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July 2019
The Symposium will take place July 15–19, 2019, in Paris.
Find out morePlaton sur le Parménide L’extrême difficulté d’interprétation de la seconde partie du Parménide est devenue un lieu commun des introductions générales au dialogue[1]. L’étonnement des lecteurs, qui a généré une multitude d’hypothèses exégétiques différentes déjà au cours de l’Antiquité, se reflète – et trouve en partie son origine – dans la structure formelle de la section, où l’εὐτονία caractéristique du dialogue socratique[2] est abandonnée à la faveur d’un entretien sèchement conduit par la voix de Parménide, avec la longue série des hypothèses et des déductions ; le rôle du répondant, le jeune Aristote futur membre des Trente, est presque réduit à l’assertion systématique, ce qui éloigne l’entretien de la vivacité typique de la forme dialoguée. Il n’est donc pas étonnant de voir comment l’exceptionnalité de cette partie du dialogue, autant pour la forme que pour le contenu, est soulignée à plusieurs reprises par Platon lui-même, en utilisant les personnages du [...]
Find out morePoésie et poétique dialogique dans le prologue du Parménide D’un point de vue formel, le Parménide est unique dans le corpus platonicien. Outre ses particularités stylistiques (Ledger 1989, 164-167), le dialogue comporte un cadre narratif, présenté dans le prologue (126a-130a), d’une exceptionnelle complexité. Le dialogue narré comme forme littéraire relève de la culture orale, alors encore vivace, et des biographies de héros, dont celle de Socrate. Dans le Phédon, Échérate écoute le récit que lui fait Phédon, qui a assisté au dernier entretien de Socrate en prison ; dans le Banquet le récit d’Apollodore repose sur celui d’Aristodème, qui était présent au banquet d’Agathon. Dans le cas du Parménide, la transmission orale est plus complexe encore. Céphale de Clazomènes raconte ce qu’il tient d’Antiphon, lequel à son tour dépend du récit de Pythodore, compagnon de Zénon et non de Socrate, concernant les discussions ayant eu lieu, il y a fort longtemps, entre [...]
Find out moreParmenides in Plato’s Parmenides In this paper I propose a new interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides, as Plato’s thorough engagement with Eleaticism, whose aim is to set up his briefer refutation of this position in Sophist. Most interpretations of Parmenides have in common the assumption that Plato subjects his own position to some kind of criticism in this dialogue. Instead, I think Plato is making the best case he can for Eleaticism, in a way analogous to Aristotle’s presentations of his predecessors. Plato gives what he takes to be the ‘core’ of Parmenides’ thought, in order to show its shortcomings, namely that Parmenides is forced to consider the sensory world as illusory and reduce the intelligible world to the bare One. The dialogue is a genuine attempt to explain why anyone would posit such a counterintuitive position. These consequences are shown to be shortcomings in Sophist, where Plato refutes Parmenides’ fundamental [...]
Find out moreZenonian eristic and Socratic inquiry Since the beginning of the 19th century the Parmenides has commonly been read as marking a transition from a supposed middle period of Plato’s literary production toward his hypothetically later dialogues, a transition initiated, it is commonly believed, by an ontological reorientation in Plato’s thought supposedly documented in the Parmenides. While critics have disagreed on the question how that reorientation is to be understood, the criticism of the young Socrates’ assumption of forms found in the first part of the dialogue has generally been read as a kind of self-criticism on the part of Plato, in particular of the conception of forms we find expressed in dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic.[1] A corollary view has been that Plato through this criticism wished to signal a reorientation in his conception of philosophical inquiry that led to a partial break with his earlier, Socratic [...]
Find out moreHow do the eight hypotheses in Parmenides come into light? – Chiasmus as a method of division 0. Introduction In analyzing the transitional part between the first and second part of the Parmenides (135b-137c), I focus on the way how the hypotheses come to light. First, except for the dihairesis (διαίρεσις), I introduce another method of division – that is, cross-division, which is terminologically called chiasmus (χιαστή). The hypotheses are conducted as well as structured based on the chiasmus – this fact is also justified by Proclus. In commenting on the Parmenides, Proclus uses the same chiastic method as Plato. Moreover, in my estimation, Plato makes a use of chiasmus not only in the Parmenides but also in the Politicus. Finally, I explore the relationship between chiasmus and diairesis by introducing Aristotle’s application of chiasmus. For Plato, Aristotle and Proclus apply the chiasmus in many cases, the application of chiasmus [...]
