Zenonian eristic and Socratic inquiry Since the beginning of the 19th century the Parmenides has commonly been read as marking a transition from a supposed middle period of Plato’s literary production toward his hypothetically later dialogues, a transition initiated, it is commonly believed, by an ontological reorientation in Plato’s thought supposedly documented in the Parmenides. While critics have disagreed on the question how that reorientation is to be understood, the criticism of the young Socrates’ assumption of forms found in the first part of the dialogue has generally been read as a kind of self-criticism on the part of Plato, in particular of the conception of forms we find expressed in dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic.[1] A corollary view has been that Plato through this criticism wished to signal a reorientation in his conception of philosophical inquiry that led to a partial break with his earlier, Socratic [...]

La argumentación zenoniana del Parménides de Platón   El Parménides platónico parece tener una intención claramente polémica, probablemente motivada por el interés del autor en revisar muchas de las tesis expuestas en diálogos anteriores, presentando nuevas perspectivas y matizando algunos aspectos que se habían desarrollado de manera más sencilla. El análisis de las hipótesis de la segunda parte muestra un modo de proceder que sin duda recuerda a las aporías de Zenón y no está muy lejos del estilo del propio sofista Gorgias en su tratado Sobre el no ser o sobre la naturaleza. Se plantean esas hipótesis a modo de disyuntiva y se concluye que ninguna de esas soluciones excluyentes resulta satisfactoria, de manera que se ha de postular un nuevo punto de partida. También puede destacarse la semejanza con respecto al procedimiento desarrollado en el Teeteto, diálogo redactado, a buen seguro, en una fecha muy cercana al Parménides. [...]

The eleatic doctrine of the one-all in zeno's first logos   As is widely known, the Parmenides opens with Socrates and Zeno discussing the relative demonstration of the impossibility of multiplicity, by analysing the first of Zeno's forty logoi in support of this thesis. However, most critics have regarded this as a fallacious demonstration that betrays either philosophical ingenuity or treacherous intentions. This has lead scholars to overlook the theoretical means by which Socrates sets out to refute the argument, and to lose sight of the importance of this discussion within the overall economy of the dialogue. The aim of my work is to reinterpret the demonstration attributed to Zeno, in order to highlight its inner coherence, that is to say its congruency with the metaphysics of the one-all which Plato attributes to the Eleatic thinkers. In the light of this analysis, it will then be possible to propose a [...]

Da Clazomene ad Atene: Anassagora nel Parmenide   Il Parmenide si apre evocando due volte (126a1, b1) la città di Clazomene, senza che la seconda occorrenza del termine sia una glossa autoschediastica. Dobbiamo ritenere questo riferimento casuale, oppure è una traccia che Platone ci invita a seguire? L’opportunità di leggere il riferimento geografico come filosoficamente connotato è giustificato dalla qualifica degli anonimi accompagnatori di Cefalo (sconosciuto cittadino di Clazomene) come μάλα φιλοσόσοφοι (b8). Non sono dunque cittadini comuni, ma uomini educati alla filosofia. Un lettore di Platone difficilmente poteva non pensare ad Anassagora. La tesi che intendo sostenere nel mio paper è che proprio Anassagora sia uno dei principali riferimenti del Parmenide, nella misura in cui la sua filosofia è una fonte della “teoria delle idee” (i.e. l’argomento principale dell’opera, secondo gli antichi interpreti), e che la prima parte del dialogo risulti pienamente intelligibile solo partendo da questo dato. Il [...]

Il Parmenide di Platone fra il Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος di Gorgia e il Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος di Protagora : l’ombra dei sofisti nella γυμνασία     Come è ben noto Platone sviluppa nel Parmenide la propria riflessione sulla filosofia eleatica nel codice di un dialogo che in un’Atene della metà del V secolo un Socrate ancora giovane intreccia con il vecchio Parmenide e il suo fedele discepolo Zenone. Tra il momento in cui Platone immagina l’incontro nella casa di Pitodoro e quello della composizione del dialogo la filosofia degli Eleati ha certo conosciuto interpretazioni, rivisitazioni, critiche di natura diversa di cui certo Platone, al di là della finzione letteraria, non può non aver tenuto conto. Del resto, lo stesso racconto sul destino del λόγος di Zenone evoca attacchi sviluppati da altri pensatori contro Parmenide quale motivazione della βοήθεια del più giovane discepolo (128c-e). E la stessa prima parte del Parmenide [...]

