




July 19-23.2021
Via Zoom



Koinonia in Plato's Philosophy

International Plato Society Mid-Term Meeting

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El horario del programa corresponde a la hora de Lima (GMT-5). Todas las actividades se realizarán a través de la plataforma Zoom. Los participantes recibirán por correo electrónico la contraseña para ingresar a las sesiones.

The program schedule corresponds to Lima Time (GMT-5). All activities will be performed through the Zoom platform. Participants will receive by email the password to enter the sessions.

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PROGRAMA / PROGRAM

LUNES / MONDAY 19

9:00 INAUGURACIÓN / OPENING

9:30-11:30 Chair: **Ivana Costa** | Universidad de Buenos Aires, Universidad Católica Argentina

Lauren Ware | University of Kent, Canterbury
Plato's Bond of Love: *Erōs* and the Participation Relation

Zdenek Lenner | EPHE Paris and ENS Lyon
Koinōnia in the *Symposium*: from community to communion?

Aikaterini Lefka | École Européenne Bruxelles III
Κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων. What Is Common To Friends For Plato

11:45-13:05 Chair: **Alexandra Alván** | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú / Universität Münster

Konstantinos Gkaleas | University of Thessaly
Koinōnia with the body, an arduous task for the soul

Luca Pitteloud | Universidade Federal do ABC
The Community between the Intelligible and the Sensible: the Demiurge as an Epistemic Thought Experiment

15:30-18:10 Chair: **Francisco Gonzalez** | University of Ottawa

Alan Pichanick | Villanova University
The *Koinon Agathon* of Plato's *Charmides*

Fabien Caillé | University of Ottawa
Rethoric and Responsibility in Plato's *Clitophon*

Sarah Feldman | University of Ottawa
Micro-*Koinōniai* and Their Failure in the *Crito*

Lucas Soares | Universidad de Buenos Aires
Psicologización de la política y crítica psicológica de la poesía en *República IV* y *X*

MARTES / TUESDAY 20

9:00-11:00

Chair: **Gabriele Cornelli** | Universidade de Brasilia

Ryan M. Brown | Boston College

Communion with Reality in Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Descent of Beauty

Gabriel García | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

La ciencia en sí misma y la ciencia en nosotros: En torno al rol de la *epistēmē* en el *Fedro*

Christoph Poetsch | Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Two modes of *koinōnia*? A triangular reading of the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the Papyrus of Aï Khanoum

11:15-13:15

Chair: **Renato Matoso** | Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

Catalin Partenie | National School of Political Studies and Administration, Bucharest
Justice and the *koinōnia* of forms in the *Republic*

Raúl Gutiérrez | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Koinōnia y justicia: De la *República* al *Parménides*

Richard Neels | St. Francis Xavier University

Communion and Separation of Forms in Plato's *Parmenides*

16:00-18:40

Chair: **Carolina Araujo** | Unversidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Silvio Marino | Universidade de Brasilia

Koinōnia e dialogo: un modello dialogico e metadialogico

Travis Butler | Iowa State University

Koinōnia and Immanence in the *Phaedo*: Lessons from the Soul-Body Case

Eric Sanday | University of Kentucky

Ethical and Metaphysical Senses of *Koinōnia*

Roberto Granieri | KU Leuven

'*Koinōnia tēs ousias*' or why for Plato to be is not to be *something*

MIÉRCOLES / WEDNESDAY 21

9:00-11:00

Chair: **Luca Pitteloud** | Universidade Federal do ABC

Carlo Delle Donne | Universidad Sapientia, Roma

Ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὕσης. *Koinōnia* and *syngeneia*
in Plato's Philosophy

Anna Marmodoro | Durham University

Plural Partaking

Yu-Jung Sun | University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

The Communing Power of Being and the Communion of Kinds in Plato's *Sophist*

11:15-13:15

Chair: **Claudia Marsico** | Universidad de Buenos Aires

Stephanos Stephanides | Christ's College, Cambridge

Plato on the Mechanics of *Koinōnia*-Formation

Taha Karagoz | Sorbonne University

Koinōnia en tant que combinaison linguistique des lettres, des noms
et des *logoi* chez Platon

Pauline Sabrier | Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Why don't Change and Rest combine with one another? Reconsidering the
communion of kinds in Plato's *Sophist*

15:30-18:10

Chair: **Gabriel García** | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Michael Wiitala | Cleveland State University

The *Koinōnia* of Non-Being and *Logos* in the *Sophist* Account of Falsehood

Tushar Irani | Wesleyan University

Being Together: Platonic *Koinōnia* as Unity in Plurality

William Altman | Independent researcher

Confessions of a Late Learner and Friend of the Forms

Claudia Marsico | Universidad de Buenos Aires

La sombra de Antístenes tras la *koinōnia tōn eidōn* de *Sofista*

JUEVES / THURSDAY 22

IPS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S MEETING

- 11:30-13:30 Chair: **Lucas Soares** | Universidad de Buenos Aires
- Veronika Konrádová** | Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem
Koinōnia and the Psychology of Possession
- Karine Tordo Rombaut** | Université Grenoble-Alpes
How are the virtues conditional upon partnership?
- George Rudebusch** | Arizona University
The Metaphysics of *Koinōnia* of *Ideai* in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*
- 15:00-17:00 Chair: **Rodrigo Ferradas** | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú / Universität Münster
- Etienne Helmer** | Universidad de Puerto Rico
El comercio según Platón: ¿factor de división o de comunidad política?
- Valeria Sonna** | Universidad Autónoma de México
Koinōnía tōn gynaikōn. Mujeres y comunidad política en *República*
- 17:15-19:15 Chair: **Raúl Gutiérrez** | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
- Miguel Spinassi** | Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
Platón y el diálogo común de las *Leyes*
- Giuseppe Grecco** | Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
Shaping the *koinōnia* through emotions: the role of the *pathē* in the 3rd book of the *Laws*
- Ivana Costa** | Universidad de Buenos Aires, Universidad Católica Argentina
La reivindicación de la ficción en la comunidad de los buenos bebedores de *Leyes* I y II

William Altman

Independent Researcher

Confessions of a Late Learner and Friend of the Forms

The Eleatic Stranger’s attack on the Late Learners reduces them to Eurycles, the original *Le Petománe* whose flatulence contradicts what comes out of his mouth. The alleged contradiction relates to *κοινωνία*, and more specifically whether a triad of descriptors—*εἶναι*, *χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων*, and *καθ’ αὐτό*—can be applied to any subject if there is no *κοινωνία* (252c2-5). Interestingly, all three apply paradigmatically to the Platonic Ideas, which alone truly are, exist apart from particulars, and are what they are *καθ’ αὐτό*. In other words, all three might well be applied by the Friends of the Forms to “the Forms” themselves, with which our soul, *διὰ λογισμοῦ*, is said to commune (*κοινωνεῖν*) with *ἡ ὄντως οὐσία ἢ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει* (248a11-12). The Stranger has already used this kind of epistemological *κοινωνία* to set in motion an allegedly unchangeable *οὐσία*: by being known, it has been changed (248d10-e5). In between this “refutation” of the Friends of the Forms and the *reductio ad Eurycleum* of those who allow no linguistic *κοινωνία*, the Stranger introduces the famous Late Learners, and has—at least for the most part—managed to persuade his auditors that these Late Learners have more in common with the latter than with the former. As a self-confessed Late Learner and Friend of the Forms, I want to challenge that view: both are the same, and we do not contradict ourselves by applying *εἶναι*, *χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων*, and *καθ’ αὐτό* to *ἡ ὄντως οὐσία ἢ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει* because only a sharp distinction between *οὐσία* and *γένεσις* justifies the Stranger’s desire to plead for “both” at 249c10-d4, i.e., both for what changes and what does not. In order to sort out the mess the Stranger makes of things, three distinctions are required: (1) between an epistemological and a merely linguistic kind of *κοινωνία* (hence *ἐν τοῖς λόγοις* at 252c5), (2) between two kinds of epistemological *κοινωνία*, one based on the communion of the soul with *οὐσία*, the other on bodily communion with *γένεσις* through perception (248a10), and (3) the views the Stranger expressly attributes to the Late Learners as opposed to those—leading to Eurycles—that he merely posits for a class of those who deny all linguistic *κοινωνία* (251a7-8). At the center of this paper will be my analysis of the only passage that applies explicitly and directly to the Late Learners and the disjunctions we make between One and Many, and between a merely perceptible Man and the Good (251b6-c2). The Stranger too knows

that the truly One cannot be Many (245a8-9), but he manages to make it seem that Late Learners deny the possibility of predication; we don't. It is not on the basis of its merely linguistic autonomy that the Good exists while the good man doesn't but because the *κοινωνία* that accesses the former is not linguistic, and it is only to it that εἶναι, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, and καθ' αὐτό apply.

Ryan M. Brown

Boston College

Communion with Reality in Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Descent of Beauty

In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger briefly mentions the way in which “we commune (*koinōnein*) with the body, through sensing, with becoming, while with the soul, through reasoning, we commune with genuine beinghood (*pros tēn ontōs ousian*)” (248a). Rather than clarify how we commune with genuine beinghood via the soul and its reasoning capacity, the Stranger turns instead to consider the ways in which the various forms—especially the “five greatest kinds”—come into communion with each other. While this discussion is metaphysically rich, the dialogue neglects to consider how exactly we can come into communion with these greatest kinds and thus come to know them. The lack of a discussion of how the soul comes into communion with “genuine beinghood” is made all the more conspicuous by the dialogue's connections to the *Parmenides* (since the Eleatic Stranger is a latter-day Parmenidean), a dialogue which problematizes our capacity for coming into any kind of contact with “genuine beinghood.” If, as Parmenides argues, Socrates's forms are truly separate from their instances, we will have no knowledge of them, and they will have no relation to us.

In this paper, I argue that we get an account of the soul's communion with genuine beinghood in the *Phaedrus*'s Palinode. In the Palinode's myth, Socrates depicts the soul as a winged charioteer and team of horses that is able to follow the gods, when well-ordered, up to a “place beyond the heavens” to see the “genuine beings” (*ta ontōs onta*) and, ultimately, “beinghood beingly being” (*ousia ontōs ousa*). In addition to mythically depicting the soul's communion with reality, the Palinode also discloses both how it's possible for the soul to come into such a communion and what must take place in order for the soul to do so. Accordingly, the *Phaedrus* supplies a resolution to the lacuna in the *Sophist* and meets Parmenides's challenge head on.

For the soul to come into communion with reality, certain anthropological and metaphysical features must obtain. The soul has to be both well-ordered (a significant part of the drama of the Palinode's myth is devoted to this problem) and receptive to the activity of something "higher" than itself whereby it is elevated beyond its mere capacities (this occurs particularly in the relationship between human souls and the gods whom they follow and who inspire human souls with erotic madness). Reality itself also has to be the kind of thing that can "meet us where we are," thus providing the way by which we can be drawn into communion with itself despite the fact that, unaided, we are inadequate for the job. I argue that Beauty is especially relevant to the soul's communion with reality. Beauty "descends" to us and invites us into communion with itself through its radiant images, whereby we can be drawn back up to it as itself. Beauty likewise inspires the gods to descend to us to assist us in the process by leading us to the superheavenly place.

Travis Butler

Iowa State University

***Koinōnia* and Immanence in the *Phaedo*: Lessons from the Soul-Body Case**

When he presents his "safe" account of *aitia*, Socrates offers *koinonia* (translated below as "association") as one option for understanding the causal relation between forms and sensibles (*Phaedo*, 100c9-d6). On this view, the form of Large (for example) causes large things to be large by associating with them. There are strong, initial reasons to suppose that association in this context cannot mean that the forms are immanent in sensible things (as wholes or in part). Among these is the concern that being immanent in sensible objects would compromise the forms' purity and their status as alone by themselves. I argue, however, that careful attention to the use of *koinonia* in the context of soul-body relations shows that this concern is misplaced. In this context, it is not mere *metaphysical* association that compromises purity and aloneness, but *ethical* association resulting from the soul's willing choices (65c5-9, 80e2-5). Because the forms' association with sensible objects is metaphysical and not ethical, it need not compromise purity and aloneness, even if forms are in sensibles.