Find out moreIl prologo come figura del dialogo intero Nella premessa del commento di Proclo al Parmenide di Platone (I 658.23–659.17 Steel), il filosofo spiega il significato dei proemi dei dialoghi, le scene di apertura nelle quali Platone presenta i personaggi e la conversazione si avvia nella direzione del significato del dialogo in questione. Secondo Proclo la scena iniziale è fondamentale perché presenta un'immagine nella quale il dialogo intero è rappresentato o riflesso (il verbo è eneikonizetai, I 659.10 Steel). Io credo che non sia un caso che tale considerazione generale di Proclo sui dialoghi platonici sia collocata proprio nella premessa del commento al Parmenide, infatti il prologo del Parmenide è in questo senso esemplare e nel mio contributo al Symposium Platonicum di Parigi amerei poterlo argomentare. Quel che vorrei mostrare è che nel prologo del Parmenide siano in nuce raffigurate la prima e la seconda parte del dialogo. Dopo aver [...]
Find out moreLa première antinomie de Parménide, αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά et le étonnement de Socrate Dans la première partie du Parménide, Socrate utilise un très riche vocabulaire pour expliquer comment l'interaction entre les formes et les objets sensibles peut résoudre le paradoxe de Zénon. Parmi les expressions les plus habituelles, telles que αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ εἶδός, αὐτὰ τὰ γένη, ὁμοιότης et ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον, le lecteur du Parménide trouve, dans ce qu’on appelle le "long discours de Socrate” (128e5-130a2) l’expression plutôt inhabituelle αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά. La construction n’est pas courante. Dans le contexte de discussions sur les idées, des locutions comme celles-ci, composées d’un adjectif pluriel + αὐτὰ τὰ, se produisent seulement deux fois dans l'ensemble du corpus platonicien, (Phd 74C1: αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα / Prm.129b1: αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά). Par ailleurs, depuis l’antiquité, les commentateurs et interprètes ont été intrigués par l’usage d’une expression au pluriel pour désigner, apparemment, une idée. Les [...]
Find out moreOn the division into eight: Parmenides’ scheme in 136a-b Countless attempts have been made to make sense of the second part of Plato’s Parmenides. Not only are the details and workings of the different arguments obscure, it is also unclear how the eight (or nine, counting the coda of 155e-157b) different hypotheses relate to each other and how they differ. Different proposals have been made to account for the opposite conclusions reached in the different sections, and in particular, to account for the different conclusions of the sections that ostensibly ask the same thing, i.e. between the first and second, the third and fourth, the fifth and sixth and the seventh and eighth. Some have proposed that the difference is the result of the fact that the hypotheses treat of different, or different kinds of, ‘ones’ (and/or ‘manies’), e.g. the form of one, individual sensible things, or Parmenides’ One; [...]
Find out moreLa argumentación zenoniana del Parménides de Platón El Parménides platónico parece tener una intención claramente polémica, probablemente motivada por el interés del autor en revisar muchas de las tesis expuestas en diálogos anteriores, presentando nuevas perspectivas y matizando algunos aspectos que se habían desarrollado de manera más sencilla. El análisis de las hipótesis de la segunda parte muestra un modo de proceder que sin duda recuerda a las aporías de Zenón y no está muy lejos del estilo del propio sofista Gorgias en su tratado Sobre el no ser o sobre la naturaleza. Se plantean esas hipótesis a modo de disyuntiva y se concluye que ninguna de esas soluciones excluyentes resulta satisfactoria, de manera que se ha de postular un nuevo punto de partida. También puede destacarse la semejanza con respecto al procedimiento desarrollado en el Teeteto, diálogo redactado, a buen seguro, en una fecha muy cercana al Parménides. [...]
