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July 2019
A Diagnosis of Dialectic in Parm. 142b1-144e7 The Parmenides is the Platonic dialogue that has exercised the most ancient as well as modern exegetes. The analysis of, and the relation between the two parts as well as Plato’s assessment of the Eleatic philosophy of Parmenides and Zeno have been the bones of contention. In particular, the second part of the dialogue is a complex oracle that conceals rather than reveals anything. This paper focuses on the initial two arguments in the second deduction. Though the focus is narrow, the paper draws from the Sophist in order to shed light on both similarities and differences of the notion of dialectic that is executed and in order to evaluate the two arguments. Whenever researchers have referred to the Sophist so far so as to compare wholes and parts of the form of difference with wholes and parts in the two arguments, for [...]
Find out moreHow can the objection about independent existence against knowability be solved through mental gymnastics? (Parmenides, 133b-135b) According to the objector, the main reason for someone to reject that the Forms are αὑτὰ καθ᾽αὑτὰ is that, if they were so, they could not be known (133b4-6). However, Parmenides does not regard the difficulty as insurmountable, but as one that requires an expert ‘willing to follow a long remote proof’ (133 b 4-c1; 135a7-b2). Then, it would be an error to believe that due to their being αὑτὰ καθ᾽αὑτὰ, the Forms must be unknowable[1]. In this paper I shall attempt to defend the view that the expression αὑτὰ καθ᾽αὑτὰ in the sense of ‘ontologically self-subsistent’ should not be understood as ‘radically separated’ from ‘the things among us’ or from our intellects (pace Hermann[2]) though this view might sound strange, as we are used to take it so in Aristotle’s writings[3]. Naturally, [...]
Find out moreOusia and dunamis in the greatest aporia (Parm., 133b4-135b4) Carolina Araújo Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa Brazil The so-called “greatest aporia” confronted by Socrates’s theory of forms is an argument presented by Parmenides in Plato’s Parmenides attempting to prove that we cannot know these forms. This paper disputes contemporary interpretations that defend it as a sound and as a serious objection to Socrates. I first indicate that from the start Parmenides has a conception of ousia incompatible with the one proposed by Socrates, and is therefore not able to pose him a real challenge. Then I show that Parmenides is actually defending a relativist theory, which he discloses gradually in replacing ousia with dunamis as a prior explanatory principle. I offer three arguments for the inconsistency of his thesis. I conclude that Parmenides himself is right in pointing out that not to postulate [...]
Find out more«Théétète» & «Parménide»: le problème des parallèles structurels et discursifs. L'expérience montre que l'étude des textes de Platon peut être basé sur une variété de procédures d'interprétation. Les tendances des dernières décennies ont fait sérieusement trembler des stratégies traditionnelles de la lecture des dialogues de Platon. Et surtout, il nous semble clair que la tentative d'identifier la question principalle du texte concrete, en procédant de la division habituelle en physique, logique, l'éthique, l'ontologie, le gnoseologie, l'épistémologie, ne conduisent pas à la réussite. Dans ce cadre nous voyons maintenant la possibilité de comparer les dialogues, qui sont lieés aux disciplines différentes. Ce droit de comparaison était largement bloqué par les modèles précédents d'études de Platon. Cela est particulièrement vrai pour des dialogues, qui sont unis dans certains cycles - soit par leur sujet dramatique, soit par les noms et l'identification philosophique des personnages qui participent dans ces dialogues. L'un de [...]
Find out moreLa Noesi nascosta. Sulla presenza della teoria platonica dell´Anima nella gymnasia del Parmenide (142a-144e, 155e-157b, 157b-159b) L´obiettivo del mio contributo e´di mostrare che la concezione platonica dell´Anima e della sua attivita´noetica, oltre ai numerosi riferimenti della prima parte del dialogo (132a, 132b-c, 134a-e, 135b-c), e´fortemente presente anche nella sezione dedicata allo svolgimento delle ipotesi sull´Uno. Presupponendo che il fulcro dell´esercizio dialettico sia l´analisi delle relazioni intelligibili (128e-130a, 135d-e), mi limitero´per brevita´a considerare i tre passaggi in cui la presenza di un soggetto pensante viene dichiarata espressamente o almeno e´piu´facilmente riconoscibile. 1) Nel passare dalla prima deduzione (137c sgg.) alla seconda (142a sgg.), ovvero da un´unita´priva di articolazione e non realmente essente (141e-142a) ad una unita´in se stessa molteplice ed essente sotto tutti i rispetti, non e´rilevante solo la diversa considerazione dei rapporti fra l´Uno e l´Essere. Nella seconda deduzione (Parm. 142b-144a) viene reso possibile il passaggio dall´Uno-Tutto di [...]