Koinonia between forms and sensibles

Let's define immanence as follows: forms play their causal role vis-à-vis sensibles by belonging to them and thereby being in them. *Koinonia* and the other terms used to characterize the causal relation between forms and sensibles (e.g. *parousia*, 100d5) connote the presence of forms to sensibles and thereby strongly suggest immanence. But the doctrine of immanence is arguably vulnerable to this Anti-Immanence Argument (AIA):

(P1) If the forms are immanent, they are not pure and alone by themselves.

(P2) The forms are pure and alone by themselves (79d1-7, 83a7-b3).

(C) Therefore, the forms are not immanent.

Koinonia between the soul and the body

Some passages about association between the soul and body seem to support the logic of AIA. These passages seem to imply that the soul's immanence in the body causes recalcitrant impurity that cannot be purified away until the afterlife. Even if the philosopher follows the norm of avoiding association with the body as far as possible (65c5-9), the mere metaphysical association between soul and body will prevent complete purification (66b5-7, 67a6-b2). If this is the settled view in the *Phaedo*, it provides some support for AIA above. In defending his eschatology, however, Socrates not only entertains the possibility of complete purification during human life, he establishes it as the standard for the best afterlife (82b10-c1). Underlying this development is a clarification of the relation between association and impurity: it is not association *simpliciter* that causes impurity, but *willing* association (80e2-5). To associate willingly is to engage in bodily activities beyond what is necessary for the philosophical life (83b5-7). In the case of the soul, then, impurity derives from willing association with the body, not the mere metaphysical association. Given the kinship (*suggenēs*, 79d3) between souls and forms, there is reason to believe the same will hold true for forms: the metaphysical association need not compromise purity and aloneness.

Fabien Caillé

University of Ottawa

Rethoric and Responsibility in Plato's *Clitophon*

Plato's philosophic life has often been the subject of critical scrutiny. Plato did not live a Socratic life. He did not haunt the markets or gymnasia in search of interlocutors with whom to discuss the nature of justice and wisdom. He instead retreated from the city to the Academy where he took students and wrote dialogues. Josiah Ober has challenged that Plato "lacked Socrates' immense physical and moral courage"¹ to live the life of genuine civic engagement that he himself appears to promote in his dialogues. As Ober understands it, Plato has no good reason to reject the Socratic life for himself. He would be reduced to arguing with shadows, to writing dialogues extolling the benefits of justice free from the threat of an ever-vigilant populace. Plato, that is, has separated himself from his community, and therefore surrenders the cause of justice altogether.

In this essay, challenge Ober's account on two fronts. I argue first that Plato had principled criticisms of the Socratic life. These criticisms are most clearly expressed in the *Clitophon*, where Plato shows that by questioning others and exhorting them to pursue justice, Socrates risks contributing to their corruption. Once brought to a state of *aporia*, Socrates' interlocutors become vulnerable to persuasion not just by philosophical speech, but also sophistic speech. If Socrates is not able to persuade them to take up a life of virtue, as he often isn't, then Thrasymachus or some other sophist might seize the opportunity to convert them to the life of pleasure and lawlessness. To avoid this possibility, Plato adopted a new, more responsible method for pursuing justice: written dialogue.

Second, I argue that whereas Socrates could only ever address the individual, Plato must address his texts universally to a whole community because cannot select his audience in writing. In the *Clitophon*, Plato uses this property of writing to his advantage, mixing protreptic and formative modes of discourse in order to gather together his readers in a common pursuit, a common struggle free from the antagonism of Socratic *elenchus*. He invites his readers into the drama of the dialogue in order that they might themselves interpret, debate, and reflect upon the problems presented to them and how they might manifest in the readers' own lives. Plato does not therefore separate himself from his

¹ Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998: 185-186.

political community as Ober says: he draws himself and his community together in the pursuit of justice.

I argue ultimately that Plato recognises in the *Clitophon* the limits of Socrates' philosophical method and surpasses them with his own. He does not in this way give up on the Socratic project. He adapts it for a new and different era, one that is not so easily reached by directly confronting and persuading each individual one at a time. Plato seeks to cultivate justice more responsibly and more effectively by addressing the community as a community in writing.

Ivana Costa

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Universidad Católica Argentina

La reivindicación de la ficción en la comunidad de los buenos bebedores de *Leyes I y II*

En las *Leyes*, y desde la primera página, la pregunta por el establecimiento de las normas que regirán a la *pólis* atiende a un tipo particular de *koinonía*: la comida en común. De las *syssítia* que menciona Clinias, habituales entre cretenses y espartanos (625c y e), la conversación pasa a considerar a los *sympósia* típicamente atenienses como una forma de *koinonía* (639d) de máxima relevancia para la formación de una “comunidad de benevolencia de amigos y entre amigos” (640b: *phílon ... prós philous koinonesánton philophrosýnes*). La referencia a la *philía* en esta singular *koinonía* no es un detalle, sino una diferencia importante respecto de la costumbre cretense o lacedemonia. En primer lugar porque se buscan leyes “para la paz” (*én eiréne*: 640b); en segundo lugar, porque se ha convenido que el mejor juez es el que dicta leyes (628a; cf. E. B. England, 1921, 1: 202 y F. Lisi, 1999, 1: 196) puesto que, junto con la vigilancia, prevé que los ciudadanos *sean amigos*. Además, la bebida en común no sólo ha de ser *entre amigos*: una de sus metas es incluso *incrementar la amistad* entre ellos (cf. L. Strauss, 1975: 15). El tratamiento de comidas y bebidas en común en *Leyes I y II*, que no tiene precedente en la *República*, se ha entendido como vehículo de una “teoría psicológica radicalmente diferente, con importantes consecuencias estéticas” (Belfiore, 1986: 421) que recupera aspectos irracionales para emplearlos pedagógicamente en la reafirmación de la virtud. Allí el Ateniense argumenta que, con una guía recta (641b: *paidagogethéntos katá trópon*) consagrada a la educación de la comunidad de simposiantes (Sauvé Meyer, 2015: 155-156), cada uno de ellos puede

beneficiarse del poder farmacológico del vino para ejercitarse (*meletân*) en ser menos desvergonzado (*anaíschyntos*) y así volverse temeroso de decir o hacer algo vergonzoso (649c-d). Mediante el vino no sólo recuperamos la vergüenza sino también el pudor (671d: *aidós te kai aischýnē*). Quisiera enfatizar que vergüenza y pudor son las dos emociones que, según la principal objeción que plantea *República X* a la poesía imitativa (603e-608b), se relajan cuando sucumbimos al hechizo de las ficciones más eficaces; por eso deben ser expulsadas, al parecer, de *kallípolis*. En *Leyes*, el discurso sobre la importancia educativa de las bebidas en común no es del todo explícito acerca del mecanismo por el cual se produce esta recuperación: se lo ha interpretado como “purga” o “catarsis emocional” que sirve de inspiración a la noción aristotélica (Belfiore, 1986: 433 y 436). Mi propósito es revisar este mecanismo y analizar la exposición de *Leyes I* y *II* no como teoría *radicalmente diferente* sino como continuación atenta a esa exhortación reiterada en *República X*, al final de “la mayor acusación” contra la poesía: la que reclama un argumento que pruebe que ella puede ser necesaria y beneficiosa para la *politeía* (*R.* 607c: *ophelímē pròs tà politeías*). En el nuevo examen, intentaré mostrar, la pedagogía de las bebidas en común sirve de marco a la que tienen, de suyo, la música, la danza y las imitaciones poéticas; y a la vez este nuevo marco ofrece una salida a la “teatrocracia” (701a; cf. Folch, 2013: 562 ss.) que amenaza los valores de la *pólis*. Sin renunciar a la crítica del arte y de los artistas de su tiempo, Platón reivindica con nuevo empeño el valor plástico de la ficción para forjar amistad y modelar dolores y placeres, rechazos y anhelos en una comunidad que armoniza (653b: *symphonéō*) en la virtud.

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Carlo Delle Donne

Universidad Sapientia, Roma

Ἔτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενούης οὔσης. *Koinōnia* and *syngeneia* in Plato's Philosophy

The objective of my paper is to examine the role of *syngeneia* and *koinonia* in Plato's dialogues. Although these notions have never been given much attention by Plato's scholars, particularly when it comes to their relationship, this issue is likely to be crucial in philosophical terms. As I set out to demonstrate, the function of *syngeneia* and *koinonia* can be either "vertical" or "horizontal": in the first case, it turns out to put human intellect in touch with the ideal and divine dimension, so that this proves knowable and imitable; whereas, in the second sense, *syngeneia* and *koinonia* should be considered as referring to both the inner interdependence of the intelligibles, and to our being "tied" both to one another and to the *kosmos*. Moreover, by means of an accurate research for all the occurrences of *syngeneia* and *koinonia* (along with the cognate terms) in Plato's works, I set out to elicit from them all the philosophical assumptions which lie behind, and follow from, the exploitation of these notions. What I will show is that *syngeneia* and *koinonia* play a remarkable role in any kind of philosophically relevant affinity or similarity, for they prove to be the reasons for these similitudes to occur.

Sarah Feldman

University of Ottawa

Micro-Koinōniai and Their Failure in the *Crito*

This paper takes as its starting point the view, as articulated by Alexandru-Ovidiu Gacea, that the soul should be regarded as a "micro-koinonia" that is embodied in the action of the Platonic dialogue. The dialogues, thinks Gacea, show how the micro-koinonia of the soul comprises the "coming-together" of other micro-koinoniai – the circle of family and friends, the agora – that ground an individual's beliefs and commitments. Gacea sees no inherent challenge to the soul-as-koinonia in the conflicts and aporias that pervade the dialogues. Yet most commentators would accept that such conflicts can, in fact, illuminate problematic disunities within the soul. This is widely recognized in the case of elenchus,

where disunity within a character's soul is illustrated (in part) by his failure of self-agreement in the course of the argument.

My concern in this paper, however, is the way in which such conflicts can lead an audience to see this disunity in *themselves* and to recognize its consequences in the breakdown of the self-agreement necessary to maintain their own internal koinonia. One way this is accomplished is through the audience's intellectual and affective identification with two or more characters with conflicting perspectives – that is, conflicting sets of interrelated commitments, values, and desires. When the dialogue leads to a logical impasse or reveals a breakdown in basic agreements about reasons or values, the audience is forced to come to grips with a rupture in their own internal koinonia.

The *Crito* offers a useful illustration of this process for four reasons. First, the dialogue explicitly reflects upon the interconnected ethical and rational bases for koinonia from multiple angles – perhaps most strikingly, through Socrates' speech on the basic values that allow for the "sharing of common ground" (κοινωνέω) and represent a necessary precondition for meaningful discussion (*Cri.* 49c-e). Second, the dialogue demonstrates ways in which shallow agreement can disguise fundamental conflict on such basic values. It also illustrates how this buried divergence undermines the possibility of the kind of genuine debate whose internal corollary, within the micro-koinonia of the soul, is reflective rational thought and deliberation (*Tht.* 189e-190a; *Soph.* 263e-264b). Specifically, I will argue that Crito's commitments, which privilege interpersonal relationships over the relationship to one's own soul, lead to the gradual silencing of his disagreement with Socrates and thus to the failure of the debate. Third, the highly-charged dramatic context of the dialogue, along with the ambiguous dream with which it opens, reinforces audience identification with both Crito's perspective and Socrates'. These perspectives are developed in such a way as to underscore the interrelation between the characters' values, beliefs, and emotions. In this way, the conflict between the two perspectives implicates the audience at a depth that makes it difficult for them to dismiss it as a mere logical puzzle. This means that we have good reason to think that the audience will, in fact, experience the failure of common ground between Crito and Socrates as a challenge to the coherence of their own "micro-koinonia."

