How do the eight hypotheses in Parmenides come into light? – Chiasmus as a method of division 0. Introduction In analyzing the transitional part between the first and second part of the Parmenides (135b-137c), I focus on the way how the hypotheses come to light. First, except for the dihairesis (διαίρεσις), I introduce another method of division – that is, cross-division, which is terminologically called chiasmus (χιαστή). The hypotheses are conducted as well as structured based on the chiasmus – this fact is also justified by Proclus. In commenting on the Parmenides, Proclus uses the same chiastic method as Plato. Moreover, in my estimation, Plato makes a use of chiasmus not only in the Parmenides but also in the Politicus. Finally, I explore the relationship between chiasmus and diairesis by introducing Aristotle’s application of chiasmus. For Plato, Aristotle and Proclus apply the chiasmus in many cases, the application of chiasmus [...]

On the division into eight: Parmenides’ scheme in 136a-b   Countless attempts have been made to make sense of the second part of Plato’s Parmenides. Not only are the details and workings of the different arguments obscure, it is also unclear how the eight (or nine, counting the coda of 155e-157b) different hypotheses relate to each other and how they differ. Different proposals have been made to account for the opposite conclusions reached in the different sections, and in particular, to account for the different conclusions of the sections that ostensibly ask the same thing, i.e. between the first and second, the third and fourth, the fifth and sixth and the seventh and eighth. Some have proposed that the difference is the result of the fact that the hypotheses treat of different, or different kinds of, ‘ones’ (and/or ‘manies’), e.g. the form of one, individual sensible things, or Parmenides’ One; [...]

The second part of Plato’s Parmenides and Dianoia The second part of Plato’s Parmenides is still controversial in the interpretation. Halfwassen points out, however, that the interpretation of the second part of Parmenides, despite the variety of interpretation, falls within the category of metaphysical and logical interpretations, as Proclus summarized. The metaphysical interpretation is distinguished according to what the “one” of the first hypothesis and of the second hypothesis means, and the logical interpretation is also distinguished according to whether it is a simple logical exercise unrelated to metaphysics or a pedagogical practice for better metaphysics. But if we interpret the second part of Parmenides in the dichotomy of logic or metaphysics, we would fall into the difficulty of interpretation, for Plato shows both of logic and metaphysics in the second part of Parmenides. Therefore, in the second part of Parmenides, we need not ask if it is logic or [...]

Questionable Inferences in Parmenides Deductions 1 & 2 (to 144e)   There is ongoing general disagreement about interpretation of the deductions in the second half of the Parmenides:  some consider them dialectical exercises, others parody or refutation of individual earlier and contemporary views, and/or evocations of Platonic doctrines.  I provide an analytical reading of the argument of the passage Prm. 137c-143c, with attention to the speaker Parmenides’ assumptions, point by point, and his inferential choices in alternative treatments of the same topics.  This includes the first, negative, deduction of implications for the one (to hen) of the first hypothesis (that there is one, or the one is one), and the first stages of the second, positive, deduction (as far as that the one itself is many).  In both cases I am primarily interested in the assumptions and inferences concerning the relation between the one and being, in two specific respects. [...]

“Οὐκ ἔστιν” (141e8): The Performative Contradiction of the First Hypothesis   Toward the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one [τὸ ἕν] does not partake in being”[1] (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not [οὐκ ἔοικεν]” (141e9). In the next logical step, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is [Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν] (141e9-10).” This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is [εἰ ἕν ἐστιν]” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in [...]

On the second part of Plato’s Parmenides: hypothesis and the inconsistencies of the first two deductions   Richard Robinson in his paper ‘Plato’s Parmenides. II’ [1]holds that Plato’s hope for human reason seems less high in the Parmenides than in earlier dialogues. He points out that the theory of Form here is not an eminently reasonable hypothesis as it was in the Phaedo and Republic. Besides, the method of hypothesis is severely lamed by the discovery that a hypothesis and its contradictory may both lead to absurdities. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient to establish a proposition merely by deducing a falsehood from its contradictory. Thus, he concludes that his observations perhaps explains why we hear no more of this method after the Parmenides. Is his conclusion true? I tend to reject his dismissal of the Parmenides’ methodological contribution. A proper reading of the Parmenides (134c9-137c3) is the key to [...]