Find out moreFrom the Theaetetus to the Parmenides This paper will show the continuity of considerations after the Parmenides by observing the relationship between the Parmenides and the Theaetetus, paying particular attention to the expression ‘nothing is one thing just by itself’ in the Theaetetus and the conditional phrase, ‘if one is not’ in the second part of the Parmenides. Although there have been many discussions on interpretations of this latter phrase, scholars have paid little attention to the phrase in the Theaetetus: ‘nothing is one thing just by itself (ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστίν, 152d2-3)’. However, there is a close relationship between these phrases, and I will interpret these phrases from the first part of the Theaetetus. For many years, scholars have debated the Third Man Problem in the Parmenides based on the analysis by Vlastos. While Vlastos analyses the argument, he neglects the words ‘seem (δοκεῖν)’and ‘appear (φαίνεσθαι)’ [...]
Find out moreLa “mayor dificultad” y el conocimiento divino en Parménides 133b-134e Parménides describe su última objeción a la teoría platónica de las Formas (133b-134e) como la “mayor dificultad” (133b4: μέγιστον) (MD) de todas las señaladas, la que conlleva las peores consecuencias y una que solo podría ser resuelta por un sujeto especialmente dotado y dispuesto a seguir una “larga y laboriosa demostración” (133b7-c1). Este juicio contrasta, sin embargo, con la extendida interpretación de la objeción como una serie de sofismas. Si este fuera el caso, las palabras de Parménides tendrían un sentido superficial, presentando como difícil un falso problema. En este trabajo quisiera considerar nuevamente la MD tomando tanto en serio las palabras de Parménides como las críticas al argumento. Para esto (I) presentaré los aparentes sofismas del pasaje, (II) intentaré responder a estos considerando la interpretación de quienes defienden la validez del argumento apuntando a la “separación definicional” de los [...]
Find out moreLʼêtre et le temps dans le Parménide de Platon L’exercice de la deuxième partie du Parménide de Platon contient plusieurs arguments concernant les déterminations temporelles et le temps. L’un, selon les huit hypothèses à examiner (pour le programme de l’examen cf. 136 a et 137 b), est-il « plus vieux » ou « plus jeune » ou « du même âge » (140 e-141 a ; 151 e) ? Est-il « dans le temps » (141 a) ? « Participe-t-il du temps » (151 e) ? Ces arguments sont liés à ceux concernant l’être. L’un « participe-t-il de l’être », « est-il » du tout (141 e ; 151 e) ? C’est sur ce sujet que se terminent les développements de la première déduction (140 e-149 a) et c’est à ces questions qu’est consacrée la section finale deux fois prolongée de la deuxième déduction (151 e-157 b). Si la troisième, la quatrième, la septième et la huitième déduction ne reviennent pas d’une manière explicite sur ces questions, la cinquième [...]
Find out moreLa μεγίστη ἀπορία de Parménide : enjeux théoriques et issues On sait que la plus grande difficulté (μεγίστη ἀπορία) concernant les formes, que Parménide évoque dans le dialogue qui porte son nom, est relative à la possibilité de les connaître. Si l’on admet que les formes sont complètement séparées des choses, choses qui participent des formes, alors elles ne peuvent pas être connues par les hommes, mais uniquement par les dieux. Aux hommes est réservée la seule connaissance de ce qui est dans le monde (Pl. Prm. 134b). Cette critique est la dernière d’une série de difficultés relatives à la théorie des formes avancées par Parménide, qui peuvent être lues comme l’ensemble des difficultés théoriques à surmonter si l’on veut considérer comme valable la théorie des formes. Dans le Parménide, l’aporie reste apparemment sans issue. La difficulté épistémologique soulevée par Parménide est une constante de la pensée platonicienne, plusieurs fois [...]