Find out moreThe second part of Plato’s Parmenides and Dianoia The second part of Plato’s Parmenides is still controversial in the interpretation. Halfwassen points out, however, that the interpretation of the second part of Parmenides, despite the variety of interpretation, falls within the category of metaphysical and logical interpretations, as Proclus summarized. The metaphysical interpretation is distinguished according to what the “one” of the first hypothesis and of the second hypothesis means, and the logical interpretation is also distinguished according to whether it is a simple logical exercise unrelated to metaphysics or a pedagogical practice for better metaphysics. But if we interpret the second part of Parmenides in the dichotomy of logic or metaphysics, we would fall into the difficulty of interpretation, for Plato shows both of logic and metaphysics in the second part of Parmenides. Therefore, in the second part of Parmenides, we need not ask if it is logic or [...]
Find out moreBeyond the Socratic Dialectic: Parmenidean Methodology in Plato’s Parmenides For the 2019 IPS, I propose to closely examine the second section of Plato’s Parmenides. In particular, I will focus on how it serves as an example of a Parmenidean-style method of inquiry, which follows a “path through all things.” In comparative and contrastive conjunction with Parmenides’ own poem—especially those passages which explicitly refer to the need to follow various “routes of inquiry,” in order to examine “all things”—this project may very well shed light on how certain passages of Parmenides’ own poem might best be understood. Of course, there is risk of anachronism with such speculation. Yet, at the very least, this project may provide further insight into how Plato understood and/or used Parmenides’ work for his own ends—both as a springboard source for this eponymous dialogue, as well as the intention of the dialogue’s second section. Narrative: [...]
Find out moreThe eleatic doctrine of the one-all in zeno's first logos As is widely known, the Parmenides opens with Socrates and Zeno discussing the relative demonstration of the impossibility of multiplicity, by analysing the first of Zeno's forty logoi in support of this thesis. However, most critics have regarded this as a fallacious demonstration that betrays either philosophical ingenuity or treacherous intentions. This has lead scholars to overlook the theoretical means by which Socrates sets out to refute the argument, and to lose sight of the importance of this discussion within the overall economy of the dialogue. The aim of my work is to reinterpret the demonstration attributed to Zeno, in order to highlight its inner coherence, that is to say its congruency with the metaphysics of the one-all which Plato attributes to the Eleatic thinkers. In the light of this analysis, it will then be possible to propose a [...]
Find out moreSind die Ideen wirklich unteilbar? Zur zweifachen Natur ideeller Formen im Ausgang von Prm. 131a–e. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich ausgehend von Prm. 131a5–e7 und unter Einbeziehung weiterer Stellen dieses Werkes sowie Passagen aus anderen Dialogen einen Beitrag zur Beantwortung der Frage liefern, ob und inwiefern es aus der platonischen Perspektive sinnvoll ist, eine „Teilbarkeit“ der Ideen zu behaupten. Die genannte Passage, in der sich die „Segeltuch-Analogie“ befindet, ist im Kontext von Parmenides’ Kritik an der Ideenlehre im ersten Teil des Dialogs angesiedelt. In diesem Teil formuliert Parmenides verschiedene Einwände, die im Ausgang von einigen Kerngedanken der Ideenlehre (Teilhabe-Lehre, Ideen als Vorbilder, Trennung von Ideen und Einzeldingen) im aporetischen Aufweis der Inkonsistenz der von Sokrates vertretenen Theorie kulminieren. Die Einwände gegen die Teilhabe-Lehre basieren auf der Annahme, dass die Ideen in den Dingen, die an ihnen teilhaben, anwesend sein müssen, und zwar entweder in Gänze oder als Teile. Man [...]
Find out moreDa Clazomene ad Atene: Anassagora nel Parmenide Il Parmenide si apre evocando due volte (126a1, b1) la città di Clazomene, senza che la seconda occorrenza del termine sia una glossa autoschediastica. Dobbiamo ritenere questo riferimento casuale, oppure è una traccia che Platone ci invita a seguire? L’opportunità di leggere il riferimento geografico come filosoficamente connotato è giustificato dalla qualifica degli anonimi accompagnatori di Cefalo (sconosciuto cittadino di Clazomene) come μάλα φιλοσόσοφοι (b8). Non sono dunque cittadini comuni, ma uomini educati alla filosofia. Un lettore di Platone difficilmente poteva non pensare ad Anassagora. La tesi che intendo sostenere nel mio paper è che proprio Anassagora sia uno dei principali riferimenti del Parmenide, nella misura in cui la sua filosofia è una fonte della “teoria delle idee” (i.e. l’argomento principale dell’opera, secondo gli antichi interpreti), e che la prima parte del dialogo risulti pienamente intelligibile solo partendo da questo dato. Il [...]