Parmenides, 146b2-5: Unbreakable Laws Broken?   It seems that there are three laws of identity and non-identity that are undeniable. Firstly, there is nothing that could be both identical and non-identical to something i.e. □¬∃x∃y(x=y∧x≠y).  Call this Restrictiveness. Secondly, there is nothing that could be neither identical nor non-identical to something, since these are necessary conditions for something counting as a thing at all i.e. □¬∃x∃y(¬x=y∧¬x≠y).  Call this Exhaustivity.  Thirdly, ‘non-identical’ must entail ‘not identical’ and vice versa and ‘not non-identical’ must entail ‘identical’ and vice versa i.e. □∀x∀y((x≠y ↔¬x=y)∧(¬x≠y ↔ x=y)).  Call this Exclusivity.  Yet, in the second deduction of the Parmenides, at 146b2-5, Parmenides seems to break Exhaustivity and Exclusivity by claiming that there is at least one thing that is neither identical nor non-identical to something.  In this paper, I argue that this is not as troubling as it initially appears because Parmenides does not say that [...]

The One and its Two Manners of Being. The Divination of the Unspeakable and the Genesis of Thinking My paper focuses on the first two hypotheses about the One in the second part of Plato’s Parmenides (137 c 4-155 e 3). I propose a philosophical analysis of these two hypotheses, trying to understand what links them, as well as what separates them essentially, and why, despite a certain similarity between them, they lead to totally opposite consequences. Starting from this analysis, I will draw some conclusions regarding why Proclus and Damascius – the two commentators of the Parmenides in the Neoplatonic School – differ in their interpretation of the first hypothesis. Both hypotheses put the One in a certain relationship with being. They both assume that the One is: either the One is One (εἰ ἕν ἐστιν… τὸ ἕν), as in the first hypothesis, or the One is (ἓν εἰ [...]

I molti sensi dell'Uno nel Parmenide di Platone Non ci sono dubbi sull’importanza del concetto di Uno nella trattazione dialettica della seconda parte del Parmenide. Ma Platone stesso ci invita nei dialoghi a non rimanere vittima dell’errore che le parole ci inducono a fare. Queste danno l’impressione di definire qualcosa di unitario, mentre spesso “nascondono” differenze profonde. Questo è ciò che accade nel Parmenide: con il termine “Uno” Platone mette in gioco realtà diverse, che occorre cogliere. Platone evidenzia subito queste differenze. Infatti l’Uno della Prima tesi non è quello della Seconda tesi. La Prima tesi riguarda un Uno che ha le caratteristiche che Platone stesso successivamente sintetizzerà nella formula uno-uno (ἓν ἕν, 142C3). Data tale natura questo principio assolutamente semplice esclude nella sua stessa valenza semantica ogni articolazione interna e qualsiasi rapporto con qualcosa. Il risultato finale non può che essere negativo: una serie di negazioni che portano alla [...]

Design and Purpose of the Hypotheses The two largest questions facing interpreters of the Parmenides are: (1) what are the subjects of the hypotheses and why? And (2) why there are eight hypotheses? There are many fine studies that aim to add to work in the field but that are of uncertain value as long as these questions are not well answered. First and most fundamentally, I do not accept the received reading that the subject of the hypotheses is the form or principle of unity. The subject of the hypotheses as given is an underdetermined monad, and the task of reading the hypotheses is to sort out distinct senses that "one" must have given the context and structure created by the hypotheses. The most obvious reason not to take the subject to be the form of unity is that the subject  of the hypotheses is not identified that way. [...]

A Diagnosis of Dialectic in Parm. 142b1-144e7 The Parmenides is the Platonic dialogue that has exercised the most ancient as well as modern exegetes. The analysis of, and the relation between the two parts as well as Plato’s assessment of the Eleatic philosophy of Parmenides and Zeno have been the bones of contention. In particular, the second part of the dialogue is a complex oracle that conceals rather than reveals anything. This paper focuses on the initial two arguments in the second deduction. Though the focus is narrow, the paper draws from the Sophist in order to shed light on both similarities and differences of the notion of dialectic that is executed and in order to evaluate the two arguments. Whenever researchers have referred to the Sophist so far so as to compare wholes and parts of the form of difference with wholes and parts in the two arguments, for [...]

