le rappelle Parménide quand il dit : « si l’un est, comme nous l’avons déjà exposé ». Ce n’est pas pour autant qu’elle doit être considérée comme un simple appendice dont l’importance n’est pas significative (Graeser 1999 et plus généralement sur [...]
Find out moreThe Problem of Separation in Plato’s Parmenides The Platonic Forms are often characterized as from the sensible objects separately existing entities. The separation is hence one of the most well-known features of Plato’s ontology. In Phaedo, Socrates asserts that the soul as an ontological entity is not the same as the body (Phaedo 80a-b), and the death means the liberation and the separation of the soul from the body (λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος) (Phaedo 67e-d, 80e). This kind of ontological difference between the sensible and the intellectual world will be repeatedly stressed in Republic (514a ff.) and some other middle dialogues. Nevertheless, it is still controversial if the separation of Forms brings Plato troubles in his later dialogues. In the first half of Parmenides, six arguments are introduced to criticize Plato’s theory of Form. It is remarkable that this passage (Parmenides 130a-134e) begins with the problem of separation, [...]
Find out moreThe Eleatic gymnasia In this paper, I discuss the classical problem about the valence of the exercise recommended by Parmenides to Socrates. In Parm. 135b5-137c3 we find the bridge between the first and the second part of the dialogue, which establishes the educational valence of the method displayed in the second part as an answer to Socrates' aporia in the first part. In these lines, Parmenides said that Socrates should be trained in the method that would make him able to "define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all other ideas", which is dialectic as the method of the hypotheses. But why does dialectics is also depicted as a mere exercise (γυμνασία) of babbling (ἀδολεσχία)? Why should it be beneficial for the young? Is its function just propedeutic, or does it possess an epistemic valence? These questions are not just contextual to the Parmenides. These questions are problematic if [...]
Find out moreThe One and Time: Parmenides 151e-153a In what is traditionally called the Second Hypothesis, Parmenides presents a series of deductions meant to contradict the opposite deductions in the First Hypothesis. In this paper, we will focus on the deduction in the Second Hypothesis which draws out the consequences of the one’s partaking of being, where partaking of being implies partaking of time. While, in the First Hypothesis, Parmenides denies that the one partakes of time, now he supposes that it does. In an elaborate, but careful argument, he draws two conclusions, which contradict one another. First, he concludes that: (III.12) The one always both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself.[1] Second, he concludes that: (IV.4) Since the one is or comes to be for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself, it neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself. [...]
Find out moreThe Absence of Perception. An Examination on Likeness in Plato’s Parmenides The absence of perception in Plato’s Parmenides seems evident. This is foreshadowed by the weighty roles of two Eleatic philosophers—Parmenides and Zeno—and their method of deduction in the dialogue. Zeno’s book is read as the philosophical setting for this fictional dialogue. (127c-d) According to Socrates’ summary, Zeno uses a contradiction that things are “both like and unlike (ὅμοιὰ τε … καὶ ἀνόμοια)” to reject the assumption “things are many.” (127e2) The form of argument is what we called Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA). The validity of an RAA argument does not have to appeal to premises in which perception is involved. A feature shown by Zeno’s argument as the typical Eleatic style is to apply RAA without appealing to any perceptible fact of the physical world. This feature is particularly observable in the deductions practiced by a Socrates’ contemporary fellow [...]
Find out moreHomonymy and Likeness in Plato’s Parmenides It is generally agreed that in the Parmenides Plato tackled several theoretical difficulties entailed in the theory of transcendent Forms, proposed in the Phaedo, Symposium, and the Republic. Parmenides examines a series of difficulties concerning “participation” (methexis) in the first part, which have been extensively discussed by modern scholars, in particular with the Third Man Argument (TMA) in focus. But I suggest that the issue of “likeness” (homoion) is no less important. In this paper, I examine how Plato discussed “likeness” in this dialogue and sorted out the problem, so that the Form of Likeness (proposed by Socrates in this dialogue) no longer appeared in the later dialogues, e.g. the Sophist. I will discuss the issue in four stages. In the first stage, we shall look at the backgrounds of the problem. In the theory of transcendent Forms, the relation between Forms and [...]