Find out moreQuestionable Inferences in Parmenides Deductions 1 & 2 (to 144e) There is ongoing general disagreement about interpretation of the deductions in the second half of the Parmenides: some consider them dialectical exercises, others parody or refutation of individual earlier and contemporary views, and/or evocations of Platonic doctrines. I provide an analytical reading of the argument of the passage Prm. 137c-143c, with attention to the speaker Parmenides’ assumptions, point by point, and his inferential choices in alternative treatments of the same topics. This includes the first, negative, deduction of implications for the one (to hen) of the first hypothesis (that there is one, or the one is one), and the first stages of the second, positive, deduction (as far as that the one itself is many). In both cases I am primarily interested in the assumptions and inferences concerning the relation between the one and being, in two specific respects. [...]
Find out moreDialectic in the Parmenides The Parmenides is Plato’s most enigmatic dialogue and, as a consequence, no general agreement has been reached in relation to its philosophical contents and the methodological character of the deductions which constitute the main theme of its second part. In my view this enigmatic character, which has to do, first of all, with Plato’s theory of ideas and the unresolved objections presented in this dialogue against this doctrine as stated in the middle dialogues, is closely related to the no less enigmatic nature of Plato’s concept of dialectic. My proposal will focus on dialectic, but it is impossible to avoid the analysis of the ontological implications of the eight hypotheses (with the appendix), besides those epistemological hints given in the discussion that cannot be neglected in order to evaluate the soundness and even the seriousness of the logic exhibited in Parmenides’ performance. I am completely [...]
Find out moreIl Parmenide di Platone fra il Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος di Gorgia e il Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος di Protagora : l’ombra dei sofisti nella γυμνασία Come è ben noto Platone sviluppa nel Parmenide la propria riflessione sulla filosofia eleatica nel codice di un dialogo che in un’Atene della metà del V secolo un Socrate ancora giovane intreccia con il vecchio Parmenide e il suo fedele discepolo Zenone. Tra il momento in cui Platone immagina l’incontro nella casa di Pitodoro e quello della composizione del dialogo la filosofia degli Eleati ha certo conosciuto interpretazioni, rivisitazioni, critiche di natura diversa di cui certo Platone, al di là della finzione letteraria, non può non aver tenuto conto. Del resto, lo stesso racconto sul destino del λόγος di Zenone evoca attacchi sviluppati da altri pensatori contro Parmenide quale motivazione della βοήθεια del più giovane discepolo (128c-e). E la stessa prima parte del Parmenide [...]
Find out more“Οὐκ ἔστιν” (141e8): The Performative Contradiction of the First Hypothesis Toward the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one [τὸ ἕν] does not partake in being”[1] (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not [οὐκ ἔοικεν]” (141e9). In the next logical step, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is [Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν] (141e9-10).” This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is [εἰ ἕν ἐστιν]” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in [...]
Find out moreLa presenza del Parmenide di Platone nel dibattito antico sulla dialettica Nello sviluppo delle molteplici tesi o ipotesi (hypotheseis) sull’uno che Platone presenta nella seconda parte del Parmenide (Parm. 137 C sgg.), viene coinvolta una serie di nozioni che sono esattamente lo strumento mediante il quale è possibile giungere alla conclusione di ciascuna, positiva o negativa che essa sia. Esse sono principalmente le nozioni di totalità, mutamento, identità, somiglianza, uguaglianza, ed altre relative al luogo e al tempo. La particolarità di tale uso sta nel fatto che queste nozioni, indicate esplicitamente come ciò di cui l’uno “è affetto” (paschonton, peponthon) (Parm. 135 E; 140 A; passim), vale a dire come determinazioni che all’uno sono attribuibili, non sono assunte in generale, ma nel loro rapporto col termine a ciascuna opposto. Anzi, è proprio questa forma delle nozioni, cioè il loro essere strutturate in coppie di opposti, ciò che consente il [...]