Find out moreThe Dialogue between Parmenides and Timaeus: the Concept of Eternity in Plato The concept of eternity plays a crucial role in Plato’s philosophy. “Eternal forms,” “the eternal world of forms” are phrases so usual in the literature that “the eternal” could be considered almost as a synonym for the “forms.” Nevertheless, up to the Timaeus, Plato does not offer a more or less complete analysis of the concept. And even in the Timaeus the description of eternity (as well as of the eternal) is ambiguous and causes controversy in the historical and philosophical literature. There are two main strategies for interpreting the notion of eternity in a broader context. First, by eternity one can understand the infinity of time: x is eternal, iff there is no such past when x did not exist, and there is no future when x will not exist. This strategy can be called temporalism. [...]
Find out moreHow does the Sophist reply to the Parmenides? -or- Why the One is not among the Megista Gene This paper explores the relation of the Sophist to the Parmenides; in what ways the Sophist responds to the questions, aporias and demands raised in the Parmenides. It aims to show how the problems encountered in the first part and the categories used in the second part of the Parmenides relate to the solutions proposed in the Sophist. The Parmenides has been interpreted in various ways: as a logical exercise and as a theory about gods, even as an example of perfect symmetry in impossibility. It has been acclaimed as the best collection of antinomies ever produced, but also, as an impossible map; how the theory of forms should not be thought. Its purpose; a parody, or – training; pedagogic, exercise necessary for the proper way to truth. Not, however, to [...]
Find out moreA Long Lost Relative in the Parmenides? Plato’s Family of Hypothetical Methods Plato’s Parmenides has not received the attention it deserves from a methodological perspective, especially as concerns its systematic use of the language of hypothesis. In this paper I argue that the Parmenides contains a unique but overlooked method for testing first principles, a method I call ‘exploring both sides’. Plato has Parmenides recommend exploring the consequences of both a hypothesis and its contradictory then has him employ the method throughout the second half of the dialogue. It is a genuine dialectical method, but distinct from the so-called ‘method of hypothesis’ of the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic in both structure and aim. In this way I challenge Richard Robinson’s influential dismissal of the Parmenides as being of little methodological importance. Interpreters interested in Plato’s use of ‘hypothesis’ (ὑπόθεσις) have focused on the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic and for [...]
Find out moreThe Argument of Zeno at Parmenides 127e1-8 to which Socrates Responds Introduction My goal in this essay is to understand Zeno’s argument, as reported by Socrates, against the thesis that beings are many (ei polla esti ta onta, Parmenides 127e1-2). Socrates’ summary, which Zeno approves (127e5; 128a1-2; 128b8-9), is this: If beings are many, then they must be both like and unlike, but that is impossible: for unlikes (ta anomoia) can’t be likes, nor likes (ta homoia) unlikes? . . . If they were many, they would suffer impossibilities (paschoi an ta adunata). (127e1-8) Three features of the argument create difficulties for interpreters. First, Socrates’ summary does not provide details to fill the gap in the inference from “beings are many” to “they are both like and unlike.” Second, Zeno wants to defend the thesis of Parmenides that everything is one by attacking its opposite. But Parmenides’ thesis [...]
Find out moreUnité et différenciation de l’Être : 139b4-148d8 du Parménide de Platon Parmi toutes les démonstrations faites par Parménide dans la deuxième partie du dialogue, les déductions concernant deux paires de prédicats – à savoir le rapport de l’un avec le tout et les parties, ainsi qu’avec l’identité (ταὐτόν) et le différent (ἕτερον) – semblent révéler la cause qui mène toutes ces déductions à une conclusion absurde. Dans cette série de déductions faites à partir de la première hypothèse « s’il est un » (137b4), l’un n’ayant pas de partie et n’étant pas un tout, l’un n’a donc ni figure, ni limite, ni extrémité, ne se trouve nulle part, et n’est ni en mouvement ni au repos ; aussi, l’un n’étant ni même ni différent par rapport à lui-même et aux autres, il n’est donc ni semblable ni dissemblable, ni égal ni inégal, ni jeune ni vieux, et n’est pas situé dans le temps. [...]