Gabriel García

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

La ciencia en sí misma y la ciencia en nosotros: En torno al rol de la *epistēmē* en el *Fedro*

En el *Fedro* se describe la visión que tiene el alma del τόπος ὑπερουράνιος a partir de tres contenidos: la justicia (δικαιοσύνη), la sensatez (σωφροσύνη) y la ciencia (ἐπιστήμη). Solamente de la ciencia obtenemos una mayor precisión, a saber, que a) “no se le añade la generación” (οὐχ ἤ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, 247 d7) y que b) “no se encuentra en cierto modo como algo diferente en algo que pertenece a los que ahora nosotros denominamos seres, sino que es la ciencia que es verdaderamente y se encuentra en lo que es” (οὐδ’ ἢ ἐστὶν που ἕτερα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὐσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, 247 d7-e2). En “‘Der Geistcharakter des Überhimmlischen Raumes’. Zur Korrektur der herrschenden Auffassung von *Phaidros* 247c-e”, W. Schwabe² mostró que este pasaje distingue necesariamente la ciencia “en lo que es” de la ciencia “en lo que ahora denominamos seres”, y que esta última remite a la ciencia como práctica humana de adquisición y transmisión de conocimiento. Mi propósito aquí es examinar la forma en que se plantea esta distinción en el resto de la obra, prestando especial atención a la forma en que Sócrates formula la ciencia “en lo que ahora denominamos seres”. Para ello analizaré dos momentos: 1) el resultado de la visión de la ciencia como un recuerdo, μνήμη, cuando el alma “regresa” al ámbito sensible, así como su recuperación en la relación erótica (en la palinodia); y 2) la forma como se relacionan μνήμη y ciencia en la transmisión del conocimiento (en la crítica de la escritura). La caracterización de la ciencia como “semilla inmortal” contenida en los discursos del dialéctico, en un pasaje (276 e5-277 a4) que evoca la caracterización de la procreación en la belleza como transmisión de una semilla en el *Banquete*, muestra que la ἐπιστήμη en tanto contenido de los λόγοι expresa la relación dinámica entre las ideas. La diferencia entre la “ciencia en sí” y la “ciencia en nosotros” remite por tanto a una interpretación de la ciencia como “rasgo estructural” del ámbito eidético, del mismo modo que la justicia en la *República* (500 c3-4, las ideas no cometen ni padecen injusticia unas respecto de las otras) y, cabe suponer, la sensatez.

² En: Szlezak, T. y Heinz, K. (Hg.), *Platonisches Philosophieren*. Hildesheim: Olms, 2001.

Konstantinos Gkaleas

University of Thessaly

Koinōnia with the body, an arduous task for the soul

In the tenth book of the *Republic*, Plato uses the term κοινωμία (*koinonia*) in association with the physical body. While examining the true nature of the soul, Plato explains that her original purity along with her beauty cannot be revealed as a result of her κοινωμία *with the body and other miseries* (611c). Prior to this passage, in the first book of the *Republic*, Plato states that it is not enough for the body to be the body, standing in need of something else, since it is axiomatically defective and that's the reason why the art of medicine was invented (341e). In the same context, Plato relates again the term κοινωμία with the body in the dialogue *Phaedo*, where he alleges that, in contrast to all other men, the philosopher will try to release his soul as much as he can from the κοινωμία with the body (65a), *for the body is forever taking up our time with the care which it needs, filling us with passions and desires and fears and all manner of phantoms and much foolishness* (66b-c). It seems that the communion with the body is an arduous task for the soul; nevertheless, *the wise soul will not yield to the passions of the body*. On the contrary she leads all the elements which she is said to consist of, choosing to oppose them and furthermore to chastise them, *sometimes severely, and with a painful discipline, such as medicine and γυμναστική* (*gymnastikè*) (94c-d). It is quite important that we explore such a concept, where the art of γυμναστική becomes a mean to ameliorate the relation between the body and the soul. In the first place, γυμναστική helps the body to cope with the matters of physical health by protecting or restoring its equilibrium, but the second favourable impact of the specific discipline relates with the soul. To be more precise, γυμναστική fortifies the θυμοειδές, contributing to its virtue (ανδρεία). The thymic part of the soul - when it is well educated and uncorrupted - acts as a natural ally to the rational part of the soul (λογιστικόν), facing together the complications that originate in the κοινωμία with the body. It is thus necessary to use the *painful discipline* in order to facilitate the proper hierarchical function of the soul and soften the effects of her coexistence with the body. In this paper we will shed as much light as possible to the notion of κοινωμία with the body predominantly in regard to γυμναστική in the interest of comprehending exactly the structure and the functioning of this relation.

Roberto Granieri

KU Leuven

‘Koinōnia tēs ousias’ or why for Plato to be is not to be something

My aim in this paper is to challenge a consensus view regarding Plato’s conception of being, through an in-depth examination of *Sophist* 250a11-b11. I will especially focus on the notion of *koinonia tēs ousias*, which appears prominently in this passage (250b10-11). The consensus view in question is aptly summarized by the famous slogan, authoritatively introduced by G.E.L. Owen and echoed by many, that for Plato ‘to be is to be something’. This slogan is typically explained by saying that for Plato to exist always means to exemplify or instantiate a determinate property (different from sheer being). For example, when Plato says ‘Motion is’ he does not mean that Motion just exists; instead, he means that Motion is *as moving*, or is *itself*, or is *in motion*. I think this reading is misconceived and that *Sophist* 250a11-b11 (among other texts) disproves it. Here, the Eleatic Stranger argues, among else, that [1] ‘to be’ (εἶναι) is said *in the same way* (ὁμοίως) of *both and each* (ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἑκάτερον) of Motion and Rest; [2] that for *both and each* of Motion and Rest ‘to be’ does not mean either ‘to be in motion’ (κινεῖσθαι) nor ‘to be at rest’ (ἑστάναι); [3] instead, it means just to be, which is metaphysically explained by appeal to combination with being (b10-11: τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωσίαν). Plato’s reiterated emphasis on the pair ‘ἀμφότερα καὶ ἑκάτερον’ (250a11-12, b2) suggests a reformulation of the first two claims in a slightly different, if perfectly equivalent, phraseology: (i) for Motion to be is *neither to be in motion*, nor to be at rest; (ii) for Rest, to be is *neither to be at rest*, nor to be in motion. Hence, in this lines Plato overtly rejects analyses of ‘Motion is’ as ‘Motion moves’, or ‘Motion is motion’, or ‘Motion has the nature of what moves’. So explained, then, to be is not to be *something*: it is just to be (*simpliciter*), i.e., as [3] establishes, to possess the property of being, obtained through combination (κοινωσία) with Being, viz., with what will soon be identified as the Kind Being, one of the *megista genê*.

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Giuseppe Grecco

Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

Shaping the *koinōnia* through emotions: the role of the *pathē* in the 3rd book of the *Laws*

The subject of this paper is the role of the emotional sphere in the historical development of political community in the 3rd book of the *Laws*. In this section of the dialogue Plato examines the origins (*arche*) of political institution (*politeia*). Thus he proposes to consider the origins of the concrete political organizations and its further development and crisis, by focusing on those he regarded as the three most representatives political communities of all times: the Peloponnesian Confederation, the Persian empire and the Athenian democracy.

I propose to observe how along the discussion of the 3rd book Plato describes such historical formation of political community (*koinonia*). My main focus will be on the contribution of emotions to the formation, development and preservation of social life and political organization.

I will thus consider firstly the role played by emotions and passions in the good or bad deliberation of individuals and, consequently, in their concrete actions. As I try to show, a special relevance is assumed by ‘fear’ and ‘courage’. Indeed throughout the historical description, they are indicated as the principal driving element of human actions. The question is whether these irrational instances have only a negative effect or, on the contrary, a positive one too.

Secondly, I will try to define how such virtuous or bad actions shape the destiny of communities, towards success or failure. In this perspective, I will focus on the Plato’s observations about the role of individuals – leaders or common citizens – in the welfare of communities, both in monarchies and democracies.

Finally, I will consider how Plato defines the mutual relationship among emotional sphere, intellect and virtue both in an ethical and political level. I will try to show how, through the observation and analysis of historical process, Plato seems to formulate a complex scheme, where emotions, intellect and virtuous actions feed back into each others.

At the same time, I will observe that a similar mechanism is also recognized in the bond between individuals and community. On the one hand, politics is responsible for improving citizens’ souls through education. Conversely, the development of healthy and virtuous

souls promotes the establishment of good community politics. Nevertheless, this circular mechanism can also work in the opposite direction, in a circle which may potentially result in either virtuous or destructive outcomes.

Raúl Gutiérrez

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Koinōnia y justicia: De la *República* al *Parménides*

La razón fundamental por la que según cierto modelo historiográfico el Parménides platónico constituye un diálogo de crisis en el desarrollo del pensamiento de Platón, es la supuesta presencia en él de una crítica de la Teoría de las Ideas expuesta en los diálogos del período medio – *Fedón*, *Simposio*, *República*, *Fedro*. Según ese modelo, la insuficiencia de esa teoría consistiría en una concepción de las Ideas como unidades absolutamente simples y completamente aisladas que les impediría cumplir la función para la cual habrían sido concebidas. Eso es precisamente lo que demuestran tanto la crítica a la Teoría de las Ideas expuesta por el joven Sócrates como la primera deducción de la segunda parte de ese diálogo. Como señala Parménides, si hay que darle crédito a esa deducción, esto es, si lo uno es concebido como una unidad absoluta que excluye toda relación, ni sería uno ni sería, y no habría nombre ni enunciado, ni ciencia, ni sensación ni opinión que le correspondan (*Parm.* 141e-142a). Así pues, concebidas como unidades completamente separadas en sí mismas, las Ideas serían inútiles para explicar el ser de las apariencias tanto como el pensamiento y el lenguaje. Esa función solo podría ser cumplida por una nueva concepción relacional de las Ideas que estaría sugerida en el *Parménides* y desarrollada en el *Sofista*. Es aquí donde se habría examinado por primera vez la noción de una “comunidad” o “comuni6n” de ideas o géneros (κοινωνία τῶν εἰδῶν, κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν) como revisión de la teoría inmadura de las Ideas del período medio. A pesar de los múltiples y diversos intentos de refutar este modelo historiográfico cuya acta de defunción, a mi parecer, ha sido emitida en varias ocasiones (Ferrari 2000, 374-376), persisten interpretaciones que la dan por supuesta. Por contraste con la que yo llamaría una estrategia del silencio (Cordero 2014), quisiera, en primer lugar, insistir en que la noción de *koinonía* es fundamental e imprescindible para el proyecto de la *República*, pues su tema central, la noción de justicia, es impensable sin la noción de *koinonía* entre las Ideas. Y, en segundo lugar, y desatendido por los especialistas, quisiera llamar la atención sobre el uso de la noción de justicia de la *República* en el Parménides (cf. 150a), precisamente en conexión con la cuestión de

la interrelación eidética (143a-b) y la concepción de la Idea como un todo (ὅλον) “que ha surgido como un uno a partir de todas las partes - ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός” (157e1, ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν, 157c6, ἐν τέλειον μόρια ἔχον, 157e4).

Etienne Helmer

Universidad de Puerto Rico

El comercio según Platón: ¿factor de división o de comunidad política?

Según una larga tradición interpretativa, se suele pensar que los filósofos griegos despreciaban no solo las actividades económicas productivas, por ser ejecutadas por los esclavos y las mujeres, sino también el comercio en sus diversas manifestaciones: tanto el comercio al por mayor entre ciudades, como el comercio al por menor dentro de las ciudades. Según esta interpretación, Platón se conforma con la tradición poética homérica y hesiódica al respecto: el comercio tiene la reputación de ser un oficio asociado con la deshonestidad y el afán de lucro, por lo cual se estima que propicia más la división y el conflicto que la armonía y la cohesión social. Esta interpretación se apoya principalmente en dos argumentos. En primer lugar, Platón hace una crítica bastante fuerte de la mala influencia ética y política que los puertos y sus actividades comerciales pueden tener sobre la armonía de la *polis* (*Leyes* IV, 704d-705b). En segundo lugar, un aspecto de sus recurrentes críticas a los sofistas consiste en destacar el hecho de que venden su engañosa enseñanza a sus alumnos, y parecen estar más motivados por hacerse ricos que por una genuina búsqueda de la verdad (*Sofista* 231c-d).

Sin embargo, una lectura minuciosa de algunos pasajes de Platón revela otra vertiente de su acercamiento al comercio y su influencia sobre la cohesión de la *polis*. Tanto en el Libro II de la *República* (370e-371d) como en el Libro XI de las *Leyes* (918c-d; 920b-c), Platón enseña que es posible entender las actividades comerciales como algo beneficioso para la comunidad. Cuando el comerciante se limita a una “ganancia moderada” (κέρδος ποιεῖ τὸ μέτριον, *Leyes* XI, 920c), introduce igualdad en la *polis*, y cuando practica su actividad sin recurrir al fraude, propicia la *philia* mutua entre sus miembros.