La Noesi nascosta. Sulla presenza della teoria platonica dell´Anima nella gymnasia del Parmenide (142a-144e, 155e-157b, 157b-159b)   L´obiettivo del mio contributo e´di mostrare che la concezione platonica dell´Anima e della sua attivita´noetica, oltre ai numerosi riferimenti della prima parte del dialogo (132a, 132b-c, 134a-e, 135b-c), e´fortemente presente anche nella sezione dedicata allo svolgimento delle ipotesi sull´Uno. Presupponendo che il fulcro dell´esercizio dialettico sia l´analisi delle relazioni intelligibili (128e-130a, 135d-e), mi limitero´per brevita´a considerare i tre passaggi in cui la presenza di un soggetto pensante viene dichiarata espressamente o almeno e´piu´facilmente riconoscibile.   1) Nel passare dalla prima deduzione (137c sgg.) alla seconda (142a sgg.), ovvero da un´unita´priva di articolazione e non realmente essente (141e-142a) ad una unita´in se stessa molteplice ed essente sotto tutti i rispetti, non e´rilevante solo la diversa considerazione dei rapporti fra l´Uno e l´Essere. Nella seconda deduzione (Parm. 142b-144a) viene reso possibile il passaggio dall´Uno-Tutto di [...]

Lʼêtre et le temps dans le Parménide de Platon L’exercice de la deuxième partie du Parménide de Platon contient plusieurs arguments concernant les déterminations temporelles et le temps. L’un, selon les huit hypothèses à examiner (pour le programme de l’examen cf. 136 a et 137 b), est-il « plus vieux » ou « plus jeune » ou « du même âge » (140 e-141 a ; 151 e) ? Est-il « dans le temps » (141 a) ? « Participe-t-il du temps » (151 e) ? Ces arguments sont liés à ceux concernant l’être. L’un « participe-t-il de l’être », « est-il » du tout (141 e ; 151 e) ? C’est sur ce sujet que se terminent les développements de la première déduction (140 e-149 a) et c’est à ces questions qu’est consacrée la section finale deux fois prolongée de la deuxième déduction (151 e-157 b). Si la troisième, la quatrième, la septième et la huitième déduction ne reviennent pas d’une manière explicite sur ces questions, la cinquième [...]

The Dialogue between Parmenides and Timaeus: the Concept of Eternity in Plato   The concept of eternity plays a crucial role in Plato’s philosophy. “Eternal forms,” “the eternal world of forms” are phrases so usual in the literature that “the eternal” could be considered almost as a synonym for the “forms.” Nevertheless, up to the Timaeus, Plato does not offer a more or less complete analysis of the concept. And even in the Timaeus the description of eternity (as well as of the eternal) is ambiguous and causes controversy in the historical and philosophical literature. There are two main strategies for interpreting the notion of eternity in a broader context. First, by eternity one can understand the infinity of time: x is eternal, iff there is no such past when x did not exist, and there is no future when x will not exist. This strategy can be called temporalism. [...]

Unité et différenciation de l’Être : 139b4-148d8 du Parménide de Platon Parmi toutes les démonstrations faites par Parménide dans la deuxième partie du dialogue, les déductions concernant deux paires de prédicats – à savoir le rapport de l’un avec le tout et les parties, ainsi qu’avec l’identité (ταὐτόν) et le différent (ἕτερον) – semblent révéler la cause qui mène toutes ces déductions à une conclusion absurde. Dans cette série de déductions faites à partir de la première hypothèse « s’il est un » (137b4), l’un n’ayant pas de partie et n’étant pas un tout, l’un n’a donc ni figure, ni limite, ni extrémité, ne se trouve nulle part, et n’est ni en mouvement ni au repos ; aussi, l’un n’étant ni même ni différent par rapport à lui-même et aux autres, il n’est donc ni semblable ni dissemblable, ni égal ni inégal, ni jeune ni vieux, et n’est pas situé dans le temps.   [...]