Find out moreLa maschera di Parmenide: riduzionismo ed equiparazionismo nella prima parte del Parmenide Una tradizione interpretativa prestigiosa e ancora oggi abbastanza influente considera il Parmenide un punto di svolta della filosofia di Platone, e ritiene che in esso vengano gettate le basi per una sostanziale revisione della teoria delle idee, se non addirittura per un abbandono di essa. Secondo questa tendenza interpretativa, le obiezioni che il personaggio di Parmenide muove alla concezione delle idee avanzata da Socrate (e molto simile a quella esposta nel Fedone, nel Simposio e nei libri centrali della Repubblica) sono filosoficamente consistenti e determinano l’esigenza di riformulare in modo radicale questa concezione o addirittura di abbandonarla. Si tratta di un punto di vista che reputo profondamente sbagliato, sia perché non esamina le obiezioni di Parmenide alla luce dei principali assunti della dottrina platonica, sia perché non valorizza il contesto dialogico in cui tali obiezioni vengono formulate. Alle [...]
Find out moreThe Second Part of the Parmenides as Plato's "Way of Seeming": What the Equestrian Theme Can Tell Us. Horses and horsemanship are prominent in the pages of the Parmenides that precede its second part. I propose that the system of allusions their mention generates has some bearing on the status Plato intended us to attribute to the arguments that follow the prologue. Antiphon, the immediate source of transmission for the discussion with Parmenides, is described as a dedicated horseman (126c), and first shown to us at his home in the company of a blacksmith, who is there to get instructions about a bridle that Antiphon would like fixed up (127a). In his original poem, the real Parmenides portrays himself as a charioteer who drives his horses to meet with a goddess, whose words he then transmits to the audience for his poem. We have here a parallel, then: two [...]
Find out moreThe number as a prototype of “unified plurality” (Parm.147a3-6) As well known, the second series of deductions related to the first hypothesis “the one is” (Parm.142b1-157b5) aims at examining the consequences for the “one” in relation to the others, i.e. for the “one” that participates in being. Within such a theoretical scenario, the being assigned to the “one” is clearly participative, for which whatever the “one” may be, that is whatever predicate is assigned to it, its being is linked to participating in that specific character. The determination of the being of the “one” in terms of participation allows also to assign this entity a series of qualifications, such as “being identical” and “being different”, which had not been assigned to the “one that is one”, i.e. only for itself, like in the first series of the exercise. In this second deduction, the “one” participates in properties which are considered [...]
Find out moreDiakrisis et Sugkrisis dans le Parménide L’un des intérêts du Parménide est d’offrir un témoignage sur la langue platonicienne de la participation concernant le couple de contraires diakrisis/sugkrisis. Hérité de la physique, ce couple est employé par Platon pour désigner la dialectique non sans une certaine hésitation sur laquelle je voudrais m’interroger. Dans la première partie du Parménide, la séparation ou non-participation est assimilée à ce qu’exprime le verbe « διακρίνεσθαι » (être discriminé, distingué, dissocié) comme en témoigne le passage consacré à l’aporie posée au niveau des Formes (ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι, 129e2-3). Ce verbe s’oppose à « συγκεράννυσθαι » (être confondu, 129e2), un verbe assimilable à sugkrinein comme en témoigne par exemple le Sophiste (243b5-6). Ce passage du Parménide retient l’attention en raison de son contexte : il concerne l’expression « entrelacée en tous sens (παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην », 130a1), dans laquelle on reconnaît la métaphore tisserande (la sumplokè) employée pour décrire la dialectique dans le [...]
Find out more‘Why is the recovery of thought and philosophy conducted through an investigation into the one?’ The outcome of the arguments in the first part of the Parmenides is an aporia and Socrates’ profession (135c7) that he does not at all know where to turn in response to it. The aporia is as radical as can be imagined, because it concerns the prospect of philosophy, and indeed thought in general, being undermined. This prospect, Parmenides has concluded (135b-c), is a consequence of giving up on the existence of Forms, and on our desire to mark off and define them, in response to the series of objections that have been levelled against Forms. The remainder of the dialogue is cast as at least the beginning of a recovery from this predicament, conducted in terms of an extended investigation into the one. But why is the recovery conducted in terms of this [...]
Find out moreLa strada per l’Accademia : Il protrettico implicito del Parmenide di Platone Alcuni tratti del Parmenide non hanno termini di paragone nel corpus platonico. Anzitutto, un Socrate diciannovenne prova a sconfiggere Zenone sul terreno di quest’ultimo, prima di essere ridotto al silenzio da Parmenide. Come Alcibiade o Teeteto, Socrate è qui rappresentato come un giovane promettente ma inesperto, che sembra essere confutato da una benevola e riconosciuta autorità nel campo della filosofia. All’interno del corpus platonico, quindi, il Parmenide riunisce in sé la data drammatica più antica (agosto del 450) e più recente (probabilmente gli anni ’80 del IV secolo), corrispondenti, rispettivamente, alla scena principale del dialogo e alla cornice introduttiva. Il grosso del testo, circa due terzi del dialogo, consiste sorprendentemente in un esercizio dialettico che pare un rompicapo, battezzato dal suo progenitore come un ‘gioco estenuante’ (πραγματειώδη παίδιὰν 137b2). Tale esercizio può essere inteso come un esame serio [...]