El propósito de esta comunicación es demostrar que, en la *República* y en las *Leyes*, Platón ve en el comercio bien organizado un factor que favorece la comunidad de la *polis*. Para ello examinaremos en qué sentido debe entenderse esa “ganancia moderada” en la cual descansa el papel político positivo del comercio.

Tushar Irani

Wesleyan University

Being Together: Platonic *Koinōnia* as Unity in Plurality

Drawing mainly on the *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, and *Laws*, I argue in this paper that *koinōnia* implies *kinēsis*, and that the best kind of *koinōnia* implies the best kind of *kinēsis*. Plato identifies such *kinēsis* in several dialogues with the expression of unity in plurality. Interpersonal *koinōnia* illustrates such unity, and it represents the same sort of unity exhibited by the interrelatedness of the forms.

A key text for me in developing this view is the *Sophist*, which provides a good starting point for Plato's understanding of *koinōnia*. In this work, to clarify what he means by the verb *koinōnein*, the Eleatic Visitor provides Theaetetus with the following account of the term:

An affection or an affecting that arises from some power when things come together in relation to one another (πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον). (248b5–6)

This account is a general one: any state of *koinōnia* implies an affection (*πάθημα*) or an affecting (*ποίημα*) that results from things coming together in some way. The account thus strongly suggests that *koinōnia* implies *kinēsis*. Further, it implies a certain unity arising out of plurality. If this account applies to the *koinōnia* of the forms, we must infer that the forms exhibit a certain kind of *kinēsis*. The *kinēsis* they exhibit, I claim, is a kind of self-motion. And the *kinēsis* we exhibit in coming to know the forms is likewise a kind of self-motion.

Taha Karagoz

Sorbonne University

Koinōnia en tant que combinaison linguistique des lettres, des noms et des *logoi* chez Platon

Dans ce travail, nous interrogeons si, dans le *Sophiste*, Platon construit une relation parmi la combinaison de lettres dans les noms, voire le niveau syntaxique de la langue, et la combinaison de noms dans les *logoi* où les noms sont prédiqués d'autres noms, voire le

niveau sémantique de la langue, et si l'une de ces combinaisons précède l'autre en en étant dépendante ou si les deux sont interdépendantes. Autrement dit nous essayerons d'examiner si l'émergence des lettres, des noms et des *logoi* se produit chacune indépendamment les uns des autres ou bien si l'un de ces processus est dépendant à l'autre, ou bien si tous les processus sont interdépendants et simultanés de sorte que les lettres n'apparaissent qu'en se mélangeant dans les noms qui se construisent eux-mêmes en se mélangeant dans les *logoi*.

Dans le dialogue, Platon présente une forme de *koinonia* afin de commencer à construire sa propre ontologie: la combinaison des lettres dont certaines sont en commun et d'autres non. Autrement dit, les lettres peuvent se rassembler grâce aux voyelles qui fonctionnent comme le lien établissant une connexion entre elles. En effet les voyelles deviennent, sans consonne, un phonème ininterrompu dans lequel chaque lettre perd son unité propre et se perd dans la totalité comme dans l'ontologie parméniidienne. Les consonnes, de surcroît, ne peuvent même pas être prononcées sans voyelles comme dans les ontologies de la multiplicité sans interaction. Dans ce contexte, Platon souligne que les lettres se manifestent à travers la combinaison de voyelles et de consonnes sous la forme de l'articulation de sorte que cet exemple représente son ontologie de la façon la plus juste.

Ensuite, Platon explique que le logos se construit en tant que produit de cette ontologie et il précise que la question du logos sera discutée en considérant la combinaison des lettres de sorte que cela nous montre qu'il a établi un lien entre le niveau syntaxique de la langue et le niveau sémantique. Par la suite, il décrit que le logos est nécessairement assemblé des *onomata* et des *rhēmata*, et non pas par simple suite de noms ou des verbes. À cet égard, les noms ou les verbes consécutifs ne signifient rien, donc un nom et un verbe ne peuvent être tels qu'au sein du logos dans une relation qui consiste dans la prédication.

Enfin, considérant l'ontologie platonicienne, ainsi que le fait que les lettres n'apparaissent que dans les noms qui les combinent et les noms également n'apparaissent que dans les *logoi* qui les combinent, il devient clair que ni les noms combinés des lettres ne précèdent les *logoi* combinés des noms, ni les *logoi* ne précèdent les lettres: ils semblent tous simultanément interdépendants. À cet égard, il n'y a pas de lettres sans *logoi*, les lettres n'apparaissent qu'en tant qu'unités sonores qui sont articulées dans les noms combinés dans les *logoi* uniquement composés de lettres en commun/en relation (*koinonia*) dans les noms.

Veronika Konrádová

Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem

Koinōnia and the Psychology of Possession

This paper addresses the concept of *koinōnia* discussed in Plato's *Republic*. It particularly focuses on the specific ways the term enters the discussion about social organisation within the guardian class, such as the proposal for abolishing a nuclear family in favour of the community of wives and children. Through a detailed analysis, the paper seeks to reveal the subtle complexity of the ethical, political, social and psychological aspects of this issue.

The textual basis for the examination is drawn from relevant passages in Book III and V, which introduce the idea of common property and intimate relationships (*Resp.* 416d–417b, 457c–465d), and Book VIII and IX, which explore the corruptive factors jeopardising the stability of the *polis* (*Resp.* 547b ff.). The paper promotes a complementary reading of these passages, as it helps highlight the fundamental psychological grounding in the radical rearrangement of the traditional household structure, fostered in the 'second wave' of the *Republic*.

The paper primarily examines the permanent tension between the 'private' and 'common', and the strict preference for the latter over the former. A specific expression of this preference is the requirement of mutual sharing – even in areas naturally considered the most private, such as intimate relationships, family ties, beliefs, decisions, actions and feelings – which is a mechanism of establishing mental and emotional cohesion to the *polis*. This interpretation relates these proposals to a unifying idea defined as the 'psychology of possession'. This thought complex is explicitly elaborated in Book IX, which presents a profound analysis of the soul's inner dynamic. Here, Plato pays particular attention to the risks inherent in dominance and the unrestrained growth of the epithumetic part of the soul. Identifying greed as a common denominator of desires that stems from the *epithumêticon*, he simultaneously regards acquisitiveness as the prime force of destruction among humans. Above all, Plato's description of the parallel process of psychological and political decline – initiated by the universal desire to possess – sheds further light on the motivation for promoting a collectivist way of life in the guardians' community.

In this regard, the paper highlights the intensive efforts to suppress possessive tendencies, both at the level of material goods and of personal affections and relationships. Subtle

elaboration begs the question of how innovative measures in the guardian class cope with the complexity of inherited ideas about the domestic economy and institution of marriage. Here, the paper points out particularly the ambivalence of protective and destructive aspects associated with the institution of marriage, which Plato addresses in his project. From this perspective, the proposal for shared property *and* shared women represents one coherent step in Plato's political legislation, binding together deeply rooted notions of the mutual interconnection of property and marital relationships, including permanent fears about domestic disruption and its political consequences.

By focusing on these topics, the paper aims to show the psychological basis connecting Plato's socio-economic proposals to his principal ethical and political concerns.

Aikaterini Lefka

École Européenne Bruxelles III

Κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων. What Is Common To Friends For Plato

Plato cites in different passages of his dialogues the well-known maxim: “κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων”. The Pythagoreans expressed thus an original position concerning especially the property of material goods and one of the radical principles of their political theory. Plato speaks about the community of wealth (*Lysis* 207 c 7-11), but he refers also to a great variety of other “goods” that can be shared by friends.

To cite only some examples, Crito considers shameful for himself and the other familiars of Socrates to let him be executed without trying to use their resources to organize his escape, as if money were of greater importance to them than friends (*Crito*, 44 b 5-46 b 8). Socrates refuses to profit from this opportunity, but remains confident that his intimates, with whom he shared his everyday life, will take good care of his family after his death (*Crito*, 54 a 1-b 1), a duty usually assumed by the eldest closest male relative of the departed.

In the ideal Platonic Kallipolis the philosopher-governors, men and women, don't have any property to share, but they live together as a community of companions and their children are raised collectively as “brothers” and “sisters”, calling “father” and “mother” all the persons of age to be their biological parents (*Republic*, IV, 423 e 4-424 a 2; V, 449 c1-462 a 1).

The philosopher-governors share also an extraordinary desire and capacity for knowledge, a high education in all sciences, including the dialectics leading to the Idea of the Good, and the application of their theoretical expertise in administrative tasks, as they are totally dedicated to the realization of the city's *eudaimonia* (*Republic*, III, 412 c 9-e 8).

As for Socrates and his companions, they also engage in an educative dialectical exchange of ideas and rational arguments, motivated by their common love for wisdom and truth. Their knowledge should contribute to their becoming better persons and citizens (*Apology of Socrates*, 30 a 2-b 4). Thus, they naturally strive – and may even pray - for an excellent life for themselves as well as for their friends (*Phaedrus*, 279 b 8-c 7).

Besides, the very definition of friendship presupposes that the persons who participate in it are at the same time partaking in goodness, as evil persons cannot become friends (*Lysis*, 214 b 8-e 1). Moreover, they show a mutual good will, affection and care towards one another, because they share at least some common characteristics of their soul (*Lysis*, 221 e 5-222 a 3). They are alike, naturally linked together and thus their meeting is attributed to a divine providence by some poets (*Lysis*, 214 a 2-b 1).

In my paper, I propose to examine the definition and the importance of the sharing of various kinds of “goods” among friends in Plato’s works, in the public and in the private domain. I shall take under consideration the theoretical treatment of the subject, as well as what one may deduce from the apparent practices of the interlocutors, especially Socrates and his companions. I hope that in this way some more light may be shed on the multiple and crucial role of the notion of community in friendly interpersonal relations for Plato, which includes not only material, social, political and ethical aspects, but also emotional, epistemological, educative, ontological and religious ones. Indeed, a human being couldn’t develop his personality, lead a “good life”, and perhaps even exist outside a *κοινωνία φίλων*.

Zdenek Lenner

EPHE Paris and ENS Lyon

***Koinōnia* in the *Symposium*: from community to communion?**

Symposia were in Antiquity fundamental social institutions, not only strengthening the social bonds between citizens through commensality (Schmitt-Pantel, 1992), but also promoting education and social integration of young people through *paiderastia* (Dover, 1978), and

even establishing a connection with the gods through ritual sacrifices and the sharing of animal parts (Detienne and Vernant, 1979). Now what Plato's *Symposium* does, is to shift from this traditional paradigm to a philosophic one, through a playful satire of the masculine model of sexual and epistemic transmission, and a sharp critique of ancient poets and theogonies definitely separating men from gods (Brisson 1998, 2006).

From this perspective, the three occurrences of *κοινωνία* in the dialogue (182c3, 188c1, 209c5) are very significant of the shift between the first five speeches more or less sophistic (except for that of Aristophanes maybe) and the more philosophic one from Socrates-Diotima, and should be rendered differently in modern languages as they convey different conceptions of *eros*.

First, by separating the Celestial Eros from the Vulgar Eros, Pausanias praises the good one in the name of freedom against tyranny, as ensuring “solid friendships and strong solidarities” or “communities” (*φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωνίας*)³. But this paiderastic and political conception of *eros* aims in fact at establishing an asymmetric *philia* and *koinonia* which might be temporary, as is a need and a use, except for the uncommonly durable relationship between Pausanias and Agathon.

Then, extending the distinction made by Pausanias to the whole universe, Eryximachus praises the harmony of the opposites in medicine, music, and religion. Sacrifices and divination are indeed ways of “communication between gods and humans” (*ἡ περὶ θεοῦς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία*), hence the task of divination is to heal the Erotes in the name of piety. Still, this geometric and cosmic conception of *eros* aims by its cure to maintain the hierarchical separation between gods and men as Pausanias is willing to do so between *erastai* and *eromenoi*.

Finally, Socrates, who arrived after the *deipnon*, reminds Agathon of a speech of the prophetess Diotima, who had predicted that the philosophic lovers will enjoy “a much more intimate communion than that which consists in having children together, a much more solid affection” (*πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν τῆς τῶν παιδῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἴσχουσι καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιωτέραν*). Their children will be more immortal than the human one's, because they have elevated themselves, as Socrates and Agathon, to the divine, and finally commune with it as the philosopher at the end of the night.