“Antisthenes, Aristotle, and the “participation” in the “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis (Parm. 132b-c): an historical approach”   Using a historical approach, I aim to understand Socrates’ “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis and the second objection raised against it by Parmenides. In particular, I aim to understand how the hypothesis and the objection deploy  “participation”. Here we have both texts (Parmenides 132b3-c11):   [Hypothesis] “But, Parmenides, said Socrates, perhaps it may be that each of these forms is a thought, and it would not be proper for it to come to be anywhere else but in souls.” [...] [2nd Objection] “And what, then? said Parmenides. Is it not necessary, from the way you say the other things participate in the forms, that it seems to you that either each is made of thoughts and everything thinks, or, although thoughts, they are without thought?”   I will try address three issues: i) what [...]

Zenonian workout. The aim and uses of dialectic in Plato's Parmenides, 135d-136e and Aristotle's Topics, I.1-2 One of the most controversial issues of Plato's Parmenides is the relationship between its first and its second half. Despite the amount of scholarly attention received by the logical structure of the series of deductions,[1]1 the more general methodological framework of Parmenides' exercise has been considerably less well explored. In this paper, I shall address myself to this problem by focusing on the explicit aim and uses of Parmenides' exercise and by comparing it with Aristotle's description of the aim and uses of dialectic in the Topics. In short, I shall suggest that, in the Parmenides, Plato displays not merely a dialectical exercise, but more specifically a method of philosophical inquiry. I shall divide my paper into three parts. I shall start by providing a thorough reading of lines 135d-136e of Plato's dialogue, which [...]

Three Reasons that the Five Uses of διάνοια in Parmenides are Significant Although the word διάνοια appears only five times in Parmenides, an analysis of those uses sheds light on three significant issues in the study of Plato: (1) the value of Aristotle’s testimony on the status of mathematical objects as “Intermediates” (τὰ μεταξύ), (2) the value of Aristotle’s testimony about the role of the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato’s ἀρχαί-metaphysics, and finally (3) the unity of Plato’s Parmenides itself, and more specifically, how the hypothesis-based investigation of the One in the second part of the dialogue actually contributes toward its stated purpose (135c8-d1): to provide the young Socrates with the exercise he needs before defining what is καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν “and each one of the forms [καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν].” To state the paper’s thesis in a preliminary way, if the true One, thanks to its [...]

Socrate en devenir. L’évolution spirituelle de Socrate comme clé herméneutique du Parménide Le Parménide est le texte qui, plus que tout autre, force le lecteur à interpréter activement et à se demander ce qui constitue une bonne interprétation d’un dialogue platonicien. Il a donné lieu à plusieurs styles de lecture: métaphysique, logique, et plus récemment cosmologique. Un critère plus fondamental consiste à distinguer les interprétations soucieuses de complétude et d’exactitude (respectant la cohérence interne du texte) des interprétations que l’on pourrait qualifier de ‘créatrices’ (lectures d’inspiration néo-platonicienne ou analytique exploitant les ressources philosophiques du texte de façon plus libre). Aussi stimulantes soient-elles, ces interprétations sont ‘atrophiantes’ en ce qu’elles tendent à privilégier une partie du texte au dépend du tout. Ma communication repose sur la conviction qu’une interprétation claire et cohérente du Parménide – dans son entier— est accessible et doit être privilégiée. Deux éléments sont essentiels pour comprendre le [...]

La deuxième partie du Parménide : identité et altérité de l’intelligible Quel rapport entretient la deuxième partie du Parménide avec la première partie ? Parménide précise que l’exercice proposé doit porter sur les « choses qui sont par excellence objets de la raison et dont on pourrait estimer que ce sont des Formes » (135e2-4). Nous essaierons de montrer dans cette présentation que Parménide suggère dans la deuxième partie du dialogue un changement de point de vue : si les apories de la première partie étaient causées par l’analyse de la notion de participation du sensible à l’intelligible, la deuxième partie, à travers les huit séries de déductions, développe une réflexion concernant la nécessité pour l’intelligible de posséder une identité propre sans toutefois que cette identité implique qu’il faille considérer les Formes intelligibles comme autarciques et complètement isolées. En réalité, chaque Forme, dans sa dimension d’altérité, doit s’ouvrir sur ce qui lui est [...]