Find out moreParmenides on Trial: Infinite difficulties and one challenge In Plato’s Parmenides the reader faces a fictional Parmenides who, in the second half of his exercise, treads the very path which, according to the poem of the historical philosopher, is utterly inscrutable (παναπευθέα, Parm. 2, 6). This puzzling, yet fundamental observation is the starting point for the following claim: The Parmenides represents an invitation to examine critically Eleatic philosophy, which is of central importance to Plato, by revealing some of its difficulties. In light of this assumption, Plato’s masterstroke is to choose the initiator of Parmenidean thought to first question it himself, and to undertake this by the means of his own student Zeno, the ‘Eleatic Palamedes’ (Phdr. 261d6). For the exercise is explicitly (Prm. 135d8) based on Zeno’s method and can be considered a consistent further development of the same. This interpretation presents at least two advantages: firstly, it [...]
Find out moreIf the One is not: Beyond the Arithmetization of Being The Parmenides is a dialogue chiefly introductive. Its collocation within the Platonic corpus leads us to think it prepares the following dialogues, which refer each other in a really unique manner. We must therefore think that these dialogues do anything but develop what is deployed in the Parmenides. The hypothesis I would like to propose is that there is a clear theoretical line from the Parmenides to the Statesman, and it concerns the crisis introduced in the ancient thought by the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. I thus consider all the dialogues, which follow the Parmenides (above all the Theaetetus and the Sophist), as seismographs of the conceptual earthquake produced by this discovery: they move in a disrupted situation, which obscured what once was clear and makes again necessary to inquiry what is science, what is Being, what is the [...]
Find out moreReference, Being and Participation. Parm. 160b4-163b5 and the Sophist It has been frequently remarked in the Platonic scholarship that the so-called fifth deduction (D5)[1] of the second part of the Parmenides (160b5-163b6) paves the way for claims and arguments developed in the ontological section of the Sophist[2]. While I believe that there are good reasons to agree with this claim in general, I consider unsatisfactory the attempts made so far to clarify how exactly this preparation is supposed to work. The aim of this paper is to offer a fresh examination of (the main moves of) D5, in order to shed light on its connections with the Sophist. I shall argue that far from providing us with a clear statement of the arguments or the theses spelled out in the Sophist, and in particular of the new qualified meaning of not-being in terms of difference, D5 is meant to [...]
Find out moreIntra-Socratic Polemics. The Parmenides as part of an anti-megaric programme During the last years, there was a strengthening of the Platonic studies in dialogue with the Socratic philosophies. The exam of the extant materials can shed light on the controversies with contemporaries that motivated numerous passages of the corpus. The expansion of the analysis on lines such as the Megarics, Cyrenaics, Antisthenes, Aeschines, among others, allows transposing the mere suggestion of allusions and conduct a study of the tension between the Platonic philosophy and that of its fellow disciples. The Parmenides offers a compelling case for this line of research, especially taking into account the nineteenth-century historiography that considered it as part of a "megaric period" of Plato coinciding with his prolonged stay in Megara, and even led to reject works such as the Sophist, the Parmenides and the Statesman as texts directly written by authors of the Megaric [...]
Find out moreHow the Separation Argument Frames the Method of Hypotheses Parmenides’ third argument problematizing the young Socrates’ theory of forms—the so-called separation argument—is presented in the text as the most devastating of his three arguments against young Socrates and his position. Many attempts have been made to overcome the double problem presented by the argument: that we humans have no knowledge of the forms and that the gods have no knowledge of us and of our affairs. In this paper I will argue that not only are such attempts doomed to failure, they are unnecessary and even unhelpful. Consequently, I will suggest a different tack. I will suggest that our inability to overcome the force of the separation argument is itself a key of sorts for unlocking Parmenides’ method of hypotheses presented in the second half of the dialogue. That is, our attitude towards the hypotheses should not be to [...]