³ We follow Brisson's translation in French: *Banquet* (Garnier-Flammarion, 2018: new edition corr. And agm. [1998]).

We propose to read this progression in the light of the tripartition of *philia* and *eros*, which is an intensified *philia*, in the *Laws* (VIII, 836e5-837e1). Whilst Pausanias and Eryximachus are praising love as a kind of friendship and community between dissimilars and unequals, Socrates- Diotima is elevating Agathon to the love of similars which might tend, though not in the corporeal way of Aristophanes's myth, to real communion with the divine.

Silvio Marino

Universidade de Brasilia

***Koinōnia* e dialogo: un modello dialogico e metadialogico**

Lo scopo di questo contributo è quello di analizzare la *koinonia* come comunità dialogica e la sua strutturazione così come si presenta all'interno dei dialoghi di Platone. L'analisi prenderà le mosse, pertanto, dalla genesi della *koinonia* dialogica per metterne in luce le dinamiche e quindi i fini, per concludere che il tipo di comunità che Platone ha in mente, per anima, discorso e città, ha come fondamento strutture dialogiche, e che essa si comporta come un *holon* in cui tutti gli elementi in causa concorrono all'armonia del tutto.

Che un dialogo condotto correttamente costituisca una comunità di amici non è tema nuovo. Tuttavia è importante considerare il modo in cui tale *koinonia* si dà, quali sono le condizioni di possibilità affinché essa nasca, come essa si struttura all'interno dei rapporti dialogici, e infine cosa essa determini ai fini del dialogo stesso e cosa implichi.

Il termine *koinonia* assume, a seconda dei contesti in cui occorre, molteplici sfumature di significato. Di fatto, esso è utilizzato per indicare la comunanza tra gli interlocutori di un dialogo, quella di donne e figli nella *Repubblica*, quella tra *logistikon* e *thymoeides*, quella tra i cittadini della *Kallipolis*, quella tra le discipline, e quella tra gli *eide*.

Nei vari contesti in cui occorre, il termine *koinonia* specifica non soltanto i propri sensi, richiamando i termini che concorrono a connotarla (*philia* e *philos*, *syngeneia* e *syngenes*), ma determina anche opposizioni polari richiamando termini che si pongono come antonimi (*stasi* e il verbo *stasiazo*).

Nel *Simposio* (209b-c) Diotima descrive come nasce la comunanza-comunità dialogica. Essa nasce appunto dall'incontro di persone che sono gravide di bei discorsi sulla virtù

e sull'uomo buono, specificando che esse hanno una 'comunanza' maggiore che con la propria prole. La comunità dialogica, pertanto, si definisce in base all'affinità che si riscontra nei discorsi, e di questo il *Politico* (258a) ci dà una chiara testimonianza, poiché i *syngeneis* si riconoscono attraverso i discorsi. Tuttavia, perché si abbiano dei dialoghi condotti in maniera corretta è necessario che essi abbiano determinate caratteristiche, la più importante della quale è la condivisione, da parte degli interlocutori, della medesima disposizione d'animo, da cui deriva il parlare *kata doxan*, secondo quanto ciascuno di essi pensa, senza infingimenti (*Cratilo* 49c-d). Di fatto, gli interlocutori di un dialogo, che non sia un agone di discorsi, sono individui amici, congeneri tra di loro e soci di un'impresa, come il *Lachete*, la *Repubblica*, il *Protagora* e il *Politico* dicono esplicitamente.

La *koinonia* dialogica sembra pertanto indicare una comunanza che sfocia nella costituzione di un *holon*, in cui tutte le parti che lo costituiscono operano in maniera armonica al tutto. Ed è proprio questa conclusione che è capace di portare il livello del discorso su altri piani, perché questa *koinonia* dialogica diviene metadialogica in quanto struttura delle dinamiche corrette che l'anima e la città presentano, oltre che, perfino, il modo con cui il cielo, la terra e gli uomini sono legati gli uni agli altri (*Gorgia* 508a).

Anna Marmodoro

Durham University

Plural Partaking

I argue that Plato offers us a thoroughly different way of conceiving of relations than the way we, post-Russellian philosophers, understand them. We (generally speaking) primitively assume that, whereas monadic properties, (Fx), only qualify their subjects, polyadic properties, aka relations (xRy), somehow both qualify their relata and additionally relate them. How polyadic properties can perform these two different metaphysical functions (in contrast to monadic properties, which perform only one function) is left unaccounted for in modern metaphysics. Plato does not make such a (metaphysically unjustifiable, I submit) assumption. Making a departure from the received scholarly view, I argue that Plato holds that Forms *only qualify* their partakers, and I show how they do so by way of two types of partaking: *individual and plural*. There is no metaphysical 'mechanism' by which the Forms could additionally relate their partakers to each other, nor did Plato assume there is one.

My general interpretative proposal (defended elsewhere in full) is that (pre-*Timaeus*) for Plato Forms qualify their partakers by overlapping constitutionally with them (as the Opposites do in Anaxagoras's system). In examining the issue of relations, here I argue that Plato enriches Anaxagoras's model of constitutional overlap by positing that two or more objects may overlap with a certain Form together, and only together, thereby coming to possess jointly a single part of that Form. This innovative conception of *plural partaking* eliminates the need to posit relations in the ontology, and yet it captures the interdependence of related entities. To illustrate: for Plato, stones of equal size and shape are not each equal to the other; they are equal *with* each other, in the way that you and I are two, not individually, but only *together*. That is to say, they are not related to one another by a relation of equality; rather, they are jointly qualified as equal, by sharing between them a part of the Forms of Equality/the Equals. Plato develops different types of plural partaking, which I call *joint-partaking* and *parallel-partaking*, to account respectively for what we call symmetric and asymmetric relations. Plato's ontology is very parsimonious: for him, there are only ways the world is qualified; being related (in symmetric or asymmetric ways) is for Plato possessing a qualification jointly or in parallel with something else, which is cashed out in terms of the constitutional overlap of two or more objects together with the relevant properties.

Plato further discovers, I argue, that some joint or parallel qualifications are *necessary* (e.g. being hot and being circular are *necessarily different* properties). He thus reifies necessary qualification by introducing in the *Sophist* second-order Forms, the so-called Great Kinds (e.g. the Form of Sameness), and a different type of overlap, which I call *permeation*. (At this point, Plato has thus enriched Anaxagoras's original model with three new types of overlap: *joint-partaking*, *parallel-partaking*, and *permeation*.) Interestingly, Plato does not develop his account of the Great Kinds further, beyond the *Sophist*.

Claudia Marsico

Universidad de Buenos Aires

La sombra de Antístenes tras la *koinōnia tōn eidōn* de *Sofista*

El estudio de los rastros de las fricciones teóricas entre Platón y Antístenes en los textos del primero ha tendido generalmente a la identificación de alusiones puntuales, generalmente críticas. El caso del diálogo *Sofista* no es diferente, ya que suele repetirse que Platón puede estar pensando en Antístenes cuando menciona a los brutales materialistas que

arrastran todo hacia la tierra en 246a-b o a quienes comenzaron a filosofar de viejos en 251e, como si las huellas se limitaran a un ejercicio de invectiva hiriente. Sin embargo, los estudios actuales sobre Antístenes permiten un estudio más profundo de sus ideas y, por tanto, de las relaciones teóricas con la posición platónica.

Por esta vía, este trabajo estará orientado a sostener que la figura de Antístenes es un contrapunto constante a lo largo de este diálogo que refleja disidencias poderosas respecto de aspectos lógicos y metafísicos. En este sentido, el tipo de *koinōnia* de base onomástica asociada con el método de investigación de los nombres (*episkepsis tōn onomatōn*) desarrollado por Antístenes resulta, desde la perspectiva de Platón, insuficiente y *Sofista* ofrece, junto con su propuesta positiva, un diagnóstico de los defectos de la matriz antisténica en el contexto de las discusiones dentro del círculo socrático.

Para ilustrar esta cuestión, bosquejaremos, en primer lugar, los desacuerdos fundamentales de ambas líneas a propósito de los principios metafísicos y gnoseológicos que pueden sustentar la posición anti-escéptica en la que coinciden. Luego, analizaremos los elementos anti-antisténicos presentes en el planteo acerca del método, en el pasaje sobre el método de división, y acerca de la ontología, en la mención del parricidio y el pasaje historiográfico.

Ambos constituyen elaboraciones en las cuales la noción de *koinōnia* resulta fundamental y conducen a la tesis de la comunicación de los géneros entendida como superación de los presupuestos antisténicos. De este modo, mostraremos que Platón no se limita en *Sofista* a realizar alusiones puntuales a su problemático condiscípulo, como se ha entendido tradicionalmente, sino que desarrollos centrales del texto tienen la impronta de la disputa teórica entre ambos, lo cual sugiere un escenario rico de intercambios teóricos como marca de origen de la filosofía clásica.

Richard Neels

St. Francis Xavier University

Communion and Separation of Forms in Plato's *Parmenides*

In Plato's early presentation of the theory of forms (i.e. *Phaedo*), he says that the forms are *auta kath' hauta* (themselves by themselves). This has been taken to mean that the forms are *separate* from the sensibles that partake of them and separate from other forms. For the purposes of this paper, I am only interested in the second sense of separation:

the separation of forms from one another. This separation of the forms from one another seems to indicate *independent existence* – at least, this is how it is often understood. For example, the form of the One is a foundational entity, as is Being and Same, and so on. A foundational entity is an entity that grounds other things (i.e. sensibles) but is itself not grounded by anything else.

However, in Plato's later works, such as the *Sophist*, Plato argues that, at least the great kinds [*megista genê*] blend with one another in a relation of communion [*koinonia*] (*Sophist*, 256b2). It seems as though the forms are interdependent (i.e. coherent) entities rather than foundational entities. Interdependent entities, as distinct from foundational entities, stand in a relation of mutual grounding. Blending, communion (*koinônia*) and mutual partaking (*metexein*) are all properties of the forms that seem to suggest that the forms exist in a state of ontological interdependence. But, even as late as the *Sophist*, Plato still maintains that, at least some of, the forms are *auta kath' hauta* (*Sophist*, 255c12-13. The *Parmenides*, obscure as it is, presents a picture of the forms as balanced in terms of communing with one another and being separate from one another. This balance has been recognized in the literature (e.g. Gill 1996/2014 and Meinwald 1991/2014). However, no interpretation to date has explained this odd feature of the forms in terms of their structure of grounding.

I argue that the forms are not foundational entities (independent) nor are they coherent entities (i.e. interdependent), they are metaphysically *foundherent*: that is, they are in part *foundational* entities, and in part *coherent* entities. I attempt to explain how this is conceptually possible. I focus on Deductions 1 and 2 of the *Parmenides*. From Deduction 1, we learn that the forms have a foundational component: the nature of the forms are *unanalyzable*. From Deduction 2, we learn that the forms are dependent on other forms for their existence. To resolve this, I argue that the forms are composite entities. One part of each form is a foundational part while the other parts are dependent (i.e. coherent) on other forms. A form therefore has one foundational part and many coherent parts. The forms in the deductions of the *Parmenides* are therefore foundherent entities. It is this view of grounding that makes sense of the separation and communion of the forms in Plato's *Parmenides*.

Catalin Partenie

National School of Political Studies and Administration, Bucharest

Justice and the *koinōnia* of forms in the *Republic*

In the *Republic* justice (*dikaiosunē*) is defined as “doing one’s own” (*oikeiopraxia*). A city like Callipolis is just when each of its three classes does only its own and when the military and the workers agree to be ruled by those who know best how to rule (433a). Likewise, a soul is just when each of its parts does only its own, and when the spirited and appetitive parts agree to be ruled by reason (443c-e). As Myles Burnyeat put it, justice as *oikeiopraxia* is “exemplified by any system of elements working harmoniously together for the good of the whole and of each part.”