Find out moreOn the second part of Plato’s Parmenides: hypothesis and the inconsistencies of the first two deductions Richard Robinson in his paper ‘Plato’s Parmenides. II’ [1]holds that Plato’s hope for human reason seems less high in the Parmenides than in earlier dialogues. He points out that the theory of Form here is not an eminently reasonable hypothesis as it was in the Phaedo and Republic. Besides, the method of hypothesis is severely lamed by the discovery that a hypothesis and its contradictory may both lead to absurdities. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient to establish a proposition merely by deducing a falsehood from its contradictory. Thus, he concludes that his observations perhaps explains why we hear no more of this method after the Parmenides. Is his conclusion true? I tend to reject his dismissal of the Parmenides’ methodological contribution. A proper reading of the Parmenides (134c9-137c3) is the key to [...]
Find out more“Antisthenes, Aristotle, and the “participation” in the “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis (Parm. 132b-c): an historical approach” Using a historical approach, I aim to understand Socrates’ “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis and the second objection raised against it by Parmenides. In particular, I aim to understand how the hypothesis and the objection deploy “participation”. Here we have both texts (Parmenides 132b3-c11): [Hypothesis] “But, Parmenides, said Socrates, perhaps it may be that each of these forms is a thought, and it would not be proper for it to come to be anywhere else but in souls.” [...] [2nd Objection] “And what, then? said Parmenides. Is it not necessary, from the way you say the other things participate in the forms, that it seems to you that either each is made of thoughts and everything thinks, or, although thoughts, they are without thought?” I will try address three issues: i) what [...]
Find out moreParmenides, 146b2-5: Unbreakable Laws Broken? It seems that there are three laws of identity and non-identity that are undeniable. Firstly, there is nothing that could be both identical and non-identical to something i.e. □¬∃x∃y(x=y∧x≠y). Call this Restrictiveness. Secondly, there is nothing that could be neither identical nor non-identical to something, since these are necessary conditions for something counting as a thing at all i.e. □¬∃x∃y(¬x=y∧¬x≠y). Call this Exhaustivity. Thirdly, ‘non-identical’ must entail ‘not identical’ and vice versa and ‘not non-identical’ must entail ‘identical’ and vice versa i.e. □∀x∀y((x≠y ↔¬x=y)∧(¬x≠y ↔ x=y)). Call this Exclusivity. Yet, in the second deduction of the Parmenides, at 146b2-5, Parmenides seems to break Exhaustivity and Exclusivity by claiming that there is at least one thing that is neither identical nor non-identical to something. In this paper, I argue that this is not as troubling as it initially appears because Parmenides does not say that [...]
Find out moreLa exégesis plotiniana de Parménides 131 a-b: el problema de la participación. Platón plantea en Parménides 131 a-b el problema de la participación de las cosas sensibles en las Ideas desde un punto de vista aporético. El argumento se desarrolla de la siguiente manera: si hay ciertas formas de las que participan las cosas sensibles, cabe preguntarse si cada cosa participa de la forma entera o de una parte. Si la forma entera está en cada una de las múltiples cosas manteniendo su unidad, entonces la forma estará simultáneamente en cosas múltiples y separadas. Luego estará separada de sí misma. Sócrates propone la imagen del día para evitar el problema y Parménides la sustituye por la imagen del velo, introduciendo un modo literal de entender el concepto “estar en”. Si una parte del velo está sobre una parte y otra sobre otra, entonces las formas son divisibles en partes [...]
Find out moreZenonian workout. The aim and uses of dialectic in Plato's Parmenides, 135d-136e and Aristotle's Topics, I.1-2 One of the most controversial issues of Plato's Parmenides is the relationship between its first and its second half. Despite the amount of scholarly attention received by the logical structure of the series of deductions,[1]1 the more general methodological framework of Parmenides' exercise has been considerably less well explored. In this paper, I shall address myself to this problem by focusing on the explicit aim and uses of Parmenides' exercise and by comparing it with Aristotle's description of the aim and uses of dialectic in the Topics. In short, I shall suggest that, in the Parmenides, Plato displays not merely a dialectical exercise, but more specifically a method of philosophical inquiry. I shall divide my paper into three parts. I shall start by providing a thorough reading of lines 135d-136e of Plato's dialogue, which [...]