Find out moreNot being anywhere, it would not be at all (145E): the physical-empirical dimension in the second part of the Parmenides Studies on the second part of the Parmenides usually seem to assume that the dialectical exercise concerns exclusively the intelligible realities, the Ideas and the Principles. It may be useful to focus on those passages that imply empirical and material references, which are often overlooked. The aim is to recognize that Plato never loses sight of the entire sphere of reality, therefore including the physical dimension, even within a metaphysical or – according to other scholars – logical-linguistic reflection. This fact cannot be evaded: it must, instead, be promoted in order to have a more complete and adequate understanding of this decisive part of the dialogue. To this purpose, we will identify in the various arguments those marks which are not only or exclusively referable to the ideal realities but [...]
Find out moreApuleian Evidence regarding Pre-Plotinian Interpretation of the Parmenides The multi-level metaphysical interpretation of Parmenides surfaces openly in Plotinus, most obviously in Ennead V.i [10] 8, where Plotinus is denying his originality. Furthermore, only three of the nine ‘hypotheses’ are correlated with a metaphysical level, so that Plotinus says nothing about the referent of the final two pictures that emerge from the affirmation of the One, nor about what emerges from its denial. For complete interpretations Proclus had to employ Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinus himself presupposes such an interpretation of Parmenides, rather than announcing it. Proclus does not credit Plotinus with the invention of such an interpretation, since at Theol.Plat. 2.4.31.4-22 he thinks that Origenes, having shared the same education, ought to have attributed the same transcendence to the One, following the first hypothesis. Ammonius Saccas is thus credited with separating the Ones described in the first two hypotheses. Clearly, [...]
Find out more“Plotinus and Parmenides” In 1939, F.M. Cornford published his Plato and Parmenides. In the course of this influential commentary on the dialogue, Cornford takes a few pages to heap scorn on what he calls “the Neoplatonic interpretation” of the hypotheses of the second part of the dialogue. In part owing to this dismissal, and no doubt in part owing to many others who have followed Cornford in their work on Parmenides, interpretations of the “exercise,” especially in the English-speaking world, have not been fruitful. Even among those who see in the second part of the dialogue a positive contribution to the solution to the problems raised in the first part of the dialogue, it is supposed that the superposition of a One above Being is irrelevant to that contribution. In this paper, I hope to show that (1) there is an entire “family” of interpretations of Parmenides that can [...]
Find out moreτὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν: Xenocrates and the notion of ἐξαίφνης in Plato’s Parmenides In the second part of Parmenides, several arguments are dedicated to the problem of time. In the first argument (A I), the one is proved to be completely 'atemporal' (141d: οὐδὲ χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔν τινι χρόνῳ). In the second argument (A II), the one participates in time insofar it participates in being (152a: Μετέχει ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι), and in variety of ways: it can be both younger and older than itself (152d4-e3); younger and older than others (153b8-d5; 152e10-153b7); the same age as itself and as others (152e3-10; 153d5-e7). In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with the third argument (A III) on time in its relation to the previous two. Some regard it as an ‘appendix’ to A II (Scolnicov 2003, p. 135) or simply as the third stage [...]
Find out moreSeparation Anxieties. Parmenides 133a-135c There are manifold problems with postulating ἔιδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτα, says Parmenides; but the greatest [μέγιστον] among them is that such beings will be unknowable (by us, as it turns out). Why is this the problem that really worries Parmenides? What is he anxious about? What is it about auta kath’auta that generates the difficulty? And what would it take to dispel it? At first it seems that Parmenides’ worry outstrips the difficulty of the puzzle. The elaboration of this greatest difficulty comprises the assertion of basic principles; a ‘test case’ (‘master’ and ‘slave’); and an application to the case of real interest (‘knowledge’ and ‘knowables’). But the crucial flaw is already conspicuous in the initial principles set out, and the application to the test case does nothing to ameliorate it. If we can identify this misstep, we should be able to dispel the [...]
Find out moreThe Ground of Being in the Parmenides' First and Second Hypotheses: Damascius' Inheritance of Proclus' Reading of the First Hypothesis Like nearly all Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius were well-known for holding an ontological reading of the Parmenides' hypotheses in the second half of the dialogue, according to which the first three hypotheses respectively describe the three main principles of all things: the One, which is prior to Being; Being-itself, or the intelligible world; and Soul and all particular souls. In the background for both philosophers, as with most Neoplatonists, is a longstanding problem of explaining how the second hypothesis' affirmations come to be from the negations of the first hypothesis. This in turn corresponds with the problem of how the principle of Being comes to be from the first principle which is beyond being, so that Being is an effect that comes from a cause that shares none of [...]