The number as a prototype of “unified plurality” (Parm.147a3-6) As well known, the second series of deductions related to the first hypothesis “the one is” (Parm.142b1-157b5) aims at examining the consequences for the “one” in relation to the others, i.e. for the “one” that participates in being. Within such a theoretical scenario, the being assigned to the “one” is clearly participative, for which whatever the “one” may be, that is whatever predicate is assigned to it, its being is linked to participating in that specific character. The determination of the being of the “one” in terms of participation allows also to assign this entity a series of qualifications, such as “being identical” and “being different”, which had not been assigned to the “one that is one”, i.e. only for itself, like in the first series of the exercise. In this second deduction, the “one” participates in properties which are considered [...]

If the One is not: Beyond the Arithmetization of Being The Parmenides is a dialogue chiefly introductive. Its collocation within the Platonic corpus leads us to think it prepares the following dialogues, which refer each other in a really unique manner. We must therefore think that these dialogues do anything but develop what is deployed in the Parmenides. The hypothesis I would like to propose is that there is a clear theoretical line from the Parmenides to the Statesman, and it concerns the crisis introduced in the ancient thought by the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. I thus consider all the dialogues, which follow the Parmenides (above all the Theaetetus and the Sophist), as seismographs of the conceptual earthquake produced by this discovery: they  move in a disrupted situation, which obscured what once was clear and makes again necessary to inquiry what is science, what is Being, what is the [...]

Not being anywhere, it would not be at all (145E): the physical-empirical dimension in the second part of the Parmenides Studies on the second part of the Parmenides usually seem to assume that the dialectical exercise concerns exclusively the intelligible realities, the Ideas and the Principles. It may be useful to focus on those passages that imply empirical and material references, which are often overlooked. The aim is to recognize that Plato never loses sight of the entire sphere of reality, therefore including the physical dimension, even within a metaphysical or – according to other scholars – logical-linguistic reflection. This fact cannot be evaded: it must, instead, be promoted in order to have a more complete and adequate understanding of this decisive part of the dialogue. To this purpose, we will identify in the various arguments those marks which are not only or exclusively referable to the ideal realities but [...]

τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν: Xenocrates and the notion of ἐξαίφνης in Plato’s Parmenides   In the second part of Parmenides, several arguments are dedicated to the problem of time. In the first argument (A I), the one is proved to be completely 'atemporal' (141d: οὐδὲ χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔν τινι χρόνῳ). In the second argument (A II), the one participates in time insofar it participates in being (152a: Μετέχει ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι), and in variety of ways: it can be both younger and older than itself (152d4-e3); younger and older than others (153b8-d5; 152e10-153b7);  the same age as itself and as others (152e3-10; 153d5-e7). In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with the third argument (A III) on time in its relation to the previous two. Some regard it as an ‘appendix’ to A II (Scolnicov 2003, p. 135) or simply as the third stage [...]

What the instant looks like. Plato’s Parmenides and the science of transition This contribution focuses on Plato’s view of the instant (τὸ ἐξαίφνης) as presented in the Parmenides (156d – 157b). It investigates the relevant tenet according to which the Being and the Becoming of the One can be determined through the transition from a state to another or from affections (παθήματα) or properties to others by means of the durationless instant. First, I argue that Plato’s view of instantaneity cannot be assimilated to any perdurantism. Indeed, when talking about the being of the one in the instant (156 c- 156e), Plato refers to the condition for an inner transition from a state to another to occur. Therefore, the instant is set out of the flow of time. In other words, the “now” (νῦν) cannot be assimilated with the instant. The now or different “nows” can be aggregated and can [...]