Find out moreThe risk of the ἐξαίφνης (On Parm. 156e3) This paper aims at challenging the supposed validity of the ἐξαίφνης-argument by proposing an alternative reading of “κινδυνεύει” (156e3), the one-word answer given by Aristotle at the end of the so-called appendix following the second deduction (155e4-157b5). After having overturned the results of the first deduction in the second deduction, Parmenides encourages Aristotle to say the “third thing”. What many scholars consider to be an appendix to the second (and perhaps the first) deduction begins with the highly-debated τὸ τρίτον (155e4) and concludes by the time Parmenides returns to the original positive hypothesis, this time investigating the consequences for the others (157b6-7). To overcome the difficulty the interlocutors have reached, i.e. that contradictory predicates turn out to belong to the “one that is”, Parmenides constructs a complex argument. In order to indicate its structure, I will rely on the lines [...]
Find out moreLa fuerza dialéctica y la fuerza de postular hipótesis Hay un único punto en el que coinciden los intérpretes antiguos y actuales del Parménides: con la puesta en escena del encuentro entre Zenón, Parménides y un joven Sócrates, Platón ha querido poner en relación 1) la filosofía del eleatismo, 2) la respuesta al monismo eléata que ofrece la concepción platónica de las formas, y 3) las dificultades que las forman plantean a su vez. También hay coincidencia (básicamente porque el texto lo dice de modo explícito) en que la gimnasia dialéctica, que parte de la tesis parmenídea y de su negación, y que atraviesa ocho series de deducciones, debería contribuir de algún modo a encaminarse hacia la solución de las aporías relativas a las formas platónicas. Aquí terminan los acuerdos y comienzan las divergencias interpretativas. No es claro de qué modo se deben interpretar las hipótesis, ni cuál es el [...]
Find out more1676: Leibniz, lecteur de la seconde partie du Parménide Durant le printemps 1676, Leibniz lit et résume le Phédon, le Théétète et le Parménide. De ces résumés, seuls les deux premiers nous sont parvenus (A VI.3 283-311 = FC 44-145). Du dernier, l’on ne connait guère que la forme : annotant la lettre 73 de Spinoza, Leibniz dit avoir condensé le Parménide sous la forme d’une démonstration (A VI.3 370.26-27). Si l’influence du Phédon sur la pensée leibnizienne est évidente et bien documentée, notamment parce que Leibniz le cite dans le Discours de métaphysique (A VI.4 1562.3-1563.13), celle du Théétète l’est un peu moins (à cet égard, beaucoup reste à faire, en particulier concernant la lecture leibnizienne de la dernière partie du dialogue qui a pu nourrir ses réflexions en logique, voir : A VI.3 575.7-8, 27 qui réfère à 201e-202a). Quant à l’estime de l’influence du Parménide, elle demeure une [...]
Find out moreLa ὑπόθεσις di Parmenide e la γυμνασία del Parmenide Quella che in Parm. 128d5-6 è indicata come la ὑπόθεσις di Parmenide è presentata in 128a8-b1 mediante l’enunciato [a] ‘ἓν … εἶναι τὸ πᾶν’, cui si accenna successivamente varie volte nella sezione iniziale 127d6-130a2,[1] anche al plurale ‘ἓν ἅπαντα’ in 129b5. Ancora come riferimenti alla stessa ὑπόθεσις vanno considerati alcuni enunciati affini, ricorrenti in altri dialoghi: Un’indagine su tali enunciati può fornire importanti chiarimenti per interpretare la struttura complessiva della γυμνασία del Parmenide (137c4-166c5) e il suo rapporto con la sezione iniziale del dialogo. Un’interpretazione del genere, infatti, deve rispondere ad alcune questioni. (Q1) Qual è l’esatto significato filosofico di [a] e degli enunciati affini? (Q2) Come si spiega, data la costanza di [a] in 127d6-130a2, la problematica soluzione di continuità per cui la γυμνασία – come è esplicitamente detto[2] – verte sulla stessa ὑπόθεσις, ma di questa è considerato solo [...]