“There is perhaps,” says Socrates, “a model (*paradeigma*) of Callipolis in heaven (*en tō ouranō*), for anyone who wants to look at it” (592b). But the ultimate well-functioning system, I shall argue, is the cosmos of forms. Forms are “all in a rational order (*kosmō de panta kai kata logon*)”, “always the same”, and they “neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it (*out’ adikounta out’ adikoumena*)” (500c) (to quote further from Burnyeat: “cosmic justice is another Presocratic theme that Plato appropriates”). What a just city or soul should try to imitate, I shall conclude, is the harmonious *koinōnia* of forms. (In this lecture I will develop the argument I discuss in my paper “Justice and Ideas in Plato’s *Republic*”, C. Riedweg, ed., *Philosophie für die Polis*, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 159-171.)

Alan Pichanick

Villanova University

The *Koinon Agathon* of Plato’s *Charmides*

Given the number of references to *koinonia* in Plato’s dialogues, it is striking that the phrase “common good” (*koinon agathon*) is used only once – at *Charmides* 166d. Socrates asks his interlocutor Critias a question, “Do you not think it is for the common good, almost (*sxedon*), of all men, that how all the beings (*ton onton*) are should be discovered?” The question emerges after Critias has claimed that *sôphrosunê* is self-knowledge, which he then specifies as a “knowledge of all other knowledges and of itself”. Critias has grown exasperated with Socrates’ questions about this notion. He claims that Socrates seeks only to refute him and does not inquire seriously into the unique reflexivity of this virtue.

In this talk, I will show that it is no accident that Socrates mentions the “common good” at precisely this moment in his discussion with Critias. Socrates’ questions are not unfair. Rather, they reveal what Socrates thinks to be an essential feature of self-knowledge, its orientation to the good beyond it. In contrast, the notion of *sôphrosunê* that Critias defends is incoherent owing to what Critias claims to be its distinguishing feature – its reflexivity. Because of its total reflexivity, it points to no end beyond itself and thereby it is neither capable of disclosing “the beings” nor of being connected to any good outside of itself. As such it becomes impossible to say how this virtue is either possible or beneficial to one who were to possess it.

While Critias agrees with Socrates that it would be for the common good (of “almost” all) to disclose how all the beings are, his approach to the question ends up concealing the nature of *sôphrosunê*. He thus ends up revealing that while he claims *sôphrosunê* to be self-knowledge, he himself does not adequately possess self-knowledge. I will suggest that Critias’ error is deeply rooted in his thumotic nature and his unwillingness to admit ignorance, which is in sharp contrast to the erotic character of Socrates, and his seeking of wisdom.

The common good Socrates mentions here is therefore fundamentally and essentially related to an acknowledgment of ignorance that motivates one to *wonder (thauma)* at a good beyond one’s love of one’s own things. I will thus suggest an explanation for the curious addition of “almost” (*sxedon*) in Socrates’ remark here: Critias himself shows that unless he (or his young cousin Charmides) can admit ignorance and experience such wonder, then he is constitutionally not included in this common good.

Luca Pitteloud

Universidade Federal do ABC, São Paulo, Brazil

The Community between the Intelligible and the Sensible: the Demiurge as an Epistemic Thought Experiment

In the *Timaeus*, Plato describes our universe as being constituted by a divine Demiurge (29d-33c) who looks at an intelligible model (30c-d) and attempts to bestow order and proportion upon a chaotic *milieu* (30a). Why does Plato introduce the character of the

Demiurge? Does he really intend the reader to accept the idea that our universe has been fabricated by an artisan?

I want to suggest in this paper that it is possible to understand Timaeus' *eikôs muthos* as a thought experiment which allows to give an account of the community of properties between the intelligible and the sensible through the introduction of the Demiurge. In order to defend this claim, I shall present the two following ideas:

- a) The Demiurge should not be understood as a cosmological or ontological principle, but rather as an epistemological *point of view*. This point of view actually represents what *would be* the reasonings of a divine artisan fashioning the universe. Consequently, I will try to justify the claims that 1) a discourse about god can only be likely (29c), 2) it is difficult to talk about the Demiurge (29c) and 3) the Demiurge is the best of the intelligible beings (which I believe is the correct grammatical construction of 36e6-37a2), three claims, which I will suggest, point out the epistemological limits of a thought experiment in which the reader follows the footsteps, or rather the mind, of a divine artisan.
- b) The description of the pre-cosmic chaos (52d-53c) plays an important part in this thought experiment since it describes what is the material that the Demiurge must organized. In that sense, it symbolizes a central dimension which is ontologically present within the structure of the universe.

It must be noted that both (a) and (b) are parts of the same contrafactual situation, namely that which offers to the reader the complex experience of what it *would be* for them to be a divine craftsman fashioning the whole universe. Consequently, the thesis I wish to explore does correspond neither to a literality nor to a didactic interpretation of the role of the Demiurge (as a matter of fact, didactic readings usually admit an ontological function for the Demiurge). In my interpretation, the Demiurge is not *actually* the cause of the world soul's being, nor does *he* reduce the gap between Forms and particulars. In fact, he merely *places* the reader in the situation of trying to figure out what is the intermediate status of the soul and how does participation work though the mathematization of the sensible. I will try to conclude that the main function of the Demiurge consists in providing a solution to the question of the community between the sensible and the intelligible: it is through his divine mind that we can attempt to take a look at the community of character between the Model and the *cosmos*.

Christoph Poetsch

Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Two modes of *koinōnia*? A triangular reading of the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the Papyrus of Aī Khanoum

In two of his middle dialogues, Plato famously uses *koinonia* within the context of his theory of Forms: In the *Phaedo*, the term is used (apparently interchangeably with *parousia*) to describe the ‘vertical’ relation between Forms and physical entities (Phdo. 100d3–5). Whereas in the *Republic*, *koinonia* is seemingly employed to describe a ‘horizontal’ relation between and within the Forms themselves (Rep. 476a6–7). The question thus arises, how these two modes—or aspects?—of *koinonia* relate to one another.

To address this question, the paper aims to triangulate these two passages with a third text: the philosophical papyrus of Aī Khanoum, a fragment of a dialogue very likely originating from the Peripatetic context. The philosophical position discussed in the fragment has been recently (and rightly in my eyes) attributed to Plato.⁴ Following the reconstruction of M. Isnardi Parente,⁵ the papyrus, too, uses the term *koinonia* to discuss different modes of participation. Most remarkably, it does so for describing exactly *both* of the above-described relations, to then ground these two in a higher principle above the Forms. Including this third text will hence provide a tentative basis—as the paper will argue—for a better understanding of the two modes of *koinonia* in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* as well as their relation to one another.

In a first step, the paper will analyse the content of the papyrus to then parallel several of its crucial formulations with passages from the *Republic*. This allows for heuristically aligning the papyrus with Plato’s position in the middle dialogues. In a second step, the paper will discuss how the papyrus’s approach regarding the two modes of *koinonia* fits to these modes in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. Concerning the *Phaedo*, this may allow for tentatively asking whether or not the ‘vertical’ relation of *koinonia* that unites Forms and physicals might be grounded in some kind of higher principle (eventually the *hikanon*? Phdo. 101e1), since the papyrus explicitly calls the highest principle the *aition tēs methexeōs*.

⁴ Cf. Th. Auffret. 2019. “Un « nouveau » fragment du Περὶ φιλοσοφίας : le papyrus d’Aī Khanoum” *Methexis* 40: 25–66; esp. 33–34.

⁵ Cf. M. Isnardi Parente. 1992. “Il papiro filosofico di Aī Khanoum” *Studi su codici e papiri filosofici. Platone, Aristotele, Ierocle*. Florence: Olschki. 169–188; here: 170 n. 5.

With regard to the *Republic*, this triangulation may help to improve the understanding of how the ‘horizontal’ *koinonia* of the Forms (which in turn seems to prefigure the unity of the perfectly just *polis*; cf. Rep. 500c2–5; 592b2–3) might be grounded in the *idea tou agathou*, since the latter fits remarkably well to the systematic position of the highest principle in the papyrus. Read in such a triangular way, it thus seems likely that both modes of *koinonia* are in fact aspects of a single mode that is based on the concept of unity.

George Rudebusch

Arizona University

The Metaphysics of *Koinōnia* of *Ideai* in Plato’s *Sophist* and *Statesman*

The Stranger lists four kinds of *koinōnia* of forms (*ideai*) at *Sophist* 253d5–e2, suggesting that understanding these four kinds is sufficient for dialectic, the supreme science:

1. *Extension through*: “one form extended [διατεταμένην] everywhere through many things, each one of which lies apart” (d5-6).
2. *Enclosure from without*: “many forms, different from each other, surrounded [περιεχομένης] from the outside by a single form” (d7-8).
3. *Linking through*: “one form linked [συνημμένην] into one through wholes [that are] many” (d8-9).
4. *Separate and apart*: “many forms separated [διωρισμένης] apart everywhere” (d9).

The paper interprets these four kinds of *koinōnia* of forms, illustrating the four relations using the Stranger’s discussion of the Greatest Kinds. I begin with a review of puzzles in speaking of intensional objects spatially *extending*, *enclosing*, *linking*, or being *separate*. Accordingly I interpret these four statements of *koinōnia* of forms by extending literal spatial meanings to figurative nonspatial meanings as follows.

1. A form *extends* through many things (whether those things are perceptible particulars, kinds, or forms) in virtue of those things sharing that form. As kingship is “care of a human community (*koinōnia*)” (*Stat.* 276b7), where the human beings share their king, so the two forms Motion and Rest have a “community of being” (τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν,

Soph. 250b9). Instead of sharing a king, they share the form Being, since “both [Motion and Rest] are and each is” (*Soph.* 250a11-12).

2. Before interpreting how a form *encloses* things from without, it is necessary to review the metaphysics of forms and kinds (references omitted for anonymity). Ordinary language distinguishes a *herd* of livestock from the *brand* marking each member of the herd. As a herd comprises many head of livestock, all sharing the same brand, so a *kind* comprises many things, all sharing the same *form*. And as English often uses ‘brand’ as a metonym to speak of a herd, so Greek uses form-words (‘*eidōs*’ or ‘*idea*’) as metonyms to speak of a kind (*genos*). The Stranger’s discussion of how the “forms” Motion and Rest are “surrounded” (περιεχομένην, 250b8) by the “form” Being is an example of such metonymy: it is the kind Being that contains the subkinds Motion and Rest.
3. The Stranger says that the Kind Knowledge “is one” (257c10). “But each part [μέρος] of [knowledge] that comes to be upon something bears a name proper to itself—which is why many things are called knowledge” (c10-d2), for example, geometry, shoemaking,” etc. (*Tht.* 146c8-d1). Knowledge, then, is one kind, and it is “linked together into that one” kind through wholes like the whole subject of geometry, of shoemaking, etc. By metonymy, we can also say that the forms Geometry, Shoemaking, etc. are linked into one form, Knowledge.
4. Finally, the kinds Motion and Rest lie entirely separate and apart in virtue of their members being entirely unmixed. Once again, metonymy allows us to say that the forms Motion and Rest likewise lie apart from each other, illustrating the fourth kind of relation.

Pauline Sabrier

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Why don't Change and Rest combine with one another? Reconsidering the communion of kinds in Plato's *Sophist*

In the *Sophist*, the claim that kinds combine with one another plays a central role in the dialogue. There is however one notable exception to this, namely the claim that Change and Rest do not combine with one another (cf. 254d7-8). Critics have found this claim

puzzling for two reasons: (1) because there seems to be a tension between the claim that Change and Rest do not combine with one another and the claim that Change and Rest are greatest kinds (*megista genê*, cf. 254d4-5); (2) because Change, in so far as it is a Form or a kind, is itself a resting thing and accordingly should participate in Rest. To add to the confusion, the Visitor also seems to deny that Being itself participates in Rest (250c6-7), although he maintains that there is communion (*koinōnia*) among the three (250b10-11).

This series of puzzles that arise from the *Sophist* forces us to ask again about the nature of the communion of Forms or kinds. What is the communion between two kinds or Forms supposed to stand for? Is this relation comparable to the participation relation between Forms and sensible things? If not, what does the difference amount to?

In his 2016 monograph, Hochholzer argued that the communion of kinds, just like the relation of participation, is primarily about the instantiation of a property. For instance, Change should participate in Rest because Change, in so far as it is a kind, instantiate the property ‘being a resting thing’. This account of the communion relation seems to be implicit in many of the studies of the *Sophist* that have tried to bypass the Visitor’s denial that Change combine with Rest (cf. Buckels).