Find out moreWhat the instant looks like. Plato’s Parmenides and the science of transition This contribution focuses on Plato’s view of the instant (τὸ ἐξαίφνης) as presented in the Parmenides (156d – 157b). It investigates the relevant tenet according to which the Being and the Becoming of the One can be determined through the transition from a state to another or from affections (παθήματα) or properties to others by means of the durationless instant. First, I argue that Plato’s view of instantaneity cannot be assimilated to any perdurantism. Indeed, when talking about the being of the one in the instant (156 c- 156e), Plato refers to the condition for an inner transition from a state to another to occur. Therefore, the instant is set out of the flow of time. In other words, the “now” (νῦν) cannot be assimilated with the instant. The now or different “nows” can be aggregated and can [...]
Find out moreDer ferne Gott – Ideen auf Distanz? Die siebte Aporie im Kontext (Plat. Parm. 133b4-135b4) Im Eingang des Platonischen Parmenides berichtet Kephalos von einem Gespräch, das der Parmenides, Zenon, der junge Sokrates und ein junger Mann namens Aristoteles vor langer Zeit miteinander in Athen geführt hätten. In dessen Verlauf entspinnt sich ein Dialog des Parmenides mit Sokrates über die Ideen. Parmenides formuliert dabei sieben als Aporien formulierte Kritikpunkte gegen die These von der absoluten Existenz der Ideen, wie Sokrates sie hier vertritt. Im Fokus dieses Beitrages soll die siebte Aporie des Parmenides stehen, die eng mit der sechsten resp. deren Einleitung verbunden ist: Dort formulierte Parmenides das, wie er sagt, größte Problem: Die Erkennbarkeit der Ideen (Parm. 133b3ff.). Die Widerlegung dieses Kritikpunktes könne nur von einem erfahrenen und fähigen Mann nachvollzogen werden. In der siebten Aporia nun fokussiert Parmenides (erneut) die separate Existenz der Ideen und deren Nicht-Erkennbarkeit. Daraus [...]
Find out moreEn tant que dans le Parménide L’opérateur qua permet d’indiquer sous quel rapport quelque chose est dit de quelque chose d’autre ; il peut être exprimé par exemple par le datif grec ᾗ ou l’expression française « en tant que » (voir Bäck: 1996). Dans sa somme consacrée aux propriétés logiques de cet opérateur, Allan Bäck commence par les Premiers Analytiques d’Aristote et mentionne à peine Platon. Cette omission s’accorde avec l’interprétation de commentateurs comme Grégory Vlastos qui estiment que le type de rapports introduit par l’opérateur en tant que est tout simplement incompatible avec les Formes platoniciennes : puisque une Forme F est supposée être toujours F et jamais non-F (voir, par exemple, Banquet 211a), on voit mal en effet comment elle pourrait être dite F sous un certain rapport et non-F sous un autre (Vlastos : 1981). Même dans le Sophiste où Platon soutient que les Formes sont stables car elles sont [...]
Find out morePrädikationen pros heauto im Parmenides als Aussagen über die Struktur von Ideen Constance Meinwald hat mit ihrer Monographie „Plato’s Parmenides“ (1991) eine neuartige Interpretation des gesamten Dialogs vorlegt, die sich hauptsächlich auf dessen zweiten Teil bezieht. Sie vertritt darin die Auffassung, dass die Konklusionen aller acht Ableitungen im zweiten Dialogteil einander nicht widersprechen, sondern dass mit allen acht Konklusionen von ein und demselben Gegenstand, dem Einen (bzw. der Idee Einheit, to hen), Kompatibles ausgesagt wird. Ihre Argumentation beruht auf der Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Prädikationsarten, Prädikationen in Bezug auf anderes (pros ta alla) und Prädikationen in Bezug auf das Subjekt der Prädikation selbst (pros heauto). Die Unterscheidung sei dazu geeignet, aufzuzeigen, dass die Konklusionen aller acht Ableitungen im zweiten Teil wahre und konsistente Aussagen über denselben Gegenstand enthalten, und sie sollen eine Möglichkeit eröffnen, die Argumente des Dritten Menschen im ersten Teil des Parmenides zu parieren. Der Vortrag geht von Meinwalds [...]