Find out moreForms and Images in Plato’s Parmenides, Sophist and Politeia In the Parmenides, the great philosopher from Elea, Parmenides, thoroughly examines the Theory of Forms that Plato has already presented in different ways in other dialogues. In this paper, I peer into the paradigm-based Theory of Forms in order to illuminate the problematics concerning forms and images in Plato’s philosophy. In this theory, the young Socrates proposes to understand the forms as follows: ‘the forms (εἴδη) stand fixed like models (παραδείγματα) in nature, and the others resemble them (τούτοις ἐοικέναι) and are their likenesses (ὁμοιώματα)’ (132c-d). I call this argument the ‘model-image-argument’ (MIA). According to the MIA, the relationship between the forms and the other things corresponds to that of a model and its ‘images’ (εἰκασθῆναι) (132d). Parmenides, however, turns down this argument on the grounds that, if one follows the MIA, the following difficulty emerges: ‘beside the form, another [...]
Find out moreGunk in the Third Deduction of the Parmenides In the third deduction of the Parmenides (157b5-59b1), Plato has Parmenides investigate 'what the Others undergo if the One is' (156d5-6). In the course of that investigation, we are offered an account of how the Others are one or unified: They are unified because they 'partake' of the One (157c2). Even though Parmenides goes on in the fourth deduction to undermine the account from the third deduction (because, roughly, the One would no longer be One if the Others partook of it), the third deduction has been called the 'most constructive' of the deductions in the Parmenides,[1] and some have taken it to express part of Plato’s own account of mereology.[2] There is, then, some scholarly presumption to think of the third deduction as providing a promising account of the relation between the Others and the One which, moreover, Plato himself may [...]
Find out morePhilosophizing With Ifs : the Dialectical Challenge of Plato’s Parmenides A common feature of both parts of Plato’s Parmenides is the use of a mode of reasoning originally provided by Zeno’s argument, and subsequently endowed of a dialectical function, widely implemented in the second part of the dialogue. This mode of reasoning takes the form of the reductio ad absurdum, on which, according to Socrates’ analysis (127d6-128b6), Zeno’s argument is based. In its strictest application, the reductio ad absurdum performs a negative purpose, consisting in refuting a hypothesis by exposing the absurd consequences it entails. In the first part of the dialogue, Parmenides shows how this mode of reasoning might be used against Socrates’ claim that there are Forms separated from the many entities partaking of them (128e6-135c2). Yet, in order to explain the manner of training he recommends to Socrates, Parmenides still refers to Zeno’s practice (135d8), just insisting that [...]
Find out moreSulla ὁμοιότης nel linguaggio e nell’essere a partire da Proclo, interprete del Parmenide di Platone Il paper si concentrerà su un’idea ben precisa del Parmenide, quella attraverso la quale l’Eleate, fin dalla prima parte (130e4-131a1) e poi nella sua gymnasia (147d1-e3), stipula un legame, un nesso ermeneutico tra essere e linguaggio. La domanda iniziale è questa: perché proprio il linguaggio? Perché Platone, per bocca di Parmenide, per comprendere la relazione tra l’uno e i molti, deve utilizzare proprio il confronto con i nomi? A mio parere Proclo ci aiuta nel trovare una possibile risposta a tale questione. Negli Elementi di teologia (65, 1-2), il filosofo licio dichiara che le cose possono esistere in tre modi: nella loro stessa essenza (καθ᾽ὕπαρξιν), oppure in quanto contenute nella loro causa sotto forma di principio (κατ᾽ αἰτίαν), oppure ancora in quanto partecipate dalla loro causa sotto forma di immagine (κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς). L’essere [...]