Is the Sophist a sequel to the Parmenides?  The question of the unity of the world in the two dialogues In his 2002 seminal paper, Brisson proposes a new interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides, whereby he defends the view that the dialogue is best understood as being addressed, from beginning to end, to the question of the historical Parmenides, namely ‘Is the world one?’. One strength of Brisson’s interpretation is that it allows us to understand better the notoriously vexed question of the relation between the two parts of the dialogue: according to his interpretation, the first part stages how the theory of Forms is initially a response to the Eleatics, whereas the second part offers an example of how the Eleatics themselves address the problem. Brisson’s thesis is illuminating in many respects. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether and how the issues raised in the Parmenides are addressed by [...]

«Théétète» & «Parménide»: le problème des parallèles structurels et discursifs.   L'expérience montre que l'étude des textes de Platon peut être basé sur une variété de procédures d'interprétation. Les tendances des dernières décennies ont fait sérieusement trembler des stratégies traditionnelles de la lecture des dialogues de Platon. Et surtout, il nous semble clair que la tentative d'identifier la question principalle du texte concrete, en procédant de la division habituelle en physique,  logique, l'éthique, l'ontologie, le gnoseologie, l'épistémologie, ne conduisent pas à la réussite. Dans ce cadre nous voyons maintenant la possibilité de comparer les dialogues, qui sont lieés aux disciplines différentes. Ce droit de comparaison était largement bloqué par les modèles précédents d'études de Platon. Cela est particulièrement vrai pour des dialogues, qui sont unis dans certains cycles - soit par leur sujet dramatique, soit par les noms et l'identification philosophique des personnages qui participent dans ces dialogues. L'un de [...]

From the Theaetetus to the Parmenides   This paper will show the continuity of considerations after the Parmenides by observing the relationship between the Parmenides and the Theaetetus, paying particular attention to the expression ‘nothing is one thing just by itself’ in the Theaetetus and the conditional phrase, ‘if one is not’ in the second part of the Parmenides. Although there have been many discussions on interpretations of this latter phrase, scholars have paid little attention to the phrase in the Theaetetus: ‘nothing is one thing just by itself (ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστίν, 152d2-3)’. However, there is a close relationship between these phrases, and I will interpret  these phrases from the first part of the Theaetetus. For many years, scholars have debated the Third Man Problem in the Parmenides based on the analysis by Vlastos. While Vlastos analyses the argument, he neglects the words ‘seem (δοκεῖν)’and ‘appear (φαίνεσθαι)’ [...]

How does the Sophist reply to the Parmenides? -or- Why the One is not among the Megista Gene   This paper explores the relation of the Sophist to the Parmenides; in what ways the Sophist responds to the questions, aporias and demands raised in the Parmenides. It aims to show how the problems encountered in the first part and the categories used in the second part of the Parmenides relate to the solutions proposed in the Sophist. The Parmenides has been interpreted in various ways: as a logical exercise and as a theory about gods, even as an example of perfect symmetry in impossibility. It has been acclaimed as the best collection of antinomies ever produced, but also, as an impossible map; how the theory of forms should not be thought. Its purpose; a parody, or – training; pedagogic, exercise necessary for the proper way to truth. Not, however, to [...]

The Second Part of the Parmenides as Plato's "Way of Seeming":  What the Equestrian Theme Can Tell Us. Horses and horsemanship are prominent in the pages of the Parmenides that precede its second part.  I propose that the system of allusions their mention generates has some bearing on the status Plato intended us to attribute to the arguments that follow the prologue.   Antiphon, the immediate source of transmission for the discussion with Parmenides, is described as a dedicated horseman (126c), and first shown to us at his home in the company of a blacksmith, who is there to get instructions about a bridle that Antiphon would like fixed up (127a).  In his original poem, the real Parmenides portrays himself as a charioteer who drives his horses to meet with a goddess, whose words he then transmits to the audience for his poem.  We have here a parallel, then:  two [...]