Find out moreThe One and its Two Manners of Being. The Divination of the Unspeakable and the Genesis of Thinking My paper focuses on the first two hypotheses about the One in the second part of Plato’s Parmenides (137 c 4-155 e 3). I propose a philosophical analysis of these two hypotheses, trying to understand what links them, as well as what separates them essentially, and why, despite a certain similarity between them, they lead to totally opposite consequences. Starting from this analysis, I will draw some conclusions regarding why Proclus and Damascius – the two commentators of the Parmenides in the Neoplatonic School – differ in their interpretation of the first hypothesis. Both hypotheses put the One in a certain relationship with being. They both assume that the One is: either the One is One (εἰ ἕν ἐστιν… τὸ ἕν), as in the first hypothesis, or the One is (ἓν εἰ [...]
Find out morePlatonis Parmenides, 132a 1 - 132b 1. Contra Vlastos et socios eius De la batterie de difficultés que Parménide soulève en relevant le défi lancé à Zénon de faire remonter au niveau des intelligibles les paradoxes que le jeune par Socrate venait de déjouer en le circonscrivant au domaine des réalités sensibles, celle qu’on lit en 132a 1 - 132b 2 [1] est – sinon la mieux étudiée – du moins la plus discutée [2]. De la pléthore d’études que cette section du dialogue a suscitées, la série de quelque six essais que Gregory Vlastos lui a consacrés est de loin la plus influente ou, à tout le moins, celle qui a donné lieu aux débats quantitativement – sinon qualitativement – les plus significatifs [3]. De fait, à très peu d’exceptions près, la presque totalité de la littérature secondaire sur l’argument évolue dans le cadre arrêté par Vlastos : la plupart des interprètes partagent [...]
Find out moreThree Reasons that the Five Uses of διάνοια in Parmenides are Significant Although the word διάνοια appears only five times in Parmenides, an analysis of those uses sheds light on three significant issues in the study of Plato: (1) the value of Aristotle’s testimony on the status of mathematical objects as “Intermediates” (τὰ μεταξύ), (2) the value of Aristotle’s testimony about the role of the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato’s ἀρχαί-metaphysics, and finally (3) the unity of Plato’s Parmenides itself, and more specifically, how the hypothesis-based investigation of the One in the second part of the dialogue actually contributes toward its stated purpose (135c8-d1): to provide the young Socrates with the exercise he needs before defining what is καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν “and each one of the forms [καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν].” To state the paper’s thesis in a preliminary way, if the true One, thanks to its [...]
Find out moreSocrate en devenir. L’évolution spirituelle de Socrate comme clé herméneutique du Parménide Le Parménide est le texte qui, plus que tout autre, force le lecteur à interpréter activement et à se demander ce qui constitue une bonne interprétation d’un dialogue platonicien. Il a donné lieu à plusieurs styles de lecture: métaphysique, logique, et plus récemment cosmologique. Un critère plus fondamental consiste à distinguer les interprétations soucieuses de complétude et d’exactitude (respectant la cohérence interne du texte) des interprétations que l’on pourrait qualifier de ‘créatrices’ (lectures d’inspiration néo-platonicienne ou analytique exploitant les ressources philosophiques du texte de façon plus libre). Aussi stimulantes soient-elles, ces interprétations sont ‘atrophiantes’ en ce qu’elles tendent à privilégier une partie du texte au dépend du tout. Ma communication repose sur la conviction qu’une interprétation claire et cohérente du Parménide – dans son entier— est accessible et doit être privilégiée. Deux éléments sont essentiels pour comprendre le [...]
Find out moreI molti sensi dell'Uno nel Parmenide di Platone Non ci sono dubbi sull’importanza del concetto di Uno nella trattazione dialettica della seconda parte del Parmenide. Ma Platone stesso ci invita nei dialoghi a non rimanere vittima dell’errore che le parole ci inducono a fare. Queste danno l’impressione di definire qualcosa di unitario, mentre spesso “nascondono” differenze profonde. Questo è ciò che accade nel Parmenide: con il termine “Uno” Platone mette in gioco realtà diverse, che occorre cogliere. Platone evidenzia subito queste differenze. Infatti l’Uno della Prima tesi non è quello della Seconda tesi. La Prima tesi riguarda un Uno che ha le caratteristiche che Platone stesso successivamente sintetizzerà nella formula uno-uno (ἓν ἕν, 142C3). Data tale natura questo principio assolutamente semplice esclude nella sua stessa valenza semantica ogni articolazione interna e qualsiasi rapporto con qualcosa. Il risultato finale non può che essere negativo: una serie di negazioni che portano alla [...]
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