Find out moreParmenides’ Angels in vith c. Syria At the beginning of the sixth century CE, in the province of Syria-Palestine of the Eastern Roman Empire, one can trace in the Greek sources an ongoing debate on the nature, number and function of Angels. The chief representatives of such considerations are John of Gaza, author of a 732 verses poem entitled The Description of the Cosmic Picture (ἔκφρασις τοῦ κοσμικοῦ πίνακος), and the pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite. Among some fifty allegorical figures representing the cosmos, the first describes the depiction of seven Angels whose role is to contain Nature’s overwhelming power. Although such a number corresponds to the Biblical tradition, the status of John’s Angels appears to have more to do with the Neoplatonic tradition. As for Dionysius, the interaction with Proclus’ system is at the heart of the making of his angelic hierarchy. The fact that both authors refer in a [...]
Find out moreLa duplice accezione dell’espressione me esti nella quinta e nella sesta ipotesi del Parmenide La trattazione delle ipotesi in cui si articola la pragmateia del Parmenide può essere oggetto di interpretazione da diversi punti di vista, primi fra tutti quello logico-ontologico e quello epistemologico. La prospettiva che si vuole qui adottare è, invece, quella semantica e, più precisamente, quella relativa all’impiego dell’espressione me esti e alla portata semantica che le viene attribuita. Non v’è dubbio che Platone mostri in diversi luoghi una chiara consapevolezza della complessità inerente all’impiego congiunto della negazione e del verbo essere. Interessanti elementi di riflessione al riguardo emergono dal confronto fra la quinta e la sesta ipotesi del Parmenide, la cui natura e implicazioni raramente sono state prese in esame in modo del tutto adeguato dalla prospettiva qui proposta: la rilevanza dell’aspetto semantico è testimoniata dal fatto che le conseguenze di queste due ipotesi discendono [...]
Find out moreLa méthode dialectique et le Parménide de Platon Le Parménide de Platon se trouve, de nos jours, dans une situation singulière : considéré comme un dialogue central du corpus Platonicien, son importance théorique reste néanmoins partiellement occultée. Les « difficultés » que rencontre toute personne qui veut analyser cette œuvre sont dues à sa structure complexe. Le dialogue « vrai et propre » s’enchâsse à l’intérieur de trois cadres et est divisé en deux sections liées l’une à l’autre par une « section intermédiaire » ayant une haute valeur philosophique. Comme tout le monde le sait, la première section – prenant la forme d’un dialogue indirect – contient une discussion entre Parménide et Socrate sur la doctrine des Idées, au cours de laquelle trois objections apparemment insolubles sont formulées. La « section intermédiaire », elle, contient la description, par Parménide, d’une méthode pour étudier la vérité. Enfin, la deuxième section, s’étendant sur trente pages de l’édition Stephanus, [...]
Find out moreIndirect Proof in Plato’s Parmenides In Plato’s Parmenides we learn that the purpose of Zeno’s book was to defend the criticisms against his teacher Parmenides. Those criticisms, presumably, were that if to pan is a unity, that is, if the all or the world (whatever you wish for to pan) is one, then many absurdities follow. Zeno’s paradoxes were meant to show the contrary, that if the world is a plurality, even many more absurdities follow. Cornford and his student Raven thought that it was the Pythagorean pluralists whom Zeno was targeting (Cornford, 1939; Raven, 1966). One consequence of Zeno’s attack, argued Cornford, was the separation of arithmetic from geometry (Cornford 1939:60). After Zeno, we have two different approaches to the problem of incommensurables. According to the Greek historian and mathematician Wilbur Richard Knorr, the problem of incommensurables didn’t arise until circa 430 BCE, after Parmenides and Zeno [...]