Enigmatique exaiphnès De l’ensemble relativement réduit d’occurrences du terme exaiphnes dans les dialogues de Platon (36 occurrences réparties en 9 dialogues auxquels s’ajoute l’occurrence de la Lettre VII), les lignes que lui consacre le Parménide (156 c-e) sont parmi les plus célèbres et le lien de l’un et du temps fait l’objet dans ce dialogue de l’une des plus belles pages consacrées, comme dans le Timée, aux formes que peut prendre le temps. Les études récentes (Brisson-Décarie 1987) montrent clairement que cette section du Parménide (155 e 4 – 157 b 5) ne constitue pas une troisième hypothèse autonome, mais examine les conséquences de la série des déductions qui la précèdent, comme le rappelle Parménide quand il dit : « si l’un est, comme nous l’avons déjà exposé ». Ce n’est pas pour autant qu’elle doit être considérée comme un simple appendice dont l’importance n’est pas significative (Graeser 1999 et plus généralement sur [...]

The One and Time: Parmenides 151e-153a In what is traditionally called the Second Hypothesis, Parmenides presents a series of deductions meant to contradict the opposite deductions in the First Hypothesis.  In this paper, we will focus on the deduction in the Second Hypothesis which draws out the consequences of the one’s partaking of being, where partaking of being implies partaking of time.  While, in the First Hypothesis, Parmenides denies that the one partakes of time, now he supposes that it does.  In an elaborate, but careful argument, he draws two conclusions, which contradict one another.  First, he concludes that: (III.12) The one always both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself.[1] Second, he concludes that: (IV.4) Since the one is or comes to be for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself, it neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself. [...]

The risk of the ἐξαίφνης (On Parm. 156e3)   This paper aims at challenging the supposed validity of the ἐξαίφνης-argument by proposing an alternative reading of “κινδυνεύει” (156e3), the one-word answer given by Aristotle at the end of the so-called appendix following the second deduction (155e4-157b5).   After having overturned the results of the first deduction in the second deduction, Parmenides encourages Aristotle to say the “third thing”. What many scholars consider to be an appendix to the second (and perhaps the first) deduction begins with the highly-debated τὸ τρίτον (155e4) and concludes by the time Parmenides returns to the original positive hypothesis, this time investigating the consequences for the others (157b6-7). To overcome the difficulty the interlocutors have reached, i.e. that contradictory predicates turn out to belong to the “one that is”, Parmenides constructs a complex argument. In order to indicate its structure, I will rely on the lines [...]

1676: Leibniz, lecteur de la seconde partie du Parménide   Durant le printemps 1676, Leibniz lit et résume le Phédon, le Théétète et le Parménide. De ces résumés, seuls les deux premiers nous sont parvenus (A VI.3 283-311 = FC 44-145). Du dernier, l’on ne connait guère que la forme : annotant la lettre 73 de Spinoza, Leibniz dit avoir condensé le Parménide sous la forme d’une démonstration (A VI.3 370.26-27). Si l’influence du Phédon sur la pensée leibnizienne est évidente et bien documentée, notamment parce que Leibniz le cite dans le Discours de métaphysique (A VI.4 1562.3-1563.13), celle du Théétète l’est un peu moins (à cet égard, beaucoup reste à faire, en particulier concernant la lecture leibnizienne de la dernière partie du dialogue qui a pu nourrir ses réflexions en logique, voir : A VI.3 575.7-8, 27 qui réfère à 201e-202a). Quant à l’estime de l’influence du Parménide, elle demeure une [...]

Gunk in the Third Deduction of the Parmenides In the third deduction of the Parmenides (157b5-59b1), Plato has Parmenides investigate 'what the Others undergo if the One is' (156d5-6). In the course of that investigation, we are offered an account of how the Others are one or unified: They are unified because they 'partake' of the One (157c2). Even though Parmenides goes on in the fourth deduction to undermine the account from the third deduction (because, roughly, the One would no longer be One if the Others partook of it), the third deduction has been called the 'most constructive' of the deductions in the Parmenides,[1] and some have taken it to express part of Plato’s own account of mereology.[2] There is, then, some scholarly presumption to think of the third deduction as providing a promising account of the relation between the Others and the One which, moreover, Plato himself may [...]