‘Why is the recovery of thought and philosophy conducted through an investigation into the one?’   The outcome of the arguments in the first part of the Parmenides is an aporia and Socrates’ profession (135c7) that he does not at all know where to turn in response to it. The aporia is as radical as can be imagined, because it concerns the prospect of philosophy, and indeed thought in general, being undermined. This prospect, Parmenides has concluded (135b-c), is a consequence of giving up on the existence of Forms, and on our desire to mark off and define them, in response to the series of objections that have been levelled against Forms. The remainder of the dialogue is cast as at least the beginning of a recovery from this predicament, conducted in terms of an extended investigation into the one. But why is the recovery conducted in terms of this [...]

Parmenides on Trial: Infinite difficulties and one challenge   In Plato’s Parmenides the reader faces a fictional Parmenides who, in the second half of his exercise, treads the very path which, according to the poem of the historical philosopher, is utterly inscrutable (παναπευθέα, Parm. 2, 6). This puzzling, yet fundamental observation is the starting point for the following claim: The Parmenides represents an invitation to examine critically Eleatic philosophy, which is of central importance to Plato, by revealing some of its difficulties. In light of this assumption, Plato’s masterstroke is to choose the initiator of Parmenidean thought to first question it himself, and to undertake this by the means of his own student Zeno, the ‘Eleatic Palamedes’ (Phdr. 261d6). For the exercise is explicitly (Prm. 135d8) based on Zeno’s method and can be considered a consistent further development of the same. This interpretation presents at least two advantages: firstly, it [...]

Apuleian Evidence regarding Pre-Plotinian Interpretation of the Parmenides   The multi-level metaphysical interpretation of Parmenides surfaces openly in Plotinus, most obviously in Ennead V.i [10] 8, where Plotinus is denying his originality. Furthermore, only three of the nine ‘hypotheses’ are correlated with a metaphysical level, so that Plotinus says nothing about the referent of the final two pictures that emerge from the affirmation of the One, nor about what emerges from its denial. For complete interpretations Proclus had to employ Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinus himself presupposes such an interpretation of Parmenides, rather than announcing it. Proclus does not credit Plotinus with the invention of such an interpretation, since at Theol.Plat. 2.4.31.4-22 he thinks that Origenes, having shared the same education, ought to have attributed the same transcendence to the One, following the first hypothesis. Ammonius Saccas is thus credited with separating the Ones described in the first two hypotheses. Clearly, [...]

“Plotinus and Parmenides”   In 1939, F.M. Cornford published his Plato and Parmenides. In the course of this influential commentary on the dialogue, Cornford takes a few pages to heap scorn on what he calls “the Neoplatonic interpretation” of the hypotheses of the second part of the dialogue.  In part owing to this dismissal, and no doubt in part owing to many others who have followed Cornford in their work on Parmenides, interpretations of the “exercise,”  especially in the English-speaking world, have not been fruitful.  Even among those who see in the second part of the dialogue a positive contribution to the solution to the problems raised in the first part of the dialogue, it is supposed that the superposition of a One above Being is irrelevant to that contribution. In this paper, I hope to show that (1) there is an entire “family” of interpretations of Parmenides that can [...]

The Ground of Being in the Parmenides' First and Second Hypotheses: Damascius' Inheritance of Proclus' Reading of the First Hypothesis   Like nearly all Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius were well-known for holding an ontological reading of the Parmenides' hypotheses in the second half of the dialogue, according to which the first three hypotheses respectively describe the three main principles of all things: the One, which is prior to Being; Being-itself, or the intelligible world; and Soul and all particular souls. In the background for both philosophers, as with most Neoplatonists, is a longstanding problem of explaining how the second hypothesis' affirmations come to be from the negations of the first hypothesis. This in turn corresponds with the problem of how the principle of Being comes to be from the first principle which is beyond being, so that Being is an effect that comes from a cause that shares none of [...]

Apparence et ressemblance dans le Parménide : les limites de l’image. (Dialectique de l’apparence et aporie de la ressemblance)   Le Parménide présente, dans ses deux dernières hypothèses (plus précisément, dans ses deux dernières « séries de déductions » : 164b5-165e1, 165e2-166c2) un usage systématique des termes d’apparaître (phainesthai) ou d’apparence (phantasma). On étudiera ici le sens et le statut propre à cet usage, qui semble, chez Platon, tout à fait singulier (la singularité s’expliquant en grande partie par la dimension dialectique du raisonnement).   I/ La signification de cet apparaître semble à première vue irréductible à d’autres emplois platoniciens du registre du phainesthai. On étudiera donc la spécificité de la relation entre être et apparaître dans le cas précis du jeu dialectique des hypothèses. Cependant, la question se pose aussi de savoir dans quelle mesure les développements sur ce qu’est l’apparence à la fin du Parménide peuvent être éclairés par d’autres dialogues, [...]