Find out moreLa peculiare solennità dell’isagoge procliana al Parmenide di Platone Prima di ogni inizio i Neoplatonici sono soliti discutere, attraverso notazioni di metodo, la natura dei dialoghi platonici: ciò accade in scritti propriamente isagogici, ma ciò accade talvolta anche prima dell’inizio del commento di un dialogo (Procl. in Parm. I 618,21 Luna-Segonds=I 618,15 Steel), come mostra la struttura di quei commenti procliani pervenutici assieme alla loro sezione isagogica. Questo metodo, ereditato dalla tradizione medioplatonica, sembra infatti essere stato perfezionato all’interno della scuola di Atene proprio da Proclo, il quale discute preliminarmente l’utilità e l’imprescindibilità delle indicazioni esegetiche. Tali indicazioni nella premessa del Commento al Parmenide sono racchiuse in una eccezionale e solenne cornice. Ciò è oltremodo significativo, perché è come se, nella premessa e prima ancora di essere esplicitato, il contenuto del dialogo fosse presentato da Proclo in una immagine che è la massima espressione della poesia dei teologi e [...]
Find out moreThe Being of ‘the One that is Not’ in Parmenides 160b5-163b6 Thomas M. Tuozzo, University of Kansas In the fifth deduction Parmenides asserts that the One that is not must also “partake of being in a way.” In the course of establishing this point Parmenides develops a rather baroque analysis of what it means to be or not to be (161e3-162b). According to this analysis, both what is and what is not partake of both being and not-being: what is partakes of being with respect to being, and of not-being with respect to not-being; what is not, in turn, partakes of being with respect to not-being, and of not-being with respect to being. (On some readings, the partakings don’t stop there: Parmenides, it is said, indicates that you can interpolate any number of “partaking of beings” into these basic formulae, and any even number of “partaking of not-beings.”) The [...]
Find out morePseudo-Objects in a World of Seeming (Parmenides 164b5–165e1) The view that for Plato “being-something-or-other” entails the attribution of being tout court seems to have gained rather widespread acceptance in recent years among authors writing on this topic. This analysis, convincingly presented by Lesley Brown, is confirmed, for instance, by arguments in the Sophist that aim to show that even the predication of not- being entails that the object is a being. Yet it is still an open question whether “being”, predicated absolutely, can be equated with the notion of real existence. One of the main issues, in this respect, relates to the status of unreal objects—a class that includes things such as fictitious objects, illusions, perhaps also things in the past or future. In some contexts, Plato clearly refers to inexistent objects as “things that are not”. But how can we relate, for instance, to the object of an [...]
Find out moreThe Parmenides’ ‘Greatest Difficulty’ and the Origins of Stoic Metaphysics In the last few decades scholars have progressively shown that Plato’s dialogues strongly contributed to the formulation of fundamental tenets of Stoic philosophy (e.g. F. Ademollo, ‘The Platonic Origins of Stoic Theology’, OSAPh 43 (2012), 217-43; A.G. Long, ed., Plato and the Stoics, Cambridge 2013). In this stream of studies, the influence from certain passages of Plato’s Parmenides has been detected (e.g. P. Scade, ‘Plato and the Stoics on Limits, Parts, and Wholes’, in Long 2013, 80-105). In this paper I will show that a specific passage of the dialogue, the so-called ‘greatest difficulty’ (133b4-134e8), is likely to have strongly contributed not only to the Stoics’ rejection of forms, but also – and above all – to their doctrine of genera, which represents the core of their metaphysics. This has a specific pay-off, for in this case the Stoics [...]
Find out moreParmenide e il cavallo di Ibico: l'immagine dell'eros senile per la dialettica (Parm. 136e-137c) Sulla caratterizzazione di Parmenide si concentra da sempre l'attenzione degli esegeti: chi postula un'evoluzione nel pensiero di Platone scorge in Parmenide il portavoce dell'autore che sottopone a drastica revisione la dottrina delle idee; chi invece crede nella presenza di un sistema filosofico coerente attraverso il corpus dei dialoghi ritiene al contrario che Platone intenda prendere le distanze da Parmenide, suggerendo al destinatario uno iato profondo tra la propria voce e la voce del suo personaggio. L'interpretazione del Parmenide trova quindi il suo perno nella caratterizzazione di Parmenide, nella quale la critica tenta di scorgere indizi in questa o quella direzione. Altro nodo da sciogliere è poi il rapporto tra le due parti del dialogo: l'esame dell'ipotesi delle idee condotto con Socrate (128e5-136e4), e l'esempio di gymnasia condotto con Aristotele il giovane, l'esercizio dialettico di cui, a [...]