La duplice accezione dell’espressione me esti nella quinta e nella sesta ipotesi del Parmenide   La trattazione delle ipotesi in cui si articola la pragmateia del Parmenide può essere oggetto di interpretazione da diversi punti di vista, primi fra tutti quello logico-ontologico e quello epistemologico. La prospettiva che si vuole qui adottare è, invece, quella semantica e, più precisamente, quella relativa all’impiego dell’espressione me esti e alla portata semantica che le viene attribuita. Non v’è dubbio che Platone mostri in diversi luoghi una chiara consapevolezza della complessità inerente all’impiego congiunto della negazione e del verbo essere. Interessanti elementi di riflessione al riguardo emergono dal confronto fra la quinta e la sesta ipotesi del Parmenide, la cui natura e implicazioni raramente sono state prese in esame in modo del tutto adeguato dalla prospettiva qui proposta: la rilevanza dell’aspetto semantico è testimoniata dal fatto che le conseguenze di queste due ipotesi discendono [...]

The Being of ‘the One that is Not’ in Parmenides 160b5-163b6 Thomas M. Tuozzo, University of Kansas   In the fifth deduction Parmenides asserts that the One that is not must also “partake of being in a way.” In the course of establishing this point Parmenides develops a rather baroque analysis of what it means to be or not to be (161e3-162b). According to this analysis, both what is and what is not partake of both being and not-being: what is partakes of being with respect to being, and of not-being with respect to not-being; what is not, in turn, partakes of being with respect to not-being, and of not-being with respect to being. (On some readings, the partakings don’t stop there: Parmenides, it is said, indicates that you can interpolate any number of “partaking of beings” into these basic formulae, and any even number of “partaking of not-beings.”) The [...]

 “If the One is not” (Prm. 160b-164b) My focus in this paper is the third antinomy in the second part of the Parmenides (160b-164b).[1] I ask, How does this collection of arguments help the young Socrates grasp the truth with authority (136b6-c5; cf. 135d3-6), and thereby save the theory of Forms (135b5-c4)? It is my view that the principal lesson of the Parmenides is that the Forms must be “predicationally many”[2] — both in the sense that they are many things and in the sense that they are not many things. The groundwork for the latter, I claim, is laid in the third antinomy of the Parmenides, and brought to completion in the Sophist (256c-259b). I assume the following with respect to the second part of the Parmenides: (1) Parmenides sincerely recommends the method of training to the young Socrates; (2) Parmenides’s demonstration of the method of training contains genuine [...]

Struttura e senso della settima deduzione in Parm. 164b5-165e1   Il presente intervento si propone di analizzare la settima serie di deduzioni (D7) nel complesso esercizio dialettico articolato nella seconda parte del Parmenide. Questa porzione di testo non ha ancora ricevuto particolare attenzione.[1] L’analisi si concentra sia sull’aspetto strutturale, vale a dire l’architettura della scansione argomentativa, sia su quali possano esserne gli obiettivi teorici. D7 parte dall’ipotesi che l’Uno non sia e considera le conseguenze rispetto ai molti. È oggetto di controversia se le conseguenze per i molti siano pensate rispetto a se stessi o rispetto all’Uno. Una prima discussione consiste quindi nel valutare pro e contro di entrambe le opzioni, anche rispetto alla eventuale simmetria con le altre deduzioni. D7 si apre con due assunti: primo, gli altri (alla) sono (o gli altri sono altri), perché se così non fosse non si potrebbe parlare di essi; secondo, si deve [...]

Onkoi e Arithmoi. Come i sogni di Democrito e le meraviglie dei Pitagorici possono aiutarci a capire i significati di arithmos nel Parmenide di Platone Il passo-chiave. L’intervento tenta di chiarire (almeno in parte) i significati di arithmos nel Parmenide a partire dall’ultimo passo del dialogo in cui compaiono arithmos, pari e dispari (164 c 8-165 e 1, spec. 165 d 8-e 1). Si tratta di un numero, di un pari e di un dispari, di cui «si opina» (165 e 1) o «appare» senza corrispondere a verità (164 e 3), «come sognando in un sogno» (164 d 3), l’appartenenza ad onkoi, ossia “agglomerati” (164 d 1; trad. F. Ferrari [2004]), che sono «reciprocamente altri, se sono altri, senza che l’uno sia» (164 d 5-6); a ciascun onkos spetta, fra le altre proprietà, un «simulacro di uguaglianza» (165 a 5: phantasma isotetos): l’uno, che sembra costituirlo, ma «non è», appare [...]