The Absence of Perception. An Examination on Likeness in Plato’s Parmenides The absence of perception in Plato’s Parmenides seems evident. This is foreshadowed by the weighty roles of two Eleatic philosophers—Parmenides and Zeno—and their method of deduction in the dialogue. Zeno’s book is read as the philosophical setting for this fictional dialogue. (127c-d) According to Socrates’ summary, Zeno uses a contradiction that things are “both like and unlike (ὅμοιὰ τε … καὶ ἀνόμοια)” to reject the assumption “things are many.” (127e2) The form of argument is what we called Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA). The validity of an RAA argument does not have to appeal to premises in which perception is involved. A feature shown by Zeno’s argument as the typical Eleatic style is to apply RAA without appealing to any perceptible fact of the physical world. This feature is particularly observable in the deductions practiced by a Socrates’ contemporary fellow [...]

Homonymy and Likeness in Plato’s Parmenides   It is generally agreed that in the Parmenides Plato tackled several theoretical difficulties entailed in the theory of transcendent Forms, proposed in the Phaedo, Symposium, and the Republic. Parmenides examines a series of difficulties concerning “participation” (methexis) in the first part, which have been extensively discussed by modern scholars, in particular with the Third Man Argument (TMA) in focus. But I suggest that the issue of “likeness” (homoion) is no less important. In this paper, I examine how Plato discussed “likeness” in this dialogue and sorted out the problem, so that the Form of Likeness (proposed by Socrates in this dialogue) no longer appeared in the later dialogues, e.g. the Sophist. I will discuss the issue in four stages. In the first stage, we shall look at the backgrounds of the problem. In the theory of transcendent Forms, the relation between Forms and [...]

Forms and Images in Plato’s Parmenides, Sophist and Politeia   In the Parmenides, the great philosopher from Elea, Parmenides, thoroughly examines the Theory of Forms that Plato has already presented in different ways in other dialogues. In this paper, I peer into the paradigm-based Theory of Forms in order to illuminate the problematics concerning forms and images in Plato’s philosophy. In this theory, the young Socrates proposes to understand the forms as follows: ‘the forms (εἴδη) stand fixed like models (παραδείγματα) in nature, and the others resemble them (τούτοις ἐοικέναι) and are their likenesses (ὁμοιώματα)’ (132c-d). I call this argument the ‘model-image-argument’ (MIA). According to the MIA, the relationship between the forms and the other things corresponds to that of a model and its ‘images’ (εἰκασθῆναι) (132d). Parmenides, however, turns down this argument on the grounds that, if one follows the MIA, the following difficulty emerges: ‘beside the form, another [...]

Sulla ὁμοιότης nel linguaggio e nell’essere a partire da Proclo, interprete del Parmenide di Platone   Il paper si concentrerà su un’idea ben precisa del Parmenide, quella attraverso la quale l’Eleate, fin dalla prima parte (130e4-131a1) e poi nella sua gymnasia (147d1-e3), stipula un legame, un nesso ermeneutico tra essere e linguaggio. La domanda iniziale è questa: perché proprio il linguaggio? Perché Platone, per bocca di Parmenide, per comprendere la relazione tra l’uno e i molti, deve utilizzare proprio il confronto con i nomi? A mio parere Proclo ci aiuta nel trovare una possibile risposta a tale questione. Negli Elementi di teologia (65, 1-2), il filosofo licio dichiara che le cose possono esistere in tre modi: nella loro stessa essenza (καθ᾽ὕπαρξιν), oppure in quanto contenute nella loro causa sotto forma di principio (κατ᾽ αἰτίαν), oppure ancora in quanto partecipate dalla loro causa sotto forma di immagine (κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς). L’essere [...]