Find out moreReading with the Mind’s I: The Role of Selfhood in Proclus’ Reading of the First Deduction of the Parmenides. Plato famously starts the dialectical exercise of the second half of the Parmenides with an apparently aporetic argument starting from the premise “the One is” and coming to the conclusion that “the One neither is nor is one” and that there is “neither name, nor account, nor scientific understanding, nor perception, nor opinion” of it (Parm. 137c–142a). Proclus in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides famously reads this argument as the fulfillment of Plato’s proposed dialectical move from a hypothesis (namely, “the One is”) to “the unhypothetical starting point” (vis, the One), from which all sciences should then receive their grounding (Resp. VI 510b). In this he is following his predecessor Plotinus, who already took the first deduction as an account of the One, among other things precisely because it denies being [...]
Find out more“If the One is not” (Prm. 160b-164b) My focus in this paper is the third antinomy in the second part of the Parmenides (160b-164b).[1] I ask, How does this collection of arguments help the young Socrates grasp the truth with authority (136b6-c5; cf. 135d3-6), and thereby save the theory of Forms (135b5-c4)? It is my view that the principal lesson of the Parmenides is that the Forms must be “predicationally many”[2] — both in the sense that they are many things and in the sense that they are not many things. The groundwork for the latter, I claim, is laid in the third antinomy of the Parmenides, and brought to completion in the Sophist (256c-259b). I assume the following with respect to the second part of the Parmenides: (1) Parmenides sincerely recommends the method of training to the young Socrates; (2) Parmenides’s demonstration of the method of training contains genuine [...]
Find out morePlato’s Parmenides in seventh century Constantinople. The Hexaemeron of George of Pisidia The poem by George of Pisidia dedicated to Sergius patriarch of Constantinople (610-638) on the nature of reality, entitled Hexaemeron, is important evidence for direct reading of Plato’s Parmenides, especially the second half of the dialogue. The poem describes the relation between God and creation and the tone is both Christian and philosophical. The context is important since the controversy in George of Pisidia’s time concerned the idea that Christ had two energies and two wills, that means that an individual contained both infinite and finite principles within his person. This debate, in which patriarch Sergius was at the forefront, was central in the reading of Neoplatonism in Byzantium. It is known that at this time Maximus the Confessor (580-662) employed arguments present Proclus in order to argued his point of view within orthodox theology. Using Proclus’ ideas [...]
Find out moreStruttura e senso della settima deduzione in Parm. 164b5-165e1 Il presente intervento si propone di analizzare la settima serie di deduzioni (D7) nel complesso esercizio dialettico articolato nella seconda parte del Parmenide. Questa porzione di testo non ha ancora ricevuto particolare attenzione.[1] L’analisi si concentra sia sull’aspetto strutturale, vale a dire l’architettura della scansione argomentativa, sia su quali possano esserne gli obiettivi teorici. D7 parte dall’ipotesi che l’Uno non sia e considera le conseguenze rispetto ai molti. È oggetto di controversia se le conseguenze per i molti siano pensate rispetto a se stessi o rispetto all’Uno. Una prima discussione consiste quindi nel valutare pro e contro di entrambe le opzioni, anche rispetto alla eventuale simmetria con le altre deduzioni. D7 si apre con due assunti: primo, gli altri (alla) sono (o gli altri sono altri), perché se così non fosse non si potrebbe parlare di essi; secondo, si deve [...]