Find out moreApparence et ressemblance dans le Parménide : les limites de l’image. (Dialectique de l’apparence et aporie de la ressemblance) Le Parménide présente, dans ses deux dernières hypothèses (plus précisément, dans ses deux dernières « séries de déductions » : 164b5-165e1, 165e2-166c2) un usage systématique des termes d’apparaître (phainesthai) ou d’apparence (phantasma). On étudiera ici le sens et le statut propre à cet usage, qui semble, chez Platon, tout à fait singulier (la singularité s’expliquant en grande partie par la dimension dialectique du raisonnement). I/ La signification de cet apparaître semble à première vue irréductible à d’autres emplois platoniciens du registre du phainesthai. On étudiera donc la spécificité de la relation entre être et apparaître dans le cas précis du jeu dialectique des hypothèses. Cependant, la question se pose aussi de savoir dans quelle mesure les développements sur ce qu’est l’apparence à la fin du Parménide peuvent être éclairés par d’autres dialogues, [...]
Find out moreEnigmatique exaiphnès De l’ensemble relativement réduit d’occurrences du terme exaiphnes dans les dialogues de Platon (36 occurrences réparties en 9 dialogues auxquels s’ajoute l’occurrence de la Lettre VII), les lignes que lui consacre le Parménide (156 c-e) sont parmi les plus célèbres et le lien de l’un et du temps fait l’objet dans ce dialogue de l’une des plus belles pages consacrées, comme dans le Timée, aux formes que peut prendre le temps. Les études récentes (Brisson-Décarie 1987) montrent clairement que cette section du Parménide (155 e 4 – 157 b 5) ne constitue pas une troisième hypothèse autonome, mais examine les conséquences de la série des déductions qui la précèdent, comme le rappelle Parménide quand il dit : « si l’un est, comme nous l’avons déjà exposé ». Ce n’est pas pour autant qu’elle doit être considérée comme un simple appendice dont l’importance n’est pas significative (Graeser 1999 et plus généralement sur [...]
Find out moreThe Problem of Separation in Plato’s Parmenides The Platonic Forms are often characterized as from the sensible objects separately existing entities. The separation is hence one of the most well-known features of Plato’s ontology. In Phaedo, Socrates asserts that the soul as an ontological entity is not the same as the body (Phaedo 80a-b), and the death means the liberation and the separation of the soul from the body (λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος) (Phaedo 67e-d, 80e). This kind of ontological difference between the sensible and the intellectual world will be repeatedly stressed in Republic (514a ff.) and some other middle dialogues. Nevertheless, it is still controversial if the separation of Forms brings Plato troubles in his later dialogues. In the first half of Parmenides, six arguments are introduced to criticize Plato’s theory of Form. It is remarkable that this passage (Parmenides 130a-134e) begins with the problem of separation, [...]
Find out moreThe One and Time: Parmenides 151e-153a In what is traditionally called the Second Hypothesis, Parmenides presents a series of deductions meant to contradict the opposite deductions in the First Hypothesis. In this paper, we will focus on the deduction in the Second Hypothesis which draws out the consequences of the one’s partaking of being, where partaking of being implies partaking of time. While, in the First Hypothesis, Parmenides denies that the one partakes of time, now he supposes that it does. In an elaborate, but careful argument, he draws two conclusions, which contradict one another. First, he concludes that: (III.12) The one always both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself.[1] Second, he concludes that: (IV.4) Since the one is or comes to be for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself, it neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself. [...]
Find out moreThe Eleatic gymnasia In this paper, I discuss the classical problem about the valence of the exercise recommended by Parmenides to Socrates. In Parm. 135b5-137c3 we find the bridge between the first and the second part of the dialogue, which establishes the educational valence of the method displayed in the second part as an answer to Socrates' aporia in the first part. In these lines, Parmenides said that Socrates should be trained in the method that would make him able to "define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all other ideas", which is dialectic as the method of the hypotheses. But why does dialectics is also depicted as a mere exercise (γυμνασία) of babbling (ἀδολεσχία)? Why should it be beneficial for the young? Is its function just propedeutic, or does it possess an epistemic valence? These questions are not just contextual to the Parmenides. These questions are problematic if [...]
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