Parmenides’ Angels in vith c. Syria At the beginning of the sixth century CE, in the province of Syria-Palestine of the Eastern Roman Empire, one can trace in the Greek sources an ongoing debate on the nature, number and function of Angels. The chief representatives of such considerations are John of Gaza, author of a 732 verses poem entitled The Description of the Cosmic Picture (ἔκφρασις τοῦ κοσμικοῦ πίνακος), and the pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite. Among some fifty allegorical figures representing the cosmos, the first describes the depiction of seven Angels whose role is to contain Nature’s overwhelming power. Although such a number corresponds to the Biblical tradition, the status of John’s Angels appears to have more to do with the Neoplatonic tradition. As for Dionysius, the interaction with Proclus’ system is at the heart of the making of his angelic hierarchy. The fact that both authors refer in a [...]

La peculiare solennità dell’isagoge procliana al Parmenide di Platone   Prima di ogni inizio i Neoplatonici sono soliti discutere, attraverso notazioni di metodo, la natura dei dialoghi platonici: ciò accade in scritti propriamente isagogici, ma ciò accade talvolta anche prima dell’inizio del commento di un dialogo (Procl. in Parm. I 618,21 Luna-Segonds=I 618,15 Steel), come mostra la struttura di quei commenti procliani pervenutici assieme alla loro sezione isagogica. Questo metodo, ereditato dalla tradizione medioplatonica, sembra infatti essere stato perfezionato all’interno della scuola di Atene proprio da Proclo, il quale discute preliminarmente l’utilità e l’imprescindibilità delle indicazioni esegetiche. Tali indicazioni nella premessa del Commento al Parmenide sono racchiuse in una eccezionale e solenne cornice. Ciò è oltremodo significativo, perché è come se, nella premessa e prima ancora di essere esplicitato, il contenuto del dialogo fosse presentato da Proclo in una immagine che è la massima espressione della poesia dei teologi e [...]

Reading with the Mind’s I: The Role of Selfhood in Proclus’ Reading of the First Deduction of the Parmenides. Plato famously starts the dialectical exercise of the second half of the Parmenides with an apparently aporetic argument starting from the premise “the One is” and coming to the conclusion that “the One neither is nor is one” and that there is “neither name, nor account, nor scientific understanding, nor perception, nor opinion” of it (Parm. 137c–142a).  Proclus in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides famously reads this argument as the fulfillment of Plato’s proposed dialectical move from a hypothesis (namely, “the One is”) to “the unhypothetical starting point” (vis, the One), from which all sciences should then receive their grounding (Resp. VI 510b). In this he is following his predecessor Plotinus, who already took the first deduction as an account of the One, among other things precisely because it denies being [...]

Plato’s Parmenides in seventh century Constantinople. The Hexaemeron of George of Pisidia The poem by George of Pisidia dedicated to Sergius patriarch of Constantinople (610-638) on the nature of reality, entitled Hexaemeron, is important evidence for direct reading of Plato’s Parmenides, especially the second half of the dialogue. The poem describes the relation between God and creation and the tone is both Christian and philosophical. The context is important since the controversy in George of Pisidia’s time concerned the idea that Christ had two energies and two wills, that means that an individual contained both infinite and finite principles within his person. This debate, in which patriarch Sergius was at the forefront, was central in the reading of Neoplatonism in Byzantium. It is known that at this time Maximus the Confessor (580-662) employed arguments present Proclus in order to argued his point of view within orthodox theology. Using Proclus’ ideas [...]

The reception of Plato’s Parmenides in Origen of Alexandria I shall explore the problem of the reception of Plato’s Parmenides—a dialogue that was  to  became central in Neoplatonism—in one of the main exponents of patristic philosophy,  Origen    of Alexandria († 255/6ca), who very probably was the disciple of the so-called Socrates of Neoplatonism, Ammonius Saccas, along with Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism and Origen's younger contemporary. Plotinus even attributes his own characterisation of the Nous–‘Demiurge’–‘secondary One’ as One-Many, as opposed to the ‘primary One’ as ‘absolutely One’, to Plato's Parmenides, which likely played an important role in Origen's protology too. As I shall argue, Origen’s God-Father as ‘absolutely One’ and the Son-Wisdom-Demiurge as ‘One- Many’ is very similar to Plotinus’ conception, based on the Parmenides. Origen knew both Plato’s Parmenides and, possibly, Plotinus’ protology, as well as, surely, Clement’s notion of the  Son- Logos as One-Many (‘One as All’) and [...]