Find out moreOn coming to be older and younger than yourself at the same time (Parmenides 141a6-d3) At Parmenides 141a6-b2, we find an argument whose striking conclusion is that “that which comes to be older than itself comes to be, at the same time, younger than itself”[1] (Τὸ πρεσβύτερον […] ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται; 141b1-2). Since young Aristotle seems puzzled by this conclusion, Parmenides provides a second argument that runs from 141b3 to d3.[2] However, it is not clear how these arguments are supposed to work. One half of the conclusion seems unproblematic since whatever is in time is always coming to be older than itself. But the second half is not –why would anything also and at the same time come to be younger than itself? Moreover, this part of the conclusion does not seem to follow from the arguments’ premises. So, one wonders what kind of [...]
Find out moreThe reception of Plato’s Parmenides in Origen of Alexandria I shall explore the problem of the reception of Plato’s Parmenides—a dialogue that was to became central in Neoplatonism—in one of the main exponents of patristic philosophy, Origen of Alexandria († 255/6ca), who very probably was the disciple of the so-called Socrates of Neoplatonism, Ammonius Saccas, along with Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism and Origen's younger contemporary. Plotinus even attributes his own characterisation of the Nous–‘Demiurge’–‘secondary One’ as One-Many, as opposed to the ‘primary One’ as ‘absolutely One’, to Plato's Parmenides, which likely played an important role in Origen's protology too. As I shall argue, Origen’s God-Father as ‘absolutely One’ and the Son-Wisdom-Demiurge as ‘One- Many’ is very similar to Plotinus’ conception, based on the Parmenides. Origen knew both Plato’s Parmenides and, possibly, Plotinus’ protology, as well as, surely, Clement’s notion of the Son- Logos as One-Many (‘One as All’) and [...]
Find out moreOnkoi e Arithmoi. Come i sogni di Democrito e le meraviglie dei Pitagorici possono aiutarci a capire i significati di arithmos nel Parmenide di Platone Il passo-chiave. L’intervento tenta di chiarire (almeno in parte) i significati di arithmos nel Parmenide a partire dall’ultimo passo del dialogo in cui compaiono arithmos, pari e dispari (164 c 8-165 e 1, spec. 165 d 8-e 1). Si tratta di un numero, di un pari e di un dispari, di cui «si opina» (165 e 1) o «appare» senza corrispondere a verità (164 e 3), «come sognando in un sogno» (164 d 3), l’appartenenza ad onkoi, ossia “agglomerati” (164 d 1; trad. F. Ferrari [2004]), che sono «reciprocamente altri, se sono altri, senza che l’uno sia» (164 d 5-6); a ciascun onkos spetta, fra le altre proprietà, un «simulacro di uguaglianza» (165 a 5: phantasma isotetos): l’uno, che sembra costituirlo, ma «non è», appare [...]
Find out moreUna mereologia nel Parmenide di Platone? Introduzione Platone, esplorando se l’uno è o non è, offre nel Parmenide una teoria mereologica coerente: il tutto è più che la somma delle sue parti perché, come holon, il tutto dà luogo alle parti, e non viceversa, cioè, non sono le parti a generare il tutto. Questa teoria, però, non viene utilizzata in modo consistente durante il dialogo. Argomento 2.1. Il testo. Nella seconda parte del dialogo, la discussione passa dal considerare se l’uno è uno alla considerazione se l’uno semplicemente è[1]. Ora, l’uno ch’è (ἓν ὂν) risulta essere un tutto (ὅλον); da questo viene che sia l’uno, sia l’essere (τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι), sono parti (μόρια)[2]. In questa ricerca si conclude che l’uno avrà sempre l’essere, e l’essere, a sua volta, l’uno. Pertanto, paradosalmente, l’uno essendo una molteplicità non sarà mai[3]. 2.2. Conseguenze mereologiche. Il vocabolario utilizzato da [...]