By contrast, I shall argue in this paper that we should take the Visitor’s denial that Change combines with Rest at face value and that on the basis of the relation among Being, Change and Rest, we arrive at an account of the communion of kinds as constitutive relation characterised by (i) non-identity, (ii) inclusion and (iii) non-separation.

In the first part of the paper, I shall start by giving — mostly textual — reasons why we should take the Visitor’s claim that Change and Rest do not combine seriously. In the second part, I shall turn to the passage at 250b8-11 where the claim that there is *koinōnia* among Being, Change and Rest is first introduced and show that there is a lot, in this passage, that cannot be explained if we follow the view that the communion of Forms is primarily, or exclusively, about instantiating a property. Finally, I shall point to evidence that the relation among the three kinds should be conceived along the lines of a relation of constitution.

BUCKELS, C. (2015), ‘Motion and Rest as Genuinely Greatest Kinds in the *Sophist*’, *Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 35, 317-327.

HOCHHOLZER, C. (2016), *Teile und Teilhabe: Eine Untersuchung über Platons Sophistes*, De Gruyter.

Eric Sanday

University of Kentucky

Ethical and Metaphysical Senses of *Koinōnia*

This paper aims to explore the distinction between ethical and metaphysical senses of *koinōnia*. My basic point is that there is good reason to avoid applying metaphysical senses of *koinōnia* to questions of political and ethical community. That is, Plato gives us positive reason to avoid thinking of human beings as objects of analysis that can be appropriately understood in terms of the technical and conceptual apparatus he uses for thinking about structure (e.g. συναρμόττειν, συγκεράννυσθαι, συμμείγνυσθαι, συμφωνέω, κοινωνέω, συμπλέκειν, συνίστημι). I argue that if metaphysical *koinōnia* is going to be fruitful for thinking about ethical types of association, we should focus not on the abstract analysis of complex structure but on the difference in kind between form and participants. I conclude that Plato's goal is to show us that truth is not a possession, which is an insight that has significant implications for our style of being in community with each other.

In the *Parmenides*, we are challenged to think of forms on their own terms and not on the terms appropriate to things in space and time. Parmenides in the first part of the dialogue shows Socrates that thinking of the participatory relationship in terms of part/whole complexity and one-of-many individuality fails in spectacular fashion to capture the metaphysical ultimacy associated with form. Socrates thereby finds himself forced to determine the precise sense in which forms are not like things, which drives him to undertake the exercises in the second part of the dialogue. They are called “exercises” because any understanding, and especially teaching, of the communing of forms will require us to habituate ourselves to a new set of conceptual categories. Without these new categories, philosophical inquiry will be impossible.

The interesting thing about this dialogue is that while philosophical inquiry, specifically dialectic, might seem to be an issue of concern for a narrowly defined type of intellectual activity with limited reach, what is ultimately at stake is the very meaning of words and our faith in the authority of reason. If the forms cannot be preserved as realities toward which we orient our thought and from which we take our guidance in inquiry, the power of dialogue will be destroyed. What comes in its wake is calamitous distrust in meaning and a political theater in which everything is flattery driven by love of pleasure and victory.

The most important lesson that ethical *koinōnia* can borrow from metaphysical dialectic is that the sources of truth, i.e. the forms, are not possessions, and that they have a claim on us. It is on this basis that dialectic opens us to a kind of questioning inquiry, self-testing, and the “examined life”. Beyond this one lesson, however, I think it is important to see that Plato reserves distinct methods for distinct phenomena, and that metaphysics and ethics are for him importantly and irreducibly distinct areas of concern.

Lucas Soares

Universidad de Buenos Aires

Psicologización de la política y crítica psicológica de la poesía en *República IV y X*

Sobre el trasfondo del modelo psicológico de partes (*logistikón, thumoeidés, epithumetikón*) en conflicto, la meta psico-política buscada en la *República* apunta a lograr la unidad psíquica (*R.* 430e11) como condición de posibilidad de la unidad política, puesto que el objetivo de la política no es otro para Platón que el volver a los ciudadanos lo mejor posible, lo cual sólo puede alcanzarse mediante un mejoramiento del alma individual. En este sentido la posibilidad de la justicia –psíquica y política– va a depender del grado de resolución de la *stásis* entre los “tres géneros de naturalezas” (*R.* 435b5) que configuran el alma individual y la *pólis*; en una palabra, de la *stásis* en lo privado y en lo político. Por otra parte, en el libro X, tras las críticas de orden ontológico y epistemológico a la poesía tradicional, Platón se ocupa de los efectos psicológicos que acarrea la poesía mimético-placentera en sus receptores (*R.* 602c1-608b10). Como en las argumentaciones precedentes, parte aquí de un supuesto: la naturaleza tripartita del alma. Si bien el tema de los tres impulsos fundamentales que caracterizan la actividad psíquica ya había sido desarrollado en el libro IV, a Platón le interesa ahora detenerse sobre todo en la contraposición entre la mejor (*logistikón*) parte del alma y la peor (*alógiston*), dentro de la cual podemos –simplificando– subsumir las partes apetitiva y colérica. En efecto, la pregunta central que atraviesa este tramo del libro X de la *República* gira en torno a cuál es la parte del alma sobre la que el “imitador” (*mimetés*) ejerce el poder que le es propio (*R.* 602c4-5). Tras examinar, en principio, la psicologización de la política a la luz algunos pasajes (*R.* 431a-d, 435d-e, 544d-545d, 594e, etcétera) a partir de los cuales cabe –siguiendo en parte a intérpretes como Cooper– apoyar la prioridad que la tripartición psíquica detenta por sobre la de orden político, y, en segundo lugar, puntualizar algunos de los rasgos centrales de la crítica

psicológica a la poesía mimético-placentera, en este trabajo me interesa sostener que la posibilidad de una buena *koinonía* (unidad, alianza, comunidad) en términos psíquicos y políticos se halla obstaculizada, entre otras razones, por la potencia emotiva y la perversión psicológica que dicha poesía ejerce sobre su audiencia, al estimular y fortalecer la parte irracional del alma a través de la imitación de caracteres vinculados al deseo y la ira. “Perversión” (*ponería*), disensión y enfermedad en la *politeía* interior y exterior son, así, términos clave que Platón reitera a lo largo de esta crítica psicológica a la poesía tradicional y, ya en el marco general del diálogo, uno de los principales obstáculos que debe sortear la *pólis* proyectada para llegar a consumarse alguna vez. Tal crítica platónica permite asimismo atisbar, por contraste, una poesía admisible que, supeditada al *lógos* y al *nómos* (R. 603c10-604b4), promueva en sus receptores la unidad y el autodomínio como resultado de su trato con la parte racional del alma.

Valeria Sonna

Universidad Autónoma de México

Koinonía tōn gynaikōn. Mujeres y comunidad política en República

El presente trabajo tiene por objeto explorar el concepto de *koinonía* en *República*, más específicamente, su uso en el marco de la propuesta de una *koinonía tōn paídon kai gynaikōn* para la organización social de los guardianes. La idea aparece por primera vez en forma de una alusión rápida y enigmática: “todo esto y el resto de los asuntos ... la posesión de mujeres, el matrimonio y la procreación, es necesario que todo se haga lo más posible según el proverbio de que los asuntos de los amigos son comunes (*koiná*)” (423e-424a). La alusión no escapa a Adimanto que, al principio del libro V, pide a Sócrates que especifique lo que quiere decir con esto y que defina la forma que debe adquirir esta comunidad (*koinonía*) que tiene en mente (449c). El léxico platónico para referirse a las mujeres de la comunidad de guardianes presenta cierta ambigüedad que deja lugar a dudas acerca de si las mujeres forman parte de la comunidad o de los asuntos comunes. El término *koinonía* aparece dos veces (449c y 450c), pero también se usa “*koiná*” (449c 457c 457d), así como la expresión “posesión (*ktêsis*) de las mujeres y los niños” (451c y 453d). Esto ha dado lugar a cierta discrepancia en torno a la lectura del texto. Hay quienes consideran que se trata de una verdadera comunidad de iguales (Vlastos, 1994; Smith 1980; Méndez Aguirre, 2004) y quienes consideran que las mujeres nunca dejan de ser una

posesión (Pomeroy, 1974, 1998; Annas, 1976). Pomeroy propone que debemos entender la *koinonía tôn gynaikôn* en el sentido de una “propiedad conjunta” de los bienes, de los cuales las mujeres forman parte en tanto propiedad (p. 33; ver también Annas, 1976, p. 318). Sin embargo, la autora no da mayores argumentos sobre esta posible lectura de *koinonía*. Cabe objetar, en primer lugar, que este sentido del término no es el uso más generalizado, ni tampoco es un significado que cobre usualmente *koinonía* en el *corpus* platónico. En segundo lugar, cabe objetar que la lectura de Pomeroy hace caso omiso de la importante acepción política que tiene el concepto, como estado de ciudadanos iguales, respecto de lo cual el planteamiento de *República* parecería no dejar lugar a dudas: se dice que las mujeres guardianas comparten todo por igual con los hombres. La acepción de *koinonía* que Pomeroy propone es un uso comercial del término que remite a los bienes comunes. En su origen habría sido principalmente referido a los miembros de una familia, para luego adquirir un uso más amplio en el siglo IV como propiedad de grupos formados con distintos fines, incluidos los comerciales, que podían poseer cosas en común (Harrison, p. 242). En el presente trabajo propongo ahondar en esta posible interpretación abierta por Pomeroy mediante un análisis del texto platónico que contemple las distintas acepciones comerciales y legales de *koinonía* registradas por Harrison, con el objeto de determinar la viabilidad de su hipótesis.

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Miguel Spinassi

Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

Platón y el diálogo común de las *Leyes*

En este trabajo me propongo hacer un repaso por las ocurrencias del término “común” (en griego κοινός) y sus cognados en las *Leyes* de Platón. Incluso si se dejan de lado los sinónimos y expresiones afines que podrían significar “común” o “comunidad”, sugiero que los términos de la familia de κοινός son suficientes ya para configurar un hilo conductor de sentido que atraviesa de principio a fin el diálogo confiriéndole unidad. En lo que sigue pondré en relación los contextos en donde lo común aparece referido al objeto de la conversación propiamente dicho (i. e., la regulación de una nueva colonia) y aquellos contextos en donde lo común alude a la propia conversación entre los caminantes que van de Cnosos al monte Ida. Según lo entiendo, la disposición legal propuesta para Magnesia supone el establecimiento de una comunidad de ciudadanos que, a pesar de ser multifacética o variada, tiene que mantenerse como tal gracias a sus leyes, es decir, preservar lo común que hay en ella y que la mantiene unida. Esta propuesta objetiva tiene una fuerza tal que trasciende los límites de esa comunidad bosquejada “como en un sueño”, solo de palabra, y tiene repercusiones directas en el propio diálogo que sostienen los tres viajeros, el Ateniese, Clinias y Megilo. Como hipótesis fundamental considero que en las *Leyes* Platón, al igual que en otros diálogos del corpus, no solo pone en boca de su vocero principal un tema determinado –nada más y nada menos que un sistema legal para una ciudad fundada desde sus cimientos–, sino que también se las ingenia para mostrar cómo ese tema de discusión se actualiza de hecho en la conversación y tiene un efecto preciso en los interlocutores. En última instancia, si tenemos en cuenta algunos testimonios indirectos que hablan de la participación activa de los discípulos de la Academia en cuestiones “de gobierno y leyes”, se podría afirmar que el último diálogo de Platón, como también otros, es fuertemente protréptico y se ofrece como una gran invitación a participar en una futura y posible tarea de legislación que se entiende necesariamente como una actividad “común” o “en conjunto” (κοινῆ).

Stephanos Stephanides

Christ's College, Cambridge

Plato on the Mechanics of *Koinōnia*-Formation

It is well-known that *koinōnia* is highly charged not only in the philosophy of Plato but, also in standard Greek thought generally. Broadly construed, it signified some sort of shared relation among a plurality, usually between the citizens of the *polis*. A feeling of 'communion' or 'fellowship' (LSJ), we might say, was indispensable to the very formation of early Greek states, and to the individual Greek psyche as such. One could go so far as to postulate that there *is* no stable society without *koinōnia* —at least for tight knit ancient Greek city-states—since societies are predicated on the intuition that citizens work co-operatively towards some common and overarching good. That is perhaps why *koinōnia* is traditionally coupled with *philia*, insofar as community feeling cannot exist without a general sense of amicability among citizens. Thus, in the *Histories* Thucydides (3.10) could programmatically mark that there is no friendship or community without public honesty and likeness of customs, for it was feared that differences produced conflict.