Find out moreA Valuable Nugget in Deduction 5 In Deduction 5 (If the one is not, what follows for the one?), Parmenides constructs a curious argument to show that if the one is not, then it has being--in fact, that it has to have being in order to not be. Conversely, that which is, must partake of not-being in order to be. The argument itself, and the response I will propose, point to a series of conclusions about a) the nature of a thought or spoken logos, b) an (overrated) strategy for responding to the paradoxes of Parmenides Part II, and c) the limits of paradox resolution in addressing philosophical issues raised by Parmenides’ arguments. First, the argument (162a2-b3): If the one <or anything else that is not> is not not-real, but somehow ceases from being with respect to not-being, then it will immediately be (a2-3)--i.e., whatever is not <including the one [...]
Find out moreSimplicius on the origin of the onto-epistemological parallelism between Parmenides and Plato’s Parmenides The passage I will investigate is Simpl., in Cael. 556,3-560,10, in which the neoplatonist Commentator interprets Arist., Cael. III 1, 298b14-24. Before talking about the four elements of the sublunary sphere, he discusses the question if these elements of the sublunary world are subject to generation or not and firstly he criticizes the theories of the philosophers who preceded him, in particular Parmenides and Melissus, who deny coming-to-be and consider it only an apparent phenomenon (ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν, Arist., Cael. III 1, 298b16). On the one hand Aristotle asserts that Parmenides and Melisso realized that the condition for a science of being can be that this latter refers to not generated and immobile objects and so ontologically stable (τοιαύτας δέ τινας νοῆσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνῶσις ἢ φρόνησις, Cael. III 1, 298b22-23); on [...]
Find out moreLe mauvais rêve de Parménide. A propos de la dernière hypothèse du Parménide de Platon (163b7-166c1) Voici comment le vieux Parménide récapitule, à la toute fin du Parménide de Platon, les conséquences tirées des différentes versions des deux hypothèses sur l’un et les autres, positive et négative, qui occupent toute la seconde partie du dialogue : « […] l’un, s’il est (un) ou s’il n’est pas (un) (ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν), lui et les autres, tant dans leurs rapports à eux-mêmes que dans leurs rapports mutuels, sont tout, de toutes les façons, et ne le sont pas, le paraissent et ne le paraissent pas » (166c2-4). A lire cette conclusion, on voit mal comment ce même Parménide aurait bien pu en venir à soutenir la thèse qui est par ailleurs la sienne, ainsi énoncée par Socrate au début du dialogue : ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, « tu dis que "le tout [...]
Find out moreNonbeing and the Final Four Hypotheses in Plato’s Parmenides How much is the Platonic Parmenides based on the historical thinker himself? While the question is obviously ridden with difficulties, one must nevertheless attempt an answer since Plato presents his philosophy as the true heir to Parmenides’ thought. It is of some interest to inquire into how Plato portrays Parmenides so that the nature of his disagreements with the latter can be more precisely located. This paper is a partial attempt to tackle this issue with respect to the question of nonbeing. Parmenides’ poem prohibits one from thinking nonbeing by the following reasoning. Since thinking is always thinking something, and something is something that is, then nonbeing cannot be thought (DK 28B3, B6, B7). By contrast, the Platonic Parmenides outlines a program of mental gymnastics or dialectical exercise (Parm. 135c8-9), which proceeds by first positing the being of a chosen [...]
Find out more'Let us say the third': The Meaning of τὸ τρίτον in the Deductions of Plato's Parmenides Among the many sections of argument concerning the One in the second half of Plato's Parmenides, only one is explicitly numbered: the third (to triton, 155e4). This suggests, on the face of it, that it is to be counted both after and among the first two deductions (or 'hypotheses'), as one of them. Yet one rare area of consensus today, met with only a few dissenting voices, is that it is not to be counted as a third deduction at all and can even be ignored in interpreting the genuine deductions: the only argument explicitly counted is the one that does not count. If this interpretation appears to contradict the explicit words of the text, there are still good reasons for denying that 'the third' is a third deduction. But then must we disregard [...]
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