In light of the universal importance of *koinōnia* in antiquity, the question of *how best* to form a *koinōnia*-based relationship based has, however, not always been raised. Indeed, while the concept clearly holds normative force on its own, it could be argued that *koinōnia* is lacking without further substantive explanation into the 'principles' or 'rules' that go into making any particular instance of a *koinōnia*. That is to say, it has been taken for granted that *koinōnia* (normatively understood) does not just come about on its own, but requires a certain antecedent intelligent planning or organisation. To that end, while scholars have often recognised the centrality of *koinōnia* as an aim for human and political striving in Plato, a study on the very mechanics of what legitimately constitutes a *koinōnia* and how such a relationship is best arrived at seems decidedly absent from the literature.

This paper aims to complete the story by exploring across a wide range of dialogues Plato's views on *koinōnia*-formation. I take my leave from the *Gorgias* where, having highlighted *koinōnia* as one of five key features that characterises cosmic order (508a1), Plato falls short of elucidating in any detail exactly how *koinōnia* is secured between heaven and earth, gods and men. He does nevertheless provide an account, at least in outline, of what I shall argue is central to an appreciation of *koinōnia*: ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ, or simply 'proportionality' (508a6). Thus, under the heading of τάξις in the *Definitiones*, it is surely revealing that we find 'συμμετρία κοινωνίας' (413d1-4). I will demonstrate that there is a consistent line

running through Plato's political works *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws* on the value of proportionality to *koinōnia*. As Plato's conception of what constitutes true proportional equality finds greater expression over time, so does his views on how best to instantiate *koinōnia* in the world. The salient point throughout being that differences necessarily exist between disparate items in complex wholes, for which proportionality serves as the rational basis for understanding how *koinōniai* ought to be ordered and governed.

Yu-Jung Sun

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

The Communing Power of Being and the Communion of Kinds in Plato's *Sophist*

In *Sophist* 247e4, the Eleatic Stranger announces that “being is nothing else than power”. This proposal about being (the *dunamis* proposal) has been puzzling platonic researchers for centuries. Commentators in the past try to determine whether the *dunamis* proposal defines being in the strict platonic sense, whether it indicates a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of being, or whether it is nothing more than a strategical argument momentarily held by the Eleatic Stranger. In this paper, I will argue that all being must necessarily possess power both to act and be affected, including being of intellectual forms. Moreover, I will defend a strong definition of being as power by arguing that being is nothing else than its power to commune, which as a result, forms a communion of kinds.

It is without any doubt an audacious attempt to claim that for Plato, being is nothing else than power, because this implies that all kinds as what they are and what they are not, are somehow the result of the power of being. In other words, in order to claim that being is nothing else but power, we cannot separate being as being what one thing is from being as being capable of communing with kinds. This paper sets out to corroborate this strong definition of being as nothing else than power by arguing three points: (1) the power to act and be affected of being is the power of communing, more precisely, the power of binding and of keeping apart; (2) the power that binds and keeps apart is the power to associate as being the same, and to divide as being different; and (3) by communing as the same and as the different, it is sufficient to establish an identity of being so that it can be said both αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό and πρὸς ἄλλα.

In modern Platonic scholarship, the communion of kinds tends to be considered disjointed with the *dunamis* proposal, and the transition between the two passages is often undervalued.

However, if we take a closer look into the vocabulary that Plato employs, a continuity can be established as Plato switches between δύναμις, δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν, and κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν. To address this continuity, F. Fronterotta has demonstrated that the power of being is precisely a power of communing which makes every being capable of participation⁶. He shows that in order to be, one must *have* the power to take part in the participation, whereas his argument neither proves that being *is* nothing else but power nor explains how being what one thing is can be resulted from its power to commune. By picking up where Fronterotta has left off, this paper aims to show how the communing power of being can constitute being as what it is.

Karine Tordo Rombaut

Université Grenoble-Alpes

How are the virtues conditional upon partnership?

My paper will focus on Plato's analysis of the conditions on which a partnership (*koinonia*) depends. (I) I will first consider Plato's analysis from a social and ethical standpoint. Actually, a group of interrelated people and especially a city as a whole (*Resp.* II 371b5; *Pol.* 276b8-c2; *Leg.* III 680e6-681a3) provide outstanding examples of partnership. This approach will shed light on the role of the virtues conditional upon participating in a partnership. They enable the partners to both comply with a basic requirement and perform a fundamental operation.

In the *Republic*, Socrates argues that any tribe "pursuing an unjust common purpose" would be more able to achieve it if they weren't unjust to each other than if they were (I 351c7-d3). He eventually demonstrates that justice can be equated with "doing one's own part", in a city (II 433a1-b4) as in an individual (IV 443b1-3). Doing one's own part is a basic requirement for partnership. In the *Gorgias*, he claims that partnership depends on justice and self-control, both virtues (in contrast with lack of discipline and getting the greatest share) relying on proportional equality (507d6-508a8). Proportional (geometrical) equality generally prevails over strict (arithmetical) equality in respect with the propriety of allocation (*Leg.* VI 757b1-c7). Allocating parts properly is a fundamental operation for partnership.

⁶ Fronterotta, F., La notion de DUNAMIS dans le *Sophiste* de Platon. In Michel Crubellier (Ed.), *Dunamis : autour de la puissance chez Aristote*, 2008, Edition Peeters.

Some passages also assume that a partnership needs rulers (*Alc.* 125d7-126a4; *Pol.* 276b8-c2; *Leg.* I 639c1-640a7), whose main function consists in ensuring that all partners (including the rulers) both receive and accept their share of the things (tasks, rewards, penalties, etc.) to be divided between them. Yet, to avoid infinite regress, the rulers-partners must be able to allocate parts without themselves relinquishing their own position. What specific practice enables the rulers-partners to both comply with the basic requirement (sticking to one's own part) and perform the fundamental operation (allocating parts properly)? Is this specific practice related to the dialectical method presented in the *Politicus* (285a3-b6; to be compared mainly with *Phdr.* 265c8-266c1; *Soph.* 253d1-e5: the method of division and collection) as applying to partnerships (*koinoniai*)?

(II) In order to address these questions, I will secondly consider an epistemological and dialectical implementation of the basic requirement and the fundamental operation. In Plato, the word here translated by “partnership” (*koinonia*) along with the corresponding verbs (*koinonein* and its compounds) refer to the Platonic dialogue itself (e.g. *Lach.* 196c10-d1, 197e6-8; *Crat.* 383a1-2), also described as a jointly (*koinei*) carried out research (e.g. *Prot.* 330b6-7; *Theaet.* 151e5). At first sight this observation seems to increase the problem. Indeed, the implementation of the dialectical practice conditional to partnership is conceived as itself hinging on the possibility of a partnership between participants in a collaborative dialogue. Nevertheless, taken as a paradigmatic example of partnership, the Platonic or rather Socratic dialogue might reasonably be expected to offer a way out of the problem. This hypothesis will lead me to review the rules of the philosophical dialogue in order to find how they help solve the problem.

Lauren Ware

University of Kent, Canterbury

Plato's Bond of Love: *Erōs* and the Participation Relation

Plato offers a number of ways to understand the enigmatic notion of participation: the relation between Forms and particulars. The received view suggests participation is a passive relation—beautiful particulars *just are* the way they are because of the Form of beauty, with nothing done on the part of particulars to bridge the two-worlds gap characteristic of Platonism. This has led to claims of hollowness, radical separation, and lack of action-guiding capacity.

In this paper, I argue that the *Symposium* presents us with a positive, active account of the participation relation: the relation is love (*Erôs*), which binds together Form and particular in a creative, generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of the particular's qualification by participation. Love in relation to beauty motivates engagement with beauty, resulting in the lover being best able to actively create and, therefore, *bring into being* new beauty in the world.

Whilst relations in Plato's metaphysics are a hot topic of debate elsewhere, the *Symposium* is promising for an account of participation: it is in this dialogue Plato offers his longest, most detailed description of a Form, the Form of beauty; further because beauty is the most discussed of all the Forms, given as an example by Plato even more than the Form of the good. This paper is an attempt to discern whether that promise makes good.

I present, in §1, an overview of the problem of participation, analysing a number of recent competing interpretations of this particular *koinonia* relation, and demonstrating potential problems for each. Then, in §2, I turn to the *Symposium*, where we can locate a more satisfying account of the relation: participation is a bond uniting two entities of different ontological status into the unity of a single instance; that bond is love. My central claim here is that the *Symposium* sets up a parallel between, on the one hand, immortal gods and mortal creatures, and, on the other, unqualified Forms and qualified particulars. Plato introduces a third entity into this parallel: *Erôs*, a divine daimon whose power is to bind each of these two sets together into a unified community. In §3, I demonstrate how this parallel serves to provide an account of *how*, actively, particulars can relate to Forms. Drawing on Plato's cognitivist account of the emotion, I argue how the relation of love is the clearest picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through participation in Forms.

Beyond an encouragement to armchair reflection or ascetic contemplation, Plato's *Symposium*'s ascent passage contributes an active, creative account of the metaphysics of love. What this account offers for an understanding of *koinonia* is a move beyond purely causal or explanatory links: the participation relation is a view of intentional motivation, and accordingly yields much for debate on the role of both Forms and particulars in three areas where Plato scholarship contributes to urgent social questions: the moral psychology of emotions, the role of emotions in education, and the place of beauty in the political community.

Michael Wiitala

Cleveland State University

The *Koinōnia* of Non-Being and *Logos* in the *Sophist* Account of Falsehood

At *Sophist* 260e3-261a2, the Eleatic Stranger claims that in order to demonstrate that falsehood is, he and Theaetetus must first track down (*diereunêteon*) what speech (*logos*), opinion (*doxa*), and appearance (*phantasia*) are, and then observe (*katidein*) the communion (*koinōnia*) that speech, opinion, and appearance have with non-being. Although the Stranger goes on explicitly to develop both an account of what speech, opinion, and appearance are (262b2-263b3, 263d10-264b2) and a demonstration that falsehood is (262e9-264b4), he does not explicitly discuss the communion of speech, opinion, and appearance with non-being. Yet presumably the way speech, opinion, and appearance commune with non-being is implicit in his account of falsehood, given his claim that observing that communion is needed in order to demonstrate that falsehood is (260e5-a2).

This paper seeks to make the communion that speech has with non-being explicit. To that end, I begin by articulating the comparison the Stranger points to between the communion of non-being with being, on the one hand, and the communion of non-being with speech, on the other (260d5-e3). In section 1 of the paper, I briefly offer some reasons for thinking that, according to the Stranger, apprehending the communion of non-being with being amounts to recognizing that what is different from being is nevertheless affected by being, and as a result of this affection possesses characteristics it would not otherwise have. For example, motion, since it is different from being, is a non-being; yet is still a being, since it is affected by being inasmuch as it participates in being. In section 2, I argue that to observe the communion of non-being with speech amounts to recognizing that there is something different from speech that nevertheless affects speech, and gives to it the quality of truth or falsehood. The determinate *ousia* or being that a given speech or statement (*logos*) is about is different from that speech or statement. Yet it nonetheless affects that speech or statement by rendering it true or false (262e6-263d4; esp. the *oukoun* at 262e9). I argue that the being a given speech or statement is about is the non-being with which speech communes. The subject of a given speech or statement is a non-being (1) in that it is something different from the speech whose subject it is, and so is not-being-speech; and (2) insofar as every being, as the Stranger has shown, is both a being and non-being (see esp. 259b4-7). I show that recognizing these two ways that speech communes with non-being is necessary to understanding the Stranger's demonstration that falsehood is.

CONTACTO / CONTACT

Centro de Estudios Filosóficos

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

<https://cef.pucp.edu.pe/>

cef@pucp.edu.pe

Prof. Raúl Gutiérrez


rgutier@pucp.edu.pe

Prof. Gabriel García

gabriel.garcia@pucp.edu.pe

Prof. Bárbara Bettocchi

bbettocchi@pucp